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ABSTRACT
This study is a rhetorical analysis of the public 
speaking of Harold L. Ickes, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
Secretary of the Interior. The analysis is limited to 
Iokes’ major radio broadcasts in the presidential 
campaign of 1936. In that campaign, Ickes was the 
acknowledged "hatchet-man" of the New Deal. His speeches 
were devoted almost exclusively to attacks upon the Repub­
lican candidate, Alfred M. Landon, and upon Landon’s 
leading supporters. Ickes* own Republican background 
and his reputation for lnveotive and innuendo were 
among his special qualifications for his campaign role.
This study analyzes the nature of Ickes* cam­
paign task, the characteristics of his persuasion, and 
the effectiveness of his speaking efforts. The first two 
chapters discuss Democratic campaign strategy and Ickes’ 
place in that strategy. Chapter III analyzes the 
speaker's general methods of preparation and delivery.
In the next five chapters, five network campaign broad­
casts are studied. The analysis of each speech is based 
upon the following-named factors: background and setting,
purpose and thesis, organization and lines of argument, 
forms of support, use of language, and reactions to the 
speeoh. The final two chapters synthesize characteristics
vi
of the speaker's persuasion and evaluate his performance 
as a speaker in his campaign role.
One of the principal sources of material for this 
study is the Ickes Papers deposited in the Manuscripts 
Division of the Library of Congress. This collection 
contains speech files, including all drafts of speeches, 
and memoranda and letters concerning them; letter files, 
including political correspondence; and scrapbooks, 
which Include an extensive collection of press clippings 
pertinent to Ickes' activities as a campaign speaker. 
Personal interviews with people closely associated with 
Ickes in his department or in the campaign are also a 
source from which information was gathered.
This study concludes that Ickes achieved a large 
measure of success in his role as a campaign speaker.
His attackB on Landon were widely publicized and, in 
the opinion of observers both friendly and unfriendly, 
achieved their desired result. The chief sources of 
Ickes* persuasion were psychological techniques of 
suggestion. Among these techniques were "name-calling," 
the argument of "guilt by association," the constant and 
varied repetition of unproved premises, and the use of 
persuasive humor. These psychological appeals were not 
always supported by Bound logic or evidence, nor doeB 
it appear that all of them could have been. In this
vil
respect, Iokes failed, to demonstrate a maximum awareness 
of M s  responsibility to M s  audience.
Ickes1 campaign oratory was neither elevated in 
theme nor statesmanlike in substance. It nevertheless 
captured public attention, and it apparently constituted 
politically effective persuasion in the 1936 campaign.
viil
INTRODUCTION
A unique figure in American public life is lost 
to the nation and a phase of the New Deal comes to 
a close with the death of Harold Ickes. 1
On February 3» ^952, President Harry S. Truman 
marked with these words the death of Harold L. Ickes, 
the Illinois Republican who for thirteen years served 
as Secretary of the Interior under Democratic presidents. 
President Truman’s comment was appropriate, for the 
public record of Ickes, like the man himself, was Indeed 
unique. That record ended with words of high praise from 
the president who had six years before accepted Ickes1 
heated resignation. Its most Important phase had begun 
in 1933 when Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed to his 
cabinet a life-long Republican who had never held public 
office, a man he had never before seen, and a man 
virtually unknown outside his own state. In a matter of 
weeks, Harold Ickes also became head of the Public YJorks 
Administration, and three years later he was one of the 
leading Democratic speakers in the Roosevelt campaign 
for a second term.
During the 1936 oampalgn, Iokes delivered ten
^New York Times, February 1952, p. 18.
major political addresses.^ Five of these speeches were 
broadcasts, thirty minutes each in length, over national 
networks. According to Paul C. Aiken, 1936 head of the 
Democratic Speakers' Bureau, the Republican Secretary of 
the Interior was in great demand as a campaign speaker.3 
This position was Itself unusual for Ickes, who once ad­
mitted that he was "in no demand as a speaker anywhere or 
at any time" before becoming a member of the Cabinet, 
because he was "a perfectly rotten speaker.
The most noteworthy aspeot of Ickes* campaign 
activity was not, however, the number and importance of 
his speeches; it was his unique role in the oampaign.
For Ickes was the Administration's political "hatohet- 
man." His assignment was to attack the Republican 
candidate for president, Governor Alfred M. Landon of 
Kansas, Landon*s leading supporters, his platform, and 
his party in general. That Ickes filled such a campaign 
role has been generally agreed upon by his associates
2
Manuscripts of these speeches are in Harold L. 
Ickes' Private Papers (hereafter referred to as Iokes 
jPapers), Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division.
3Personal interview, February 1, 1955*
^Harold L. Ickes, The First Thousand Days (Vol.
I of The Seoret Diary of Harold LV Ickes'. 3 voTs.; New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1953)7 P. 702. Hereafter
referred to as Seoret Diary, Vol. I.
in the campaign and by later commentators.^
Ickes1 role was one for which he had undoubtedly
certain qualifications. Despite his high position, the
Secretary never hesitated, on or off the platform, to be
blunt and outspoken. He was always the same man who, in
his autobiography, said:
If, in these pages, I have hurled insult at 
anyone, be it known that such was my deliberate 
intent, and I may as well state flatly now that 
it will be useless and a waste of time to ask me 
to say that I am sorry.®
He was an officer of cabinet rank whose sense of dignity
would not prevent his calling Governor Landon, in 1936,
"the friend of the common millionaire, 1 Wendell L.
Willkie, in 19^0, the "simple, barefoot, Wall Street
lawyer," and Governor Thomas E. Dewey, in 1948, "Mr.
Thomas Elusive Dewey, the candidate in sneakers."?
Ickes’ willingness to engage in personalities, usually
^This role has been described in personal inter­
views by such Administration associates as Paul G. Aiken, 
Thomas G. Gorooran, Michael W. Straus, and Joel David 
Wolfsohn. It has been further confirmed, and with the 
term "hatchet-man" specifically employed, by two books 
dealing, in part, with the 1936 campaign: Harold F.
Gosnell, -Champion Campaigner: Franklin D. Roosevelt.
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 181; and
Donald Rlchberg, My Hero (New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1954), p. 235.
^Harold L. Ickes, The Autobiography of a Cur­
mudgeon (New York: Reynal and Hitchcook, 19^3T> P*
?New York Times, February 4, 1952, p. 18.
through invective and irony, has been noted by Harry S. 
Truman as a factor which "made him a formidable opponent 
in public debate."®
In 1936, Secretary Ickes led the Democratic attack 
on Landon and the Republican party, and he did so with 
language seldom heard in the public pronouncements of a 
oabinet officer. The 1936 campaign was his first in the 
role of political hatohet-man. The purpose of this study 
is to analyze, first, the factors which drew Iokes into 
this unusual oampalgn role, second, hiB performance in 
that capacity, and third, the effectiveness of his 
efforts.
Detailed study of Iokes* speeches is limited to 
the five addresses broadoast by national radio networks.
A study of his other five 1936 campaign speeches would 
reveal much duplication of both method and arguments. 
Further, it was the nationally broadcast attacks which 
were most widely heard on the air, most widely reported 
in the nation's press, and most significant in the 
campaign.
The organization of the study is as follows: 
Chapter I sets briefly the background of the campaign 
and analyzes Democratic problems and strategy. Chapter
8Ibid..
II analyzes the role of Secretary Ickes as a speaker 
In the campaign, with special attention to how his role 
fitted into Democratic strategy. Since Ickes* methods 
of preparation and delivery were, in the case of his 
radio addresses, almost Identical In each speech,
Chapter III analyzes general methods of preparation and 
delivery. Each of the next five chapters Is devoted to 
an analysis of a network radio address. Those speeches 
were as follows:
"What Shall the Republican Platform Be?"— N.B.C. 
— June 7 .
"Governor Landon, Practical Progressive"— C.B.S. 
— August 3 .
"Hearst Over Topeka"— C.B.S.— August 27.
"Landon, Coughlin, 'etAl'"— N.B.C.— October 9.
"Is Landon Sincere?"— C.B.S.— October 20.
In the analysis of each speech, the following aspects 
are considered: background and setting, purpose and
thesis, organization and lines of argument, forms of 
support, use of language, and reactions to the speech.
The final chapter, Chapter IX, seeks to analyze 
and evaluate Ickes* performance in his special role. It 
attempts, first, to disoover what persuasive methods and 
techniques characterized the political hatchet-man, and 
second, to evaluate, so far as it is possible, the
effectiveness of his rhetorical efforts. The chief 
oriteria used in this study for evaluating effectiveness 
are (1) the publicity given to Ickes1 attacks, (2) the 
degree to which Democratic strategists considered that 
he had accomplished what they desired, and (3 ) the 
opinions of political observers of both parties, or of 
neither party, concerning the value of Ickes* rhetorical 
efforts to the Democratic party.
Although the man’s historical importance and his 
unique political role certainly appear to warrant such an 
undertaking, there have been no previous studies of the 
speaking of Harold Ickes. Indeed, there have been no 
biographies except his own. Incomplete biographical 
data can be obtained from Ickes* The Autobiography of a 
Curmudgeon^ and from the first three volumes of his 
partially-published d i a r y . T h e  following chronologioal 
sketch is presented as a compendium:
I87A— Born on March 15 on a farm in Blair County, 
Pennsylvania.
I8 9 0— Moved to Chicago; entered Englewood High 
School.
1 8 9 3— Graduated in the top ten of his high school 
class; entered the University of Chicago.
9Ickes, o£. olt.
■^Ickes, Seoret Diary. Vols. I-III.
71897— Graduated "cum laude" from the University 
of Chicago; began work as a news reporter.
1901— Worked in the headquarters of John Harlan, 
candidate for the Republican nomination 
for Mayor of Chioago.
1903— Wrote oampaign speeches for Graeme Stewart, 
Republican oandidate for irtayor; entered law 
school at the University of Chicago.
1905— Managed Harlan's campaign for mayor.
1907— Received law degree.
1911— Managed Charles E. Merrlam's campaign for 
mayor; married Anna Wilmarth Thompson.
1912— Joined the Progressive party of Theodore 
Roosevelt; made chairman of the Cook County 
Progressive Committee.
1916— Served on the campaign committee of Charles 
Evans Hughes, Republican candidate for 
President.
1917— Worked for the Creel Public Information 
Committee.
1918— Worked in France as XMCA representative.
I9 2 0— Opposed Warren G. Harding at the Republican 
convention; later announced for James Cox.
192^— Managed the presidential oampaign in Il­
linois for Hiram Johnson, Progressive 
candidate.
1 9 2 8 7-Remained aloof from the campaign; voted 
for Alfred E. Smith.
1932— Headed the Western Independent Republican 
Committee for Roosevelt.
1933— Appointed Secretary of the Interior; later 
appointed administrator of PWA and the Oil 
Code.
1935— Mrs. Ickes killed in automobile accident in 
New Mexico.
1936— Active In the presidential campaign.
1937—-Active as a speaker in Roosevelt’s court 
fight.
1938— Married Jane Dahlman, then in her twenties.
1940— Active as a speaker in the campaign against 
Wendell Willkle.
19&L— Appointed Petroleum Coordinator.
19*t4— Active as a speaker in the campaign against 
Thomas E. Dewey.
19^6— -Resigned his cabinet post because of Presi­
dent Truman' 8 support of Edwin C. Pauley 
for Secretary of the Navy.
19 *19— Campaigned in New York for Senator Lehman 
against John Foster Dulles.
1952— Died on February 3 in Washington, D. C.
Of the materials available for a study of Ickes, 
the most rewarding for the rhetorioal critic are the 
Iokes Papers In the Manuscripts Division of the Library 
of Congress. Among the 117,000 individual items col­
lected and indexed there are all drafts of the Ickes 
speech manuscripts, including the actual reading copies. 
The preliminary drafts are acoompanied by memoranda in 
the form of suggestions for revision from the Secretary's 
staff; the final reading copies have the reading time 
marked off into minutes, and many of the words to be 
stressed are underlined. This collection also includes 
all correspondence about the speeches, both before and 
after delivery. It includes, further, a set of
scrapbooks which contain newspaper clippings from all 
sections of the nation, many of which reflect the news 
coverage of Ickes' speeches and editorial reactions to 
them. Favorable and unfavorable comments alike were 
collected by Ickes.
Two other collections of contemporary papers have 
been helpful: the Raymond Clapper Papers in the Library
of Congress and papers from the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library in Hyde Park, New York.
A great deal of pertinent information has been 
secured by personal interviews with friends and associates 
of the late Secretary of the Interior. Two Chicago 
acquaintances of long-standing, Edward Eagle Brown and 
Walter T. FiBher, were helpful for information concern­
ing Ickes* background, his Illinois activities, and an 
insight into the man himself. Among the New Deal as­
sociates Interviewed were Rexford Guy Tugwell, James A. 
Farley, Thomas G. Corcoran, Benjamin V. Cohen, Michael 
Straus, Joel David Wolfsohn, and Miss Helen Cunningham, 
a personal seoretary. The Secretary's widow, Mrs. Jane 
Dahlman Ickes, provided first-hand information and kindly 
granted permission for use of material from the Iokes 
Papers. Also through Mrs. Ickes, a recording of a 1937 
speech favoring President Roosevelt's Supreme Court plan 
was secured. No recordings of 1936 campaign addresses 
were available.
Of unquestionable value for some specific infor­
mation and much background knowledge have been the wealth 
of volumes concerned with the New Deal— some by its ad­
herents, some by its enemies, and several by historians. 
Newspapers and periodicals of 1936 have provided not only 
acoounts of the presidential campaign, but also an in­
sight into the sooial and political atmosphere into which 
Narold L. Ickes' speeches were projected.
CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEMS AND STRATEGY OF THE DEMOCRATIC 
PARTY IN THE 1936 CAMPAIGN
The speaking of Harold L. Iokes In the 1936 cam­
paign can he studied best when placed in the political 
setting of that day. The purpose of this chapter is to 
describe significant elements of that setting, giving 
particular attention to apparent Democratic prospects, 
major Democratic problems, and Democratic campaign 
strategy.
President Roosevelt's campaign opponents were 
selected in early June by the Republican convention at 
Cleveland. Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas, who had 
received widespread newspaper support for several months 
prior to the convention, was nominated for President on 
the first ballot. Frank Knox, unsuccessful aspirant for 
the presidential nomination, was chosen to complete the 
tloket. TJie Democratic convention met in Philadelphia 
in the last week of June and quickly renominated Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and John Nance Garner.
APPARENT DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS
Democratic leaders had several reasons to antici­
pate an easy Roosevelt-Garner vlotory as they weighed
11
their prospects in early 1936. In 1932, Roosevelt had 
turned Alfred E. Smith’s 1928 deficit of over six million 
votes into a plurality of over seven million.^ In 1934, 
the Democrats had reversed the usual trend of congression­
al losses between presidential elections, increasing their 
House majority to 332 and their Senate majority to 6 9.
The economic recovery whloh had swayed voters in 1934 
continued in 1935 and 1 9 3 6.^ In his book, The History 
of the New Deal, Basil Rauch wrote that the New Deal’s 
record of reoovery was "its greatest asset" in the 
campaign.^
The Roosevelt candidacy possessed also the usual
electoral advantages of the party in office, plus others
whloh resulted from recovery and relief legislation. 
According to a reported estimate by Democratic Chairman 
James A. Farley, the 296,500 new federal appointments
•^-Review of Reviews, XCLL (March, 1 9 3 6), 21.
2Atlantlc Monthly, CLVII (January, 1936), 93.
^By April of 1936, business was reported to be 
ninety per cent of normal. Current History, XLIV (April,
1936), 1. •
^Basll Rauch, The History of the New Deal (New 
York: Creative Age Press, Inc., 1944), p. 2 2 3.
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might insure a block of over eleven million votes.5 The 
Democrats also counted on drawing heavily from the votes 
of the twenty-four million people who were receiving
l •
relief or work-relief checks from the government. 0
Labor and farm groups were also expected to support 
the re-election of Roosevelt. Except for a few craft 
unions of the American Federation of Labor, organized 
labor supported Roosevelt almost solidly; farm groups, 
except for a few leaders of the Grange, also supported 
the President.? So strong were labor and farm support 
for the President that Raymond Clapper, Washington 
political correspondent, commented upon "Roosevelts new
Q
party, dominantly farmer-labor in character."
These were the encouraging signs as Democrats 
assessed their campaign prospects in early 1 9 3 6, but 
some disoouraging facts and possibilities had to be faced 
too. On May 27, 1935, the Supreme Court handed down three 
anti-New Deal decisions, the most important being the
^"Assuming careful selection of appointees, Mr. 
Farley estimates, from long experience and careful checks, 
that every Job, on average, is worth forty votes in the 
next election." Lawrence Sullivan, "Our New Spoils 
System," Atlantic Monthly, CLVII (February, 1936), 190.
^Review of Reviews. XCIII (April, 1936), 35.
?Rauch, o£. clt. , p. 2^5.
^Review of Reviews, XCIII (May, 1936), 2 5 .
lif
Sohechter Poultry Corporation decision. This decision, 
which declared the National Industrial Recovery Act to 
he in violation of the constitution, constituted both a 
blow to the New Deal and a potentially good campaign issue 
on constitutional government for the Republicans.9 Also 
in 1935, the Republicans, in the off-year elections, 
captured the New York General Assembly, elected mayors 
in Cleveland and Philadelphia, carried formerly-Democratic 
Hudson County in New Jersey, and defeated a Democratic 
Congressman in Rhode Island. These Democratic reverses 
heartened New Deal opponents and brought forth their 
attacks with new vigor. Of these New Deal critics, 
Frederick Essary said this:
Still another practical effect of the Schechter 
decision and the Rhode Island turnover was to bring 
from cover countless Administration critics, long 
in hiding. They emerged by the thousands. One 
heard them pillorying the New Deal in the halls of 
Congress. One heard them reviling it in the market 
places, arraigning it in the press and in convention 
assembled, in the clubs, and wherever else a hearer 
could be found.
Accompanying these discouraging developments were
9"A unanimous court decision had found the Adminis­
tration and the Congress to be guilty of a violent as­
sault upon the Constitution. At last an issue had been 
raised, perhaps a winning issue. Republicans were over­
joyed." Frederlok Essary, "An X-Ray of the Campaign," 
Atlantic Monthly, CLVII (January, 1 9 3 6), 93*
10Ibid., p. 9*K
15
some unfavorable results of public opinion polls. The 
poll of the American Institute of Public Opinion, for 
example, indicated that President Roosevelt's popularity- 
declined sixteen per cent between February, 193^ &n(l 
October, 1935. 11
Most of the President's political advisers were 
keenly aware that not all signs pointed to an easy 
Democratic victory in 1936. Samuel I. Rosenraan, for 
example, indicated that Roosevelt aides were alert to 
the presence of unfavorable indications:
Although the President was to carry every state 
but Maine and Vermont in 1 9 3 6, in the spring the 
prospects for re-election did not seem quite that 
bright. Political opposition had begun to crystal­
lize. The close Democratic unity had begun to dis­
solve; many of the old-line Democrats, especially 
from the South, had come to feel that the New Deal 
was a little too strong for their tastes. The American 
Liberty League had been organized, and it included 
among its prominent members a number of national lead­
ers of the Democratic party. Its purpose was to pre­
vent the President's re-election. . . , 12
Charles Mlchelson, publicity director for the National 
Democratic Committee, also indicated that these unfavor­
able developments did not go unnoticed among Democratic 
strategists. Mlchelson admitted that fear of these
T 1A In February, 193^. sixty-nine per cent of those 
polled supported the President; in October, 1935/ this 
figure fell to fifty-three per cent. New Republic,
LXXXV (November 13, 1935), U .
12Samuel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1952)> P* 98.
16
adverse developments getting out of control was respon­
sible for the Democratic decision to begin active cam­
paigning one month earlier than originally planned.^
MAJOR DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN PROBLEMS
Democratic strategy had to be based, in large 
part, upon the specific campaign problems which confront­
ed the party. Some of the major problems faced were the 
almost solid opposition of business, the hostility of 
most leading newspapers, the defection of many Democratic 
leaders, and the strength of the early boom for Governor 
Landon. Still other problems were embodied in several 
potentially vulnerable, spots in the New Deal record.
These included the broken 1932 economy pledges, the con­
tinuation of widespread unemployment, the admitted 
presence of some degree of administrative Inefficiency, 
and the increased centralization of government which 
many Americans feared. A brief consideration of these 
problems is pertinent to understanding the strategy of 
the Democratic campaign as a whole and of the part played 
by Ickes in that strategy.
That most businessmen opposed the Administration 
in 1936 was clear. The brief era of good feeling between
-*-3New York Times, November 15, 1936, Sec. p. 10.
17
the New Deal and business, which the NRA had for a time 
effeoted, was short-lived. The opposition of the American 
Liberty League, an organisation sponsored primarily by 
conservative business interests, severely tried this 
relationship in the 1 93 +^ congressional elections; the 
President’s security program and Wealth Tax Act of 1935 
strained the truce still further; the successful op­
position of business to the New Deal in the November 
1935 elections and the President’s subsequent attack on 
business in his Annual Message to Congress in January, 
1 9 3 6, completely ended the political honeymoon. By 1936, 
the "First New Deal" was over and the "Second New Deal" 
had begun.^ A program which was to represent primarily 
farm and labor interests had emerged, and business was no 
longer a partner in the undertaking.*^ 5 Business hos­
tility in the 1936 campaign was assured. Rauch notes
■^Basil Rauch, in The History of the New Deal, 
refers to the "First New Deal1 as that "chiefly benefi­
cial to big business and large farmers"; the "Second New 
Deal," whloh began in 1935, was "chiefly beneficial to 
labor and smaller farmers." Rauch, ojd. olt. . p. vl.
■^"By 1 9 3 6, the administration had virtually 
abandoned its initial program of carrying out plans which 
were formulated by all three of the major interest groups 
in the nation, business, farmers, and labor, and of making 
each of these groups the direct beneficiary of government 
action to help it improve its status. Business had in 
effect been dropped from the coalition." Ibid.. p. 225.
18
that '‘virtually all the substantial organizations of
16business were officially in opposition." Among these 
organizations were such well-financed groups as the 
United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Associ­
ation of Manufacturers, and the business-backed American 
Liberty League.
Another Democratic problem was the hostility of 
a large section of the American press. The President 
asserted that about 85 per cent of the American press 
opposed him in the 1936 campaign.Rauch, without 
giving an exact estimate, notes that "the press was
TO
overwhelmingly favorable to Landon." This antipathy 
toward Roosevelt made it difficult for the Democratic 
campaign to receive fair and equal treatment in the 
press. The President himself stated: "Many newspapers
and magazines went to the length of coloring, distort­
ing, or actually omitting Important facts in the news 
columns as well as in the editorial p a g e s . The hos­
tility of a large segment of the nation's press presented
l6rbld., p. 2^ +5.
*1 «.
■‘•'Samuel I. Rosenraan (ed.), The People Approve 
(Vol. V of The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt. I3 vols.; New icrk: Random House,' 1938),
p. 3 . Hereafter referred to as Public Papers, Vol. V.
^Rauch, o£. clt. . p. 2*1-6.
^Rosenman, loc. clt.
19
a problem to the Democratic campaign. Getting Democratic 
arguments forcibly before the voters was a much more dif­
ficult task than it would have been with an evenly divided
or friendly press. Farley called it "a serious handicap
20that has to be met right at the start."
Another apparently serious Democratic problem was 
the defection of many prominent party leaders to the 
Republican candidates. The most publicized and perhaps 
serious Democratic defection was that of Alfred E. Smith.
In late January of 1936, Governor Smith addressed the 
American Liberty League at the Mayflower Hotel in Washing­
ton, D. 0. For an hour his audience "chortled and chuckled" 
while the former presidential candidate "belabored and 
ridiculed the New Deal policies and accomplishments of his 
political ally, Franklin D. Roosevelt. . . . "21 Smith 
later declared for Governor Landon and actively campaigned 
for him. Still other conservative Democrats of some 
prominence who publicly opposed Roosevelt and the New Deal 
were James A. Reed, former Senator from Missouri; John B. 
Ely, former Governor of Massachusetts; Bainbridge Colby, 
former Secretary of State; Daniel F. Cohalan, former New '*
20James A. Farley, Behind the Ballots (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 193&)»' P« 3°9«
21Ibld., p. 2 9 3.
York district Judge; John W. Davis, Democratic president­
ial nominee in 192^; John J. Raskob, former Democratic 
National Chairman; Jouett Shouse, former chairman of the 
Democratic National Committee; and Senator Royal Copeland 
of New York. 22 Some of these men undoubtedly had personal 
followings of varying sizes, and their influence would 
be felt in the returns of several states. Representative 
Joseph Martin, Republican Minority Leader in the House of 
Representatives, estimated that Alfred E. Smith alone 
would bring three million votes to the Republican candi­
dates. 23 The defection of men like Smith, Davis, Ely, 
Colby, and Copeland alarmed many Democrats, who expeoted 
the bolters to influence a great many votes, and their 
loss appeared to constitute an eleotion hazard as the 
campaign got underway.
For a time it also appeared that Roosevelt faced 
a very formidable Republican opponent. Almost unknown 
outside of Kansas until 193^, Governor Landon rose 
rapidly into contention for the presidential nomination.
In 193^, in the midst of Republican defeats elsewhere, 
Landon was re-elected Governor of Kansas. His repu­
tation for governmental eoonomy and a balanced budget
22Chlcago Tribune, July 19, 1936, Seo. I, p. 4.
23?he New ¥ork Times, October 3 , 1936, p. 1.
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was brought to the attention of the nation In general and 
of Republican leaders in particular. Shrewdly managed 
by John Hamilton, Kansas legislator and later Republican 
National Chairman, Landon won the support of William 
Randolph Hearst in early 193 6. The Landon "boom" then 
began to develop. Despite the opposition of such avail­
able candidates as William E. Borah, Arthur Vandenberg, 
Frank Knox, and Herbert Hoover, Landon won the Republican 
nomination in Cleveland on the first ballot. Speaking 
later of Landon1s stature at the convention, Farley said:
f
The advance publicity had been cleverly handled. 
The public was interested in this new Plumed Knight 
of the Republican Party, and the opinion was wide­
spread that an appealing political figure was about 
to come forward to ohallenge President Roosevelt on 
equal terms. The interest in Landon was especially 
keen in the agricultural states adjoining Kansas 
and in some of the Eastern industrial centers. His 
ability as a ’budget balancer' had travelled before 
him, and people really believed that he would be 
able to cut out this ’wasteful Federal spending' 
and at the same time continue to make benefit pay­
ments to agriculture and take care of the array of 
unemployed.2^
Republicans believed they had found in Landon a candidate 
who would appeal to a wide range of voters:
From the point of view of Republican strategists, 
Landon was a business man associated with the oil 
industry who was at the same time identified with 
a great farm state, so that he might be made at­
tractive to farmers without risking the 'irrespon­
sibility' towards business of a Borah. He had
2^Farley, op. olt., p. 3 0 9.
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supported the Bull Moose campaign of Theodore 
Roosevelt in 1912, which would appeal to liberals.
He was not identified with the adamant opposition 
to the New Deal, but, on the other hand, he had 
shown little Interest in the progressive legls- 
lation which Western governors usually advocated.
Apparently the strategy of selecting a candidate who
could be all things to all men proved effective during
the early stages of the campaign. A Current History
editorial feature noted in July that "He ^/Landon/ may be
a genius in disguise. His build-up has been perfect, if
the objeot was to satisfy rank and file cravings." °
Though Landon looked considerably weaker by November, in
the early phases of the oampaign his successful build-up
posed what appeared to be a serious problem to the
Roosevelt forces.
All the Democratic campaign problems to whioh 
referenoe has been made so far have been expressed in 
termB of opposition forces to be overcome. Democratic 
strategy also had to take cognizance of some of the 
strongest attacks being pressed against the New Deal 
record. The defense of parts of this record was dif­
ficult enough to constitute a serious problem. Among 
the charges to which the Roosevelt record was most
2^Rauch, o£. oit. , pp. 237-38.
2% .  E. Traoy, "Log of Major Currents," Current 
History, XLIV (July, 19367, 10.
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vulnerable were failure to fulfill the 1932 platform of 
government economy, continued unemployment, administra­
tive Inefficiency In relief, and an apparent trend toward 
centralization of government.
In 1932, the Democratic platform promised an 
economy administration. In line with that promise, the 
President submitted his economy bill to Congress on March 
10, 1933. .This measure reduced normal government ex­
penditures, especially In the field of federal salaries 
and veterans* benefits. It was enacted by Congress on 
March 11. This early Indication of reduced federal ex­
penditures was, however, short-lived. By early 193^ > 
Congress had begun passing appropriation measures over 
the President* 8 veto,*2? and by 1935 the President's 
relief and public works programs had helped to pile up 
an increasing federal deficit. By June of 1936 this 
deficit reached the sum of $3^,0°°>0 0 0 ,0 0 0 , an increase 
of about $13,000,000,000 since March,1 9 3 3 .28 This was 
despite the Increased revenues brought about by tax 
raises.
The Administration was well aware that the In­
creased federal deficit, representing as It did an
27Rauch, 0£. clt., p. 63 .
28These figures were released by the Treasury 
Department and published In the New York Times, June 30 , 
3-936, p. 6.
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apparently discarded, campaign pledge, would be strongly 
used in the Republican campaign of 1936. In June of 1936, 
the New York Times editorialized that it was "the issue 
about which Mr. Roosevelt feels probably the most self- 
conscious, "29 and Arthur Krock later wrote that since 
1933 the President "had realized the dangers of the 
budget issue in his campaign for re-election."3°
As expected, Republican campaigners kept up a 
constant fire on the federal debt and the broken economy 
plank of 1932. James Hagerty, newspaperman accompanying 
Governor Landon on his campaign tour, liBted this as one 
of the five Issues most stressed by Landon, 3^ - and it was 
a chief subjeot in the Governor* s August 2 6  address at 
Buffalo, New York. It was apparently an attack which 
brought good crowd reaction. The New York Times report­
ed of the address that the rather passive audience of 
20,000 "warmed up a little to his attack upon the Roose­
velt administration for failure to balance the budget."32 
Attacks upon this phase of the Roosevelt record posed a 
threat to which Democratic campaigners, including Ickes
2^New York Times, June 21, 1936, Sec. k ,  p. 3 .
3°New York Times. August 16, 1936, Sec. k , p. 3 .
3^ -New York Times, October 18, 1936, Sec. k , '  p. 3 .
32New York Times, August 27, 1 9 3 6, p. 1.
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and the President, gave definite attention during the 
campaign.
Despite some advance against the unemployment 
problem, the Roosevelt administration was censured dur­
ing 1936 for itb failure to obtain widespread re-employ­
ment of the idle. That serious unemployment still existed, 
no one denied. In an October 2, 1935 address in San 
Diego, General Hugh Johnson, former NRA Administrator, 
referred to "this most dangerous of our national 
problems— ten million Jobless," and added that "although 
we have tried valiantly, we haven't done anything ef­
fective yet. . . ."33 Among Franklin D. Roosevelt's 
three very "vulnerable spots," Raymond Clapper listed 
in July, 1936, "the 10,000,000 unemployed."3^ Democratic 
campaigners were able to point to employment increases, 
but Republicans charged that New Deal policies were 
actually preventing further re-employment. Lewis H.
Brown, President of the Johns-Mansville Corporation, told 
the U. S. Chamber of Commerce that ninety per cent of the 
nation's-businessmen believed that anti-business policies 
"are definitely preventing r e - e m p l o y m e n t . "35 Colonel
33sugh Johnson, "Ten Million Jobless," Vital 
Speeches,11 (October 21, 1935), 53-56.--.
3**Raymond Clapper, "What Landon Offers," Review 
of Reviews, XCIII (July, 1936), 26.
35Lewis H. Brown, "Industry," Vital Speeches, II 
(May **, 1936), **83-85.
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Henry Breckenrldge, Asslstant-Secretary of War under 
President Wilson and a Democratic foe of Roosevelt in 
I9 3 6 , charged that at least a third of the unemployment 
was because of “Wallace’s and Tugwell's economy of 
s c a r c i t y . T h e s e  attaoks upon the New Deal’s claims 
for reoovery were serious enough to require denial or 
explanation during the oampaign.
The Republicans also levelled criticism upon the 
New Deal raethodB of trying to combat unemployment, 
primarily upon the Works Progress Administration— the 
controversial WPA. Some top Democratic leaders, while 
favoring the aims of WPA, privately admitted that its 
administration was very vulnerable to attack and con­
sidered it a oampaign liability.3? The New York Times, 
which eventually declared editorially for the Presi­
dent's re-election, termed WPA a leading issue in the 
campaign and enumerated five main charges often made 
against it: waste and extravagance in planning, ex­
cessive coat of supervision, preference of relief to 
re-employment by many WPA workers, disparities in 
contributions of the various states, and use of WPA by
3^Henry Breckenridge, “The Valley of Decision," 
Vital Speeches, II (March 2 3 , 1936), 389-
37jaraes A. Farley, Jim Farley’s Story (New York:
Whittlesey House, 1948), p. 63.
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Democrats as a political Instrument.3® The vulnerability 
of WPA affected the oampaign tactics of the New Dealers 
and Influenced their use of Harold Ickes, administrator 
of the less controversial PWA, as a frequent campaign 
speaker.
Still another Republican attack which was potential 
dynamite to Democratic chances was the charge that the 
President was leaning toward alien philosophies of govern­
ment. James A. Hagerty listed this as one of the Issues 
most stressed by Landon,39 and It was on the lips of most 
of the President's enemies, both Republicans and conser­
vative Democrats. Alfred E. Smith was foremost in the 
van of the attacking Democratic minority, associating 
the President with Socialists, Communists, and "a shower 
of crackpots." ^ 0 Probably very few voters believed 
the New Deal was really communistic, but It was possible 
that a great many really feared that the trend was 
toward some form of collectivism. Some may have given 
weight, too, to the oharge that the President was ap­
proaching dictatorial power in some areas. His leader­
ship of Congress and the powers granted to him during
3^New York Times, October 11, 193o, Sec. k ,  p. 3.
39^ew York Times, October 18, 1936, Sec. 4, p. 3 .
**°New York Times, November 1, 1936, p. -^3 .
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the depression emergency were undeniably greater than 
they had been under Presidents Hoover, Collidge, or 
Harding. The fears his opponents tried to arouse In the 
public mind needed to be choked off or dispelled by 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and his campaign aides.
The opposition of business, of the press, and of 
many conservative Democrats; the successful early build­
up of Governor Landon as a challenging candidate; and the 
principal attacks upon the New Deal record and trends—  
these were Democratic problems, or apparent problems, 
which Influenced Democratic campaign strategy In general 
and the campaign role of Ickes in particular.
DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
In this as in other national campaigns, a large 
portion of strategy planning was done as the campaign 
progressed, and many people pldyed a part in Its formula­
tion. Benjamin V. Cohen, close adviser to the President 
In 1936, omphasizes that this was true of the Roosevelt- 
Landon campaign.^ 1 It is possible, however, in retrospect, 
to observe definite campaign lines which gradually took
L r \
Personal Interview with Mr. Cohen on January 29,
1955. This same opinion was also expressed by Michael 
Straus, Ickes' Director of Information, In a personal 
Interview on January 25, 1955.
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shape and to note certain broad approaches which were 
taken from the outset. The following list suggests some 
main principles which appear to have guided the strategy 
of the Roosevelt forces:
(1) The Democratic campaign was one of "watchful- 
waiting," standing on the broad record of com­
parative economic recovery and attacking 
Republican weaknesses and errors as they appeared.
(2) The oampaign capitalized to the fullest extent 
on the personal appeal and official prestige of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, utilizing him as an asset 
both on the stump and in pursuit of his executive 
duties.
(3 ) Maximum effort was made, especially in the 
early stages of the campaign, to prevent an ef­
fective Landon build-up.
The Democratic strategy of "watchful waiting" was 
described by the noted American historian, Charles A. 
Beard:
Tacticians on the Democratic side seem to operate 
on the assumption that the password should be ’watch­
ful waiting.' President Roosevelt will make no 
radical departures from the record already written, 
avoid sharp criticism of the Supreme Court, give 
some attention to economy, and, as in the campaign 
of 1 9 3 2, count on Republican errors to carry the 
election. * *
^2Charles A. Beard, "Campaign Preliminaries," 
Current History, XLIV (April, 1936), 71.
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Beard desoribed the actual oourse of events rather 
closely. The Democrats stood on their claim for progress 
toward recovery, proposing no new programs and avoiding 
the dangerous court Issue; they more often than not pre­
sented only a broad defense of the New Deal, comparing 
it favorably and forcefully with the previous Republican 
administration, and they did "wait the Republicans out,” 
pouncing upon what they thought to be vulnerable spots 
and taotical errors as they appeared.
Efforts by Democratic strategists to make the 
campaign approach a positive one are described by Laura 
Crowell in her study of the President's speeches in the 
I936 campaign:
The Republicans, as challengers, should have 
taken the offensive, driving Roosevelt to a de­
fense of the policies of his administration. In 
this oampaign, however, the incumbents became the 
challengers, constantly enforcing the comparison—  
with the powerful aid of the nation's recovery—  
between the New Deal years and the preceding Repub­
lican administrations, and never allowing the 
Republicans to consider the Roosevelt administra­
tion as a single factor.^3
The Roosevelt forces were equally Intent upon 
finding vulnerable spots in the Republican oampaign 
upon which they could capitalize. The first apparent 
campaign error of the Republicans was that of letting
^Laura Crowell, "An Analysis of the Audience 
Persuasion in the Major Addresses of Franklin D. Roose­
velt in the Presidential Campaign, 1 (unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, 1946), 
pp. 476-77.
the American Liberty League carry the brunt of the pre- 
corrvention assault upon the Administration. The Democrats 
decided that the Liberty League was so palpably an 
organization of men of wealth that public opinion would 
not support it. As a result, New Deal speakers and 
writers launched rhetorical assaults upon the Liberty 
League during the first few months of 1936. Farley later 
wrote that this organization was so thoroughly discredit­
ed by convention time that "the Republican party was 
frantically trying to denounoe and disown it."^
The Republican platform, placed under heavy 
Democratic fire, may also have been a handicap to Landon. 
Ickes devoted a great deal of attention to this document 
which Democrats denounced as "weasel worded." Arthur 
Krock wrote after the Cleveland convention that the 
Republicans' long, compromising platform had "helped the 
Democratic campaign prospect."^ Krock further believed 
that the uncertain tenor of the whole Republican campaign 
was a mistake, trying as it did to attack the New Deal,
but actually retaining almost all of its parts. This
#
"shotgun strategy," he concluded, permitted Roosevelt to
^^arley, Behind the Ballots, p. 29*4-.
New York Times, June 21, 1936, Sec. ty, p. 3.
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attack Instead of defending. ° Basil Rauch arrived at 
the same conclusion in his analysis of the 1936 campaign.
Aided by some of the Republican campaigners, the 
Democrats worked to place Landon in an untenable position 
in another respect. Landon attempted to prevent any im­
pression that his program was linked to that of the "Old 
Guard." Stung, however, by the presistent Democratic 
attacks, such Republican speakers as John Hamilton and 
Frank Knox more and more defended the Hoover line. In 
addition, Hoover himself took an Increasingly active part 
in the contest. This forged between the last Republican 
candidate and the current one exactly the link which 
Landon hoped to a v o i d . S u c h  a seeming link encouraged 
Democratic attacks on the Republican party as the party 
of depression and arch-conservatism.
Democratic strategy also involved capitalizing 
heavily on the acknowledged abilities of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt as a vote-getter. Democratic campaign leaders 
decided early that Roosevelt himself was to be the basic 
issue in the election. They further believed that no 
one could make a more favorable presentation of himself
^ New York Times, September 27, 1936, Sec. b ,  p. 3 . 
^Rauch, o£. clt. , p. 2 5 6.
^ New York Times, September 2b, 1936, -p. 2b,
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and his policies than the President, who was described 
by Arthur Krock as "unsurpassed as a campaigner.
The chief problem was to get Roosevelt before 
the voters. In view of newspaper opposition, the radio 
was the selected medium, a medium in the use of which 
Roosevelt was an admitted master. To put the President 
on the air frequently from convention time to election 
time was financially out of the reach of the party's 
treasury. The solution hit upon fitted very nicely into 
the strategy of "watchful-waiting": Roosevelt remained 
"non-political" until the last month of the campaign.
At that time he conducted a whirlwind one-month 
oampaign— touring doubtful states, answering whatever 
attacks had to be answered, and getting network radio 
coverage for every major address. Until the final month, 
the Democratic candidate attended strictly to his duties 
as President, making a "non-political" visit to Texas and 
Arkansas while the Republican convention was in progress 
and making an extended "non-political" tour of the 
drought-strioken Midwest during the summer. Some Repub­
lican newspapers accused the President of playing polltios. 
The President, however, continued to tour. As Farley 
later put it, the President simply "busied himself with
^ N e w  York Times, September 27, 1936, Seo. p. 3.
those duties which kept him before the public eye In 
legitimate fashion without indulging in direct political 
action. "5° The New York Times got to the heart of the 
matter when it said: "The value of suoh a trip, regard­
less of motive, two months before an election is in­
estimable."^'1' Roosevelt appeared before the people, 
talked with them, and probably won votes every "non- 
political" mile of the way. Meanwhile, Ickes and others 
carried on the active campaign, keeping the Republicans 
busy.
On September 29, in Syracuse, New York, Roosevelt 
initiated his openly political campaign and began to talk 
on the issues. That one month has been very effectively 
desoribed and analyzed by the Crowell study and will not 
be set down in any detail here. Farley summed it up as 
"the greatest piece of personal campaigning in American 
history."^2
Another important part of Democratic strategy waB 
to prevent the threatening Landon boom from ever reaching 
its most dangerous proportions, especially during the
■5°Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 3 0 9.
^ New York Times, August J O ,  1936, Sec. p. 10.
52Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. J 1 6 .
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time that the President was not actively campaigning.53 
Farley has described the Democratic tactics employed to 
prevent such a possibility:
While President Roosevelt was giving a good 
positive picture of public leadership during the 
summer of 1 9 3 6 ,  the Democratic National Committee 
was engaged in the task of puncturing the Landon 
•myth1 and thus preventing the Kansas Governor 
from making gains. . . .  We had a minute study of 
Governor Landon's record compiled at headquarters, 
and a vigorous fire was directed constantly at his 
official acts.5^
The attacks upon Landon, coming primarily from Xokes and
never from the President himself, will be discussed later
in considerably more detail.
This describes in general the broad strategy of 
the Democratic oampaign. A brief consideration of 
specific taotics employed to meet the particular cam­
paign problems discussed earlier sheds additional light 
on Democratic efforts.
The hostility of business to the New Deal was, in 
some respects, a serious problem. It was most damaging, 
however, only if old party lines were intact. The 
Roosevelt strategy was to see that they were not intact.
53uThe Democrats began the oampaign with the theory 
that the correct strategy was to insure, if possible, that 
the candidate of the opponents should not be built up to 
an inspiring figure." New York Times. November 15, 1936, 
Seo. p. 10.
•S^arley, Behind the Ballots, pp. 310-11.
The Democrats knew during 1935 that they were alienating 
■businessmen; but they also knew they were attracting 
labor and farm support. They deolded to aocept the 
hostility of large business interests and form the 
fanner-labor coalition which such opposition actually 
encouraged. In May of 1936, Raymond Clapper noted that 
such a party, superimposed on the old Democratic organi­
zation, was already in exi s t e n c e . W h e n  the Democrats 
attacked certain big business practices and Interests, or 
when business attacked Roosevelt, the result was a natural 
strengthening of the new farmer-labor coalition.
Also brought into the coalition were political 
progressives of both Republican and Independent status. 
Just as they had done in 1932, the Democrats won the 
support of leading liberals like Senator Norris, Senator 
Couzens, and Mayor LaG-uardla. Suoh organizations as the 
Progressive Party for Roosevelt, the Good Neighbor 
League, and Labor’s Non-Partisan League were set up to 
facilitate the campaign activity of such liberal and 
Independent groups. This helped to counter the defection 
of Smith and other conservative Democrats, though Demo­
crats also oountered with direct attacks upon some of 
these insurgents.
55Raymond Clapper, “Roosevelt's New Party," Re­
view of Reviews, XCIII (May, 1 9 3 6), 2 5.
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The hostility of the press was met primarily by 
reliance on the extensive use of radio to get facts, as 
the Democrats saw them, before the voters. The Presi­
dent's tours were also used to a large extent, partly 
through personal contact and partly through furnishing 
news which could not be entirely Ignored by the most 
hostile papers. But radio had to be the mainstay. In 
a post-election analysis, Farley gave large credit for 
Democratic victory to the use of that medium:
I have already said that the influence of the 
radio in determining the outcome of the 1936 
election can hardly be overestimated. Without 
that unrivaled medium for reaching millions of 
voters, the work, of overcoming the false im­
pression created by the tons of written propa­
ganda put out by the foes of the New Deal would 
have been many times greater than it was, and, 
to be candid, it might conceivably have been an 
impossible Job.36
To the specific attacks on portions of the New 
Deal record, the Democrats made occasional replies.
For example, Harry Hopkins occasionally would reply to 
charges against WPA,^ Secretary Morgenthau depreciated 
the amount of the national debt for whioh the New Deal 
was accountable ,-5® and the President himself took up
56Fariey, Behind the Ballots, pp. 318-19.
^Hopkins was not very active as a speaker, since 
Farley believed him and his organization so vulnerable 
in the campaign. Farley, Jim Farley1s Story, pp. 63-6 .^
58{jurrent History, XLIV (August, 1 9 3 6), 16.
the charges of New Deal adherenoe to alien philosophies 
in his Syracuse address. The primary defenses of the 
Democratic campaigners against these attacks, however, 
were embodied in the recognized emergency confronted in 
I933 and in the partial recovery achieved by 1936. If 
WPA had made mistakes, it had provided income for several 
millions; if taxes and the national debt were higher due 
to pump-priming, recovery was being achieved; if there 
was still unemployment, it had been reduced since 1933  
Using these general recovery claims as a springboard, 
Democrats then usually proceeded to attack the "inactivity" 
of the Hoover administration. Instead of making specific 
and detailed defenses, they more often took the offensive.
This chapter has described the principles of 
strategy used by the Roosevelt forces in the 1936 cam­
paign. The November results attested, in part, to their 
success. The Democratic candidates entered the campaign 
with enough political assets to make their re-election 
prospects very good, but they also faced problems which, 
if improperly handled, could have ohanged the course of 
the election. This was the political setting in which 
Harold L. Ickes, Bull-Moose Republican in the Democratic 
camp, played his part in the campaign of 1936.
5 ? I n  September, 1936> employment was at 88.7 per 
cent of the 1929 levels and still increasing; this com­
pared to a level of 56 per oent in 1933. Hew York Times, 
September 24, 1936, p. 24.
CHAPTER II
THE ROLE OF ICKES IN THE CAMPAIGN
Harold Ickes was one of the most active speakers 
in the Democratic campaign of 1936 * Between June 1, 
1 9 3 6, and the close of the campaign, he made twenty 
soheduled and prepared addresses. Ten of these speeches 
were openly political in nature; the other ten were de­
livered at public works dedications and on other 
essentially non-political occasions. Of the ten cam­
paign speeches, five were broadcast over national radio 
networks and four others were carried by speoial state 
on regional networks.
The following-listed campaign speeches, together 
with information on radio coverage given them, are in- 
eluded in the speech files in the Ickes Papers:
June 7— Studio Broadcast— "What Shall the Repub­
lican Platform Be?"— N.B.C.
July 17— University of Virginia— "Representative 
Government vs. Dictatorship"— No Badio.
August 3— Studio Broadcast— "Governor Landon, 
Practical Progressive"— C.B.S.
August 27— Studio Broadcast— "Hearst Over Topeka" 
— C.B.S.
October 9— Columbus, Ohio— "Landon, Coughlin, ' et 
Al' "— N.B.C.
October 19— Philadelphia, Pennsylvania— "Landon*s 
Angels"— State Network.
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October 20— Studio Broadcast— "Is Landon Sincere?" 
--C.B.S.
October 21— Northwestern University— "Only Thirteen 
More Days to Save America"— C.B.S. (500 
mile radius).
October 2?— Altoona, Pennsylvania— "Why Plnohot 
Ban Out"— State Network.
October 28— New York City— "The Crossroads"—  
Special Eastern Network.
Ickes was sponsored as a speaker by the Democratic 
National Committee, the Progressive National Committee 
for Roosevelt, and the Good Neighbor League. According 
to Congressman Sam Rayburn of Texas, he was the most 
requested of all Democratic speakers. 2 The President, 
during the course of the campaign, indicated to his 
Republican Secretary of the Interior that what the Demo­
cratic campaign needed was "four Harold Ickeses." 3 
Secretary Ickes, seldom guilty of any display of false 
modesty, concurred in these sentiments. On August 19, 
1936, Ickes wrote:
Thore is not any doubt that I have been putting 
more licks into this campaign on the speaking and 
publicity side than any other member of the Ad­
ministration. As a matter of fact, I have been 
doing more than all the other members of the 
Cabinet combined.^
•^Ickes Papers.
2Ickes, Seoret Diary. Vol. I, p. 682.
3Ibid., p. 659.
^Ibid., p. 6 6 3.
REASONS FOR ICKES' IMPORTANT ROLE AS A SPEAKER
An analysis of possible reasons why Ickes figured 
so prominently as a Democratic speaker Is a pertinent and 
Interesting Inquiry. Certainly it was not because of any 
long-standing reputation he had as an effective speaker.
On September 19, 1936, Ickes commented In his diary:
I certainly was in no demand as a speaker any­
where or at any time before I became a member of the 
Cabinet. And the reason is not far to seek. I was 
a perfectly rotten speaker. I was scared to death 
when I stood before an audienoe and it wasn't any 
wonder that I was not in demand. If I ever did have 
a chance to speak, I avoided it if I possibly could.5
While his friends and associates in Chicago do not recall 
that Ickes was "perfectly rotten," some of them have In­
dicated that prior to attaining cabinet office he 
certainly had no special reputation or ability as a
speaker.^
Ickes' effectiveness as a speaker undoubtedly 
improved while he was Secretary of the Interior and Ad­
ministrator of PWA. These positions gave him new prestige 
and, at the same time, required that he speak more
Slbld., p. 683.
^Personal Interviews with Walter T. Fisher, promi­
nent Chicago lawyer who was a neighbor and associate of 
Ickes for several years, and Edward Eagle Brown, Chairman 
of the Board of the First National Bank of Chicago and an 
Ickes family friend of long standing. Mr. Fisher was 
interviewed on December 27, 195^ -, and Mr. Brown on December 
29, 195*K
frequently. Marked Improvement was noted by some of Ickes' 
assistants,? and one or two of the Secretary's speeches 
In late 1935 and early 1936 attracted the attention of the 
President and his advisers. In early Deoeraber, Ickes ad­
dressed a forum In Detroit, delivering a fighting, pro­
gressive type of attack on certain national economic ills; 
in early January, he followed much the same fighting line
Q
in Rochester, New York. These speeches aroused Interest 
more, however, through the blunt ideas and the fighting 
language in the manuscript than through the platform 
ability of the speaker. The primary reasons for the 
willingness of Democratic strategists to use Ickes so 
extensively lay elsewhere.
Actually, a combination of several factors pushed 
Harold Ickes into the political limelight: his eagerness
to campaign, the good reputation enjoyed by both the 
Interior Department and PWA, the respect aocorded the 
Secretary of several minority groups, the shortage of 
effective campaigners in the Administration, and, finally,
^Personal interviews with Michael Straus, Assis­
tant to the PWA Administrator, and Joel David Wolfsohn, 
Mr. Ickes' Executive Secretary. Mr. Straus and Mr. 
Wolfsohn were Interviewed on January 23, 1955> and Feb­
ruary 1 , 1 9 5 5, respectively.
^Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, pp. ^77-78.
the presence of a special Job in the campaign which Ickes 
was qualified to handle— that of attacking the Republican 
party, Its candidates, and its leading supporters.
A definite shortage existed of Cabinet officers in 
the New Deal who were effective as speakers and yet were 
politically expedient for the Democrats to use. Morgen- 
thau and Dern were of little value as campaigners; Miss 
Perkins had little appeal outside New York; Hull was 
respected by voters, but was a dull speaker; Cummings was 
a good speaker but did not want to do much campaigning; 
W a l l a c e  was politically effective only in farm areas.9 
Some leading New Dealers outside the Cabinet could be 
used little or not at all in the face of adverse public 
opinion. National Chairman Farley advised Harry Hopkins 
to speak very l i t t l e , a n d  Rex Tugwell not at all.^ 
Hopkins* WPA was believed to be a campaign liability, 
and Tugwell was under heavy fire for what many thought 
was a political philosophy too far to the left.
Any member of the Administration who was political­
ly "good medicine," and who was eager to campaign, was
^These were the opinions expressed to Ickes by 
Farley in July, 1936. Ickes, Seoret Diary. Vol. I, p.
6 3 2 .
James A. Farley, Jim Farley* s Story (New York: 
Whittlesey House, 1 9 ^ 8 ) ,  p V  S3 .
■‘■•^Personal interview with Mr- Tugwell on December 
29, 195*K
welcomed to the thin ranks of leading New Deal campaign­
ers. The Secretary of the Interior was both.
The public works program which Ickes administered 
received more favorable public reaction than did WPA and 
some of the other alphabetical agencies. Emil Hurja, New 
Deal statistician, reported that a survey of newspaper 
editorials showed widespread support of PWA but that 
only six per cent approved completely of WPA;-*-2 Frances 
Perkins believed that PWA was a definite asset to the 
President's cause;^^ Farley also considered PWA a cam­
paign asset and advised that its administrator be used 
as a speaker to capitalize upon i t.^ The honesty and 
incorruptibility generally attributed to Ickes' operation 
of the Interior Department also helped to establish public
confidence.
*
The standing of Ickes with certain minority groups, 
especially Jewish and Negro voters,enhanced his
1 2Ickes, Secret Diary. Vol. I, p. 598.
■*■3"Never has there been a breath of scandal about 
it This was to be a great help to President Roose­
velt In the days to come." Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt
I Knew (New York: The Viking Press, 19^ -6), p. 27JI
^Jira Farley's Story, p. 57.
■^The popularity of Ickes with Negro voters was il­
lustrated by a March 11 letter from Walter White to Ickes, 
in which Mr. White said: "Negro Americans have more con­
fidence in and knowledge of yourself than of any other 
member of the Cabinet," Ickes Papers, Container 2i+6.
potential value as a campaign speaker. This standing 
was illustrated by his frequent invitations to address 
them. These addresses, while ostensibly non-political, 
certainly possessed political value in an election 
season. In early 1936, Ickes addressed two Negro groups 
and one large Jewish rally. On March 2, 1936, he deliver­
ed the Charter Day address at Howard University; on May 
Z k ,  he addressed a United Palestine Appeal dinner audi­
ence at New York's Hotel Astor (this address was broad­
cast by N.B.C.); and on June 29 (again before an N.B.C. 
microphone), he spoke to an NAACP meeting in Baltimore.
Iokes was eager to be used as a speaker. He had 
taken some part in almost every national polltioal con­
test since his graduation from college. He was intensely 
partisan, and he loved the excitement of a campaign. As 
early as December, 1935, be urged the President to use 
his services in any way possible in the coming campaign;1**
in April, he called Governor Horner to volunteer his
17services in the gubernatorial contest in Illinois; ' 
and, on May 8 , he assured Chairman Farley that he was 
available for speaking assignments.1®
1 6ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p.
1 7Ibld.. pp. 557-58.
18Ibid., p. 5 8 0.
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Of greater significance than the preceding factors, 
however, was that Ickes filled one of the biggest needs 
of Democratic campaign strategy: the Democrats needed a
political "hatchet-man" in 1936* Ickes appeared to be 
the best man for the Job.
THE NEW DEAL*3 “HATCHET-MAN"
In Chapter I it was pointed out that Democratic 
strategy in the 1936 campaign followed three main lines:
(1) Watchful waiting: not rushing to defend 
against specific Republican attacks, but resting 
on the broad New Deal record and moving to the 
attaok whenever the Republicans showed a weakness 
or made a mistake.
(2) Utilizing Franklin D. Roosevelt's appeal and 
prestige as a non-political President until October 
and as a campaigner thereafter.
(3 ) Preventing the full development of a Landon 
boom.
The effectiveness of this strategy depended in no 
small degree upon the extensive use of a well-known cam­
paigner who would launch strong and unceasing attacks 
upon the Republican party, its platform, its candidates, 
and its prinolpal supporters; it required a good political 
hatchet-man.
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If the Democrats refused to give speoific defense 
to their opponents' charges, they needed someone to 
launch a vigorous counter-attack. If they withheld the 
President until the Republicans had fully committed them­
selves, they needed a strong covering offensive during 
the tactical delay. Democratic morale had to be kept up 
by strong counter-fire, and the impression that the 
Republicans had the field unchallenged had to be prevent­
ed. This required at least one political sniper prominent 
enough and colorful enough to get his shots publicized by 
a hostile press.
The type of personal campaign which the President 
wanted to conduct also called for someone else to keep 
the Republicans under heavy fire. President Roosevelt 
preferred to proceed on a discussion of broad issues, 
never indulging in personalities in a speech or even 
mentioning the name of his opponent:
In this campaign, as in all subsequent ones, 
the President adhered to his policy of never 
mentioning his opponent by name, and seldom even 
by any allusion. There were several reasons for 
this deliberate practice. Since he was the Presi­
dent running for re-election, an attack by him 
could only result in giving his opponent more 
publlolty than he otherwise would get. It would 
give his opponent a ohance to answer him, and 
the very fact that he was answering a President 
would build up publicity for the answer.
■^Samuel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1$52), p. I2 8.
U-8
While it may have been expedient for the President to 
keep himself on a higher and more general plane, obvious­
ly someone needed to mention some names occasionally. In 
the opinion of at least one inside New Dealer, it was 
specifically with this strategy in mind that the President 
assigned himself a 'hatchet-man.^0
The third phase of broad Democratic strategy, that 
of preventing a successful Landon boom, was oertainly 
consistent with the assignment of at least one leading 
campaigner to oonoentrate his speeches upon the Repub­
lican platform and candidates. Landon1s early build-up 
could be neither ignored nor met in mere general terms.
His rapidly increasing popularity and prestige needed to 
be oountered by strong and persistent attack on his 
record, his platform, and his supporters. When Ickes 
beoarae the New Deal's "orator of the attack," this be­
came his number one Job.
The evidence indicates clearly that Ickes was 
given such an assignment. The number of his attacks and 
the importance apparently ascribed to them by the Roose­
velt forces support this conclusion. During the few weeks 
of the campaign, Ickes attacked Governor Landon, Frank 
Knox, Herbert Hoover, Alfred Smith, William Randolph
20^Personal interview with Thomas G. Corcoran, 
Presidential adviser in 1936, on January 28, 1955*
Hearst, Father Coughlin, Gifford Plnchot, Colonel Robert 
McCormick, William Hard, an assortment of duPonts, the 
Republican platform, and the Republican party in general. 
The Democratic National Committee, and other organizations 
supporting the Democratic ticket, considered these attacks 
important enough to put nine of them on some kind of 
radio network. Five of them, totaling two hours and 
fifteen minutes of radio time, were sent out on coast-to- 
coast networks.
In retrospect, many writers have pinned the hatchet-
man label on Harold Ickes. Donald Rlchberg, one-time 
administrator of the NRA, says of Ickes:
His intense partisanship made him the anointed 
'hatchet man' of the Administration. He oould be 
relied upon to attack any opposition with a 
vehemence which would Insure bruised, battered, and 
angry opponents wherever he swung his war club. 21
Harold F. Goenell, in Champion Campaigner: Franklin D.
Roosevelt, also refers to Ickes as Roosevelt's hatchet-
Pcrsonal interviews with several men aotlve in 
the 1936 election produce unanimous agreement that Ickes 
filled this role of attack in the campaign. Paul C.
21Donald Rlchberg, My; Hero (New York: G. P.
Putnam' 8 Sons, 19540 » p. 2 3 8.
22Harold F. Gosnell, Champion Campaigner: Frank-
D. Roosevelt (New York: The Maomlllan Company,
man. 22
27, p. 181.
Aiken, who directed the Democratic Speakers Bureau In 
1 9 3 6, referred to Ickes as the Administration’s "axe­
man," adding that Roosevelt and Farley made calculated 
use of Ickes’ talents In that direction.2^ Thomas G-. 
Corcoran, while agreeing that Ickes was the appointed 
hatchet-man of the New Deal, added still another term. 
According .to him, Ickes was often referred to by New
Oh.
Dealers as "the king's champion." This reference to 
the special knight of old, whose Job It was to do the 
king's fighting for him, seems to fit Ickes1 relation­
ship to Roosevelt. Some of the Secretary's close 
associates, while agreeing that he played the part Just 
described, indicated the opinion that he made his own 
role— It was not one simply assigned.2^ This version 
undeniably has some accuracy. Ickes had always been a 
reform agitator, albeit an unsuccessful one, and his 
speeches had often been characterized by Invective be­
fore I9 3 6. Two suoh addresses have already been cited, 
one in Detroit and one In Rochester. It was shortly
23personal interview with Mr. Aiken on February
1, 1955. .
2^Corcoran interview.
2^Both Straus and Wolfsohn, in interviews pre­
viously cited, stated the opinion that Ickes, with his 
eagerness to attack, made his own role, and that the 
President and Farley approved— but did not originally 
designate— this special function.
after these speeches that Steve Early, Presidential 
Secretary, told Michael Straus that his Republican boss
o/C
would undoubtedly be sent out for more New Deal speeches. ° 
In this sense, Ickes made his own job. Further, Ickes 
was usually in the forefront of those suggesting that 
various attacks be made, and he often volunteered to make 
them. As early as January 18, 1936, he urged Early to 
get someone assigned to go after Alfred E. Smith and 
William Randolph Hearst.27 He first suggested that 
attacks be aimed at Landon on May 22 but found the Presi­
dent unwilling for him to open up so soon. Combining as 
he did a firm belief in a strategy of attack and an ob­
vious availability as a speaker, Ickes made himself the 
logical candidate for the job of "king's champion." Thus 
his role was partly created by himself, partly assigned 
as deliberate strategy, and partly developed by circum­
stances as the campaign progressed.
That the President called the shots for his Secre­
tary of the Interior, as for all Administration campaign­
ers, is certain. On June 1, the President told Ickes to
prepare his attack on the Republican platform for broadcast
2^The Early comment, coming on the same day that 
another Roosevelt secretary, Grace Tully, told Iokes the 
same thing, was construed by Ickes to represent the views
of the President. Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, 512-13.
27Ibld., pp. 517-19.
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on June 7 . 28 On July 7, the President conducted a 
strategy meeting at which he discussed with Farley and 
other advisers the strategic moment at which to turn his 
"champion" loose on Landon.2^ By this time, Ickes1 role 
as chief orator for the attack had apparently become a 
confirmed part of Democratic plans. On July 1, the Presi 
dent described the assignment to him In a general way:
I /Iokes7 asked the President what part he ex­
pected me to play in the campaign and he said he 
wanted me to attack. I told him that I hoped he 
would feel free to call upon me for anything that 
I could do at any time and he said again that I 
made such a grand attaok that that was what he 
wanted.3°
Before the oampaign progressed very far, some 
Republicans and Republican newspapers were apparently 
aware of the nature of Iokes1 assignment. In August, 
the Kansas City (Missouri) Times called Iokes the Ad­
ministration^ "oatch-as-catoh-can" fighter,the Ban 
Diego Tribune labeled him the Administration's "dragon 
hunter,"32 and Congressman Joseph Martin designated him 
the "chief mudslinger" of the New Deal.33 As a matter
2 8Ibld.. p. 6 1 5.
29jlm Farley^ Story, p. 6 3 .
3°Ibld.. p. 6 2 7.
31Kansas City Times. August k ,  1936.
32San Diego Tribune, August 2 9 , 1936.
33New York Times. August 29, I936, p. 5.
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of fact, suspicion existed before the campaign got under­
way that Ickes was going to be used in a special and 
active capacity. The Springfield (Massachusetts) Repub­
lican made this editorial comment on May 28, 1936 :
The activity of Secretary Ickes as a widely 
traveled speaker in behalf of the Roosevelt ad­
ministration lends interest to a report which has 
been current for some time and which has cropped 
up again as the date approaches for the Republican 
national convention at Cleveland. According to 
the report, the Job of smashing Governor Landon, 
in case he beoomes the Republican candidate, will 
be assigned to Mr. Ickes, who Is mysteriously 
credited with having 'something on1 Governor 
Landon which will enable him to carry out his as­
signment.^
Whether the term hatohet-man*' or some similar 
word-pioture be applied to the campaign role of Ickes, 
certainly his primary Job was leading the attaok on the 
Republican party and particularly on its presidential 
candidate. This was not, to be sure, Ickes’ only 
function in the campaign. He continued to dedicate 
PWA projects as his share in the Democratic emphasis 
upon recovery through planning, and he made "non-politi­
cal" addresses to minority groups where he could prove 
effeotlve. His big Job, however, was to press the attack 
against Landon and company, and It Is with this aspect of 
the campaign that the present study is primarily con­
cerned.
3^Sprlngfleld Republican, May 28, 1936,
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ICKES* QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE JOB
Aside from his general availability as a campaign 
speaker, the Roosevelt forces felt that Ickes possessed 
some special qualifications for the role he played. To 
begin with, he was a Republican who consistently declined 
to switch to the Democratic label. Moreover, he was a 
Progressive Republican of the old "Bull Moose" variety.
He had managed the Cook County campaign for Theodore 
Roosevelt in 1912 and the Illinois campaign for Hiram 
Johnson in 1924. In I936 Landon was strongly represent­
ed by his backers to be a Theodore Roosevelt type of 
Republican. The presence in the Democratic Inner camp, 
therefore, of a Republican with an unquestionable back­
ground as a leading progressive was a Roosevelt asset 
not to be ignored. The Democrats had a progressive 
Republican to loose against a Republican candidate who 
himself claimed to be a progressive. Acoordlng to Paul 
C. Aiken, director of the Democratic Speakers* Bureau 
In I9 3 6, this waB one of the chief reasons why the 
Roosevelt forces were eager to use Ickes so often against 
Landon and his followers. ^ 5
Another qualification Ickes was thought to possess
Aiken Interview.
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aa a hatchet-man was hia relative invulnerability to 
counter attack. John Hamilton, Landon1a campaign manager, 
aaid early in the campaign: "You can't win the campaign
by being nice."36 Certainly if the Republican forces 
had been able to discredit the man who attacked them ao 
peraiatently, they would have done so. The fact is that 
Ickes was not particularly vulnerable. His administra­
tion of the Interior department and of PWA had been free 
of scandal and of serious charges of political influence. 
While the self-styled "curmudgeon"3? had made many 
enemies, both inside and outside the Administration, he 
had won respect for his honesty and hiB painstaking care 
as an administrator.-^® Ickes' record before entering 
the Administration was, apparently, also able to bear 
close scrutiny. His opponents expended money and great 
effort in Chicago trying to find something which could 
be effectively used to discredit him, apparently without
36&OSnell, OjD. cit., p. 1 5 6.
3?Harold L. Ickes, The Augoblography of a Curmud­
geon ,(New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 19^3)» P- 2*
38"PWA is one alphabetical agency which even the 
Republicans have not dared to ridicule." Newark Ledger, 
June 16, 1936. "The gimlet-eyed Chicagoan who has kept 
PWA so amazingly free from graft." Columbia (South Caro- 
lina) Reoord. June 19, I9 3 6. "There have been few charges 
of favoritism / T t l P j ".1 Washington Star. August 2, 1936.
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result.39 The most damaging personal Item which was 
turned up against Ickes during the election was his secur­
ing for his son, Robert, a minor clerkship on a federal 
housing project in Boston.^ For the most part, the 
Republicans had to be content to refer to him as a 
“mudslinger“ and to emphasize the excesses of his attacks. 
He proved difficult to discredit, either as a public of­
ficial or as a private oitizen. After the 1936 election, 
he was still referred to as “Honest Harold.“
Ickes had another qualification which Democratic 
campaigners thought would make him a good hatchet-man: 
he was good “copy"; his speeches would be listened to 
and read. By campaign time, he had a reputation as a 
hard-bitten, colorful oharaoter. He had battled publicly 
with Henry Wallace, Harry Hopkins, Robert Moses, Governor 
Talmadge, Senators Long and Tydlngs, and numerous congress-
I c i
men. When he spoke his mind, he pulled no punches;^ this 
had landed him often in print.
Newsmen considered him good copy, partially because 
of his use of colorful expression. Drew Pearson and Robert
3?Brown interview.
^Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 616.
^Ickes said of himself in this regard: "I have 
always envied the ability to thrust with a rapier but 
since I can't do that I must be content with a bludgeon." 
Letter to Henry J. Allen, editor of the Topeka State 
Journal, August 18, 1936. Ickes Papers.
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Allen, in their “Washington Merry Go Round,“ said of him: 
“Not only is Ickes the boss of an outfit that makes news 
by its activity, but also the sardonic turn of his mind 
produces words that make headlines." ^ 2 Ernest K. Llndley, 
along this same line, referred to the Secretary of the 
Interior as "the Cabinet wlt."^
His reputation as a political scrapper who did not 
pull punches, his ability to make news by his use of 
forceful and humorous language, and his Important posi­
tion in the Administration all gave Ickes publicity 
potential. The radio audience was likely to listen to 
him and the newspapers to print what he sald.^ This 
fact undoubtedly increased his qualification for the 
special Job assigned him in 1936.
In summary, then, Harold Iokes was used In a 
unique and important oapaclty as a speaker In the 1936 
campaign. It was his Job to lead the Democratic attack 
on candidate Landon and indeed upon any Important op­
position to the President. His assignment was one which 
he took with enthusiasm, one to which the President gave
^ Washington Post, November 19, 1935.
^Ernest K. Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution 
(New York: The Viking Press, 1933)» P* 290.
*^*The President himself expressed this as a reason 
for using Ickes so frequently as a speaker. Ickes,
Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 659*
complete approval, and one for which Ickee appeared to 
he well qualified. It is the further purpose of the 
present study to inquire into the performance of Harold 
L. Ickes in his assigned role.
CHAPTER III
PREPARING AND DELIVERING THE ATTACK
All of the five speeches given special consider­
ation In thlB study were broadcast to a national radio 
audience.'1' Radio broadoast required that each of these 
speeches, be carefully prepared and timed for manuscript 
reading. It further required their delivery under the 
physical limitations of microphone usage. For this 
reason, the general methods and techniques employed by 
Secretary Iokes for the preparation and delivery of his 
speeches were almost Identical for all five speeches. 
Mr. Ickes had systematized his preparation and delivery 
to a very high degree by the time the 1936 campaign was 
underway. The frequency with which he had acoepted 
invitations to speak had virtually necessitated suoh
O
systematic preparation, if not delivery, of speeches.
To avoid chapter-by-chapter repetition, a gener­
alized treatment of the speaker's preparation and 
delivery is, therefore, presented in this chapter.
AIn only one of them, the speech delivered at 
Columbus, Ohio, was there a "live" audience; the other 
four were studio broadcasts.
2Ickes' speech files show that at least 110  
speeoh manuscripts were prepared between 1933 and June, 
1936. Icke s Papers.
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Especially pertinent to the study of the speaker18 prepa' 
ration and delivery are these factors: the origin of
the speeoh ideas, the preparation and revision of the 
manuscripts, publicizing the speeches, and the delivery 
of the speeches.^
ORIGIN OF THE SPEECH IDEAS
The specific subjects with which Ickes dealt In 
his attacks on Republicans were usually Ickes1 own Ideas. 
The first all-out assault on Governor Landon, which was 
eventually delivered on August 3, was suggested and out-
h ,
lined to the President by Ickes on June 17. Ickes had
^The information concerning speech preparation has 
been gleaned chiefly from two sources: the collection of
Ickes1 private papers in the Library of Congress, and 
personal interviews with several of his assistants and 
other close associates. The Iokes collection contains 
such items as letters concerning the formulation of speech 
plans and Ideas, first drafts of speeches as diotated, all 
subsequent drafts as revised (including the final copies 
from which Ickes read), and memoranda from the Secretary’s 
staff suggesting possible speech revisions.
Informants who proved most helpful in picturing 
Ickes’ system for preparing and publicizing speeches were 
Michael Straus, Joel David Wolfsohn, and Miss Helen Cun­
ningham, all of the Secretary’s staff; Thomas Corooran and 
Benjamin Cohen, presidential advisers and close friends of 
Ickes; Paul C. Aiken, who directed the Democratic Speakers 
Bureau; and Mrs. Jane Dahlman Ickes, Harold Ickes’ widow. 
All of the people on this list were also helpful in regard 
to information about delivery.
The Seoret Diary of Harold L. Iokes: The First
Thousand Days was a fertiTe source for information on the 
genesis-of speech ideas and on general methods of prepa­
ration.
^Ickes, Seoret Diary, Vol. I, p. 618.
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agitated for some kind of attack on Governor Landon even 
before Landon was officially nominated and had already 
noted ideas upon which he later based assaults on Landon’s 
record. The same may be Bald of the speeches castigating 
William Randolph Hearst. The first attack aimed primarily 
at Hearst came on August 27, though Ickes had paid passing 
respect to him in an earlier speech on June 7. The broad 
outline of the attack was suggested by Ickes to the Presi­
dent and to Jim Farley early in July.^
The only major attack made by Ickes which was 
definitely somebody else's idea was his June 7 attack on 
the Republican platform. The suggestion for the general 
lines of that speech came to Iokes from the President, 
though the idea originated with Stanley High, one of 
Roosevelt’s "ghost writers."^ It is not to be inferred 
that Iokes had a completely free hand as to subjeot 
matter and time of attack. All of the speeohes were 
screened by the President or one of his advisers, modi­
fications sometimes being effected, and the time of the 
delivery of speeohes was determined by Roosevelt and his 
closest political advisers.
The ideas in the oontent of his speeohes were,
^Ibld., p. 6 3 3.
6Ibid., p. 6 1 3.
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according to Ickes, largely his own.? Presidential ad­
visers screened Iokes' speeches, hut they never wrote 
them. The insinuation was made several times in Repub­
lican newspapers that Charles Nlchelson, publicity 
direotor for the Democratic National Committee, was the 
real author of the speeches.® The fact Is that, ac­
cording to Ickes' associates, Mlohelson did not write 
any of them, nor did anyone else but Iokes.*7 A few 
people might make suggestions for them before the first 
draft was written, several people assisted in revising 
and editing them, but the Secretary himself was the 
author of the speeohes.
THE PREPARATION AND REVISION OF SPEECH MANUSCRIPTS
In his personal diary, Iokes has desorlbed briefly 
the routine used for preparing his speech manuscripts:
After I have dictated a speech and revised it for 
the first time, I send copies to several members of 
my staff for corrections and suggestions. They go 
over the draft very carefully and then I go over the 
speech again, giving considerations to their sugges­
tions. Some of them I adopt and some of them I do
?Ibld., p. 669.
^Examples of such suggestions of “ghosting" ap­
peared in both the Indianapolis Star and the Washington 
Herald on August 1936. Iokes took resentful note of 
such charges. Iokes, Seoret Diary. Vol. I, p. 669.
^stated by Mr. Corcoran, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Straus, Mr. 
Wolfsohn, Miss Cunningham, and Mrs. Ickes in personal 
interviews between January 23 and February 1, 1955.
not adopt. And yet I have never felt that any of 
these men were writing my speeohes. I adopt this 
method merely because I think that every one in ray 
position, speaking to a national audience, needs 
some checks not only as to his faots but as to his
expressions.10
The first draft of Ickes* speeches were dictated, 
with the assistance of only a few notes, to a private 
seoretary. This dlotation was usually done at the 
Secretary’s office or home, though he dlotated at least
one speech while riding a train.^ According to one of
12his secretaries, Miss Helen Cunningham, Ickes could 
dictate rapidly and well, with only a very few references 
to previously prepared notes. This first draft was typed 
double-spaced with numbered lines to facilitate later re­
vision. The first revision was made by Iokes, and then 
the manuscript went to several assistants for criticism 
and further revision.
Among the advisers who were frequently asked to 
make oorreotions and suggestion were Michael Straus, 
Harry Slattery, Milton Fairman, Aubrey Taylor, R. B. 
Armstrong, and Joel David Wolfsohn. All of these men
l°Ickes, Secret Diary. Vol. I, p. 619.
■^The first draft of the speech "Governor Landon, 
Practical Progressive" was dictated in part to Iokes1 
private secretary, Mr. Cubberley, enroute from Washing­
ton to New York. Ibid., p. 650.
12personal interview, January 3 1, 1955.
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exoept Slattery were former newspapermen from Chicago. A 
study of memoranda suggestions from them, found In the 
Iokes Paper8 , reveals that they were thorough In their 
work. For the speech "What Shall the Republican Platform 
Be?," for example, Straus made twenty-nine suggestions, 
Slattery nine, and Taylor thirty-eight. The Slattery 
memorandum, the shortest of the three, Is quoted here, in 
full, to illustrate the type of suggestions usually made:
June 5, 1936
MEMORANDUM for Seoretary Ickes:
I have read this draft over and it certainly is 
a bull's eye.
I suggest on page 1, line 9, you delete the word 
miscegenetio. You might say the 193^ marriage.
On page 3, line 10, I would suggest the wording 
"so that the child can later play he is a farmer."
On page k ,  lines 1^ and 15, I think because of 
the radio you will have to identify Colonel Robert 
R. McCormick. You might call him the newspaper 
Colonel.
On page 5, line 20, I think you Bhould include 
Mr. Hearst.
On page 6 , line 22, might it not also be wise to 
add Mark Hanna?
On page 10, line 13, I suggest eliminating Senator 
MoNary and substituting Senator Dickinson.
On page 12, lines 6 and 7, I think that this 
sentence does not stand up well.
On page 1 3 , I suggest that you delete the sentence 
from line 13 to 1 5 .
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On page 20, line 22, X think you will have to 
Identify more definitely to your radio audience Lord 
of San Simeon.
Harry Slattery ^
Of these nine suggestions, only two were completely re­
jected, the rest being followed entirely or in part.
I* should be noted that Slattery’s suggestions 
touohed upon subject matter as well as mechanics and 
style. The same was true of the longer memoranda of the 
same date from Straus and Taylor. Taylor went so far as 
to submit an entirely new first page, and Straus offered 
a new concluding section; these two suggestions were 
ignored in the final draft, but most of the others were 
not.1^
The preparation for an Ickes campaign speech was 
thorough. From three to six members of the Interior and 
PWA staffs worked on each speeoh, and as many as seven 
different drafts were sometimes prepared and revised 
before a final manuscript emerged. Any excesses in 
thought or language which may have appeared in Ickes’ 
attacks were not the result of hasty or skimpy prepara­
tion.
It should also be emphasized that these attacks 
were never made without the approval of the White House.
13lokes Papers, Container 315. 
l^Ibid.
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They were often read by the President, and they were 
almost always checked by Stephen Early, presidential 
secretary, or his assistant, W. D. Hassett.^ For ex­
ample, Hassett read the speech entitled "Is Landon Sin­
cere?" and sent a memo to Early referring to It as "a 
foroeful address, a stinging Indictment of the Republi­
cans." Early then read the speech and sent the following 
approval to Straus:
Bill /Hassett/ and I think the Secretary's speech 
Is a masterpiece of Ironical and logical analysis of 
the issues of the campaign. Let me know when he goes 
on the air with this. I don't want to miss it. 16
PUBLICIZING THE ATTACK
One of the chief objectives of Ickes and his 
staff, which Included several former newspapermen, were 
being sure that a radio address would be well publicized. 
They wanted It not only widely-heard, but also widely- 
read. Consequently, IckeB fought for radio time and 
extensive radio coverage; he arranged advance publicity 
for his broadcasts; and he selected controversial
•^Memoranda from Straus to Early, from Hassett to 
Early, and from Early to Straus. Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library, Hyde Park, New York. These memoranda reveal that 
Straus normally sent Ickes' speeches to Early. Either 
Early or Hassett— or both— read the speeches and sent 
White House approval.
■^Memorandum from Early to Straus on October 2, 
1936. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
subjects and provocative speech titles to help gain both 
radio listeners and newspaper readers.^7
For Ickes* speeches, securing a nation-wide, or at 
least regional, radio audience was almost a "must.14 
Michael Straus was under instructions to have sponsors of 
the Secretary's speeches secure the widest possible radio 
coverage. This became an important criteria in determin-
T O
lng which speaking invitations would be accepted. °
Indeed Paul G. Aiken of the National Democratic Committee 
organization found it almost impossible to get Ickes to 
accept engagements unless network facilities were prom­
ised.1^
To insure further their being widely heard, Ickes* 
speeches were announoed several days in advance, usually 
in a way calculated to create curiosity and interest.
For example, two announcements were released to the press 
prior to the August 27 attack on Landon and Hearst. On 
August 24, the New York Times carried advanoe notice 
under the heading "Iokes To G-lve Talk Over Badlo Thursday" 
the sub-heading was "Secretary's Subject Not Disclosed."
•^From personal interviews with Straus and Aiken.
■^Straus interview.
^Alken interview.
68
Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, will 
speak on a national radio hook-up over the Columbia 
Broadoastlng System at 9:^5 P.M. (E.S.T.) Thursday, 
the Democratic National Committee announced last 
night from Its headquarters In the Hotel Biltmore.
Secretary Ickes' subject was not disclosed, but 
it was Indicated that he would discuss some of the 
questions raised In Governor Landon's talks at 
Chautauqua Lake and in Buffalo.20
As a matter of plain fact, Ickes1 speech was to 
ignore almost completely the two Landon addresses just 
cited, but this hint could be expected to create interest. 
Closer to the truth, though indirectly promising more 
than the speech would deliver, was the preview carried 
by the New York Times on the eve of the address. This 
item of advance publicity was headed "Secret Documents 
Promised by Ickes," and the sub-title was: "Democratic
Committee Says He Will Give Hearst Letters In Radio 
Address." The Committee’s release was quoted, in part, 
as follows:
Secretary Ickes has sources of information of 
his own which without aid of the committee have 
produced documentary evidence of a raoBt enlighten­
ing charaoter. It appears from these documents, 
involving not only the Republican candidate but 
also the Republican Vice Presidential candidate and 
Republican National Committee members, that when 
Landon followers want to convey suggestions to their 
hope, the method they consider most effective is via 
William Randolph Hearst. When 'suggestions’ come 
from San Simeon, they rate as ’orders’ in Topeka. ■1
20New York Times, August 2k, 1936, p. 6.
2lNew York Times, August 27, 1936, p. 11.
By hints which were varied hut not always aocurate, 
and by predictions which captivated Interest but perhaps 
promised too much, Ickes* major addresses were given 
build-up publicity. The potential listener or reader 
might have been tempted, too, by the titles selected for 
the Secretary’s broadcasts. Such announced titles as 
“Governor Landon, Practical Progressive," "Hearst over 
Topeka," "Is Landon Sincere?", "Landon, Coughlin,*et Al',“ 
and "Landon's Angels" were probably provooative enough to 
win many listeners and assure more than average news­
paper publicity. These titles became especially effective 
when coupled with Ickes’ reputation for vitriolic attack, 
withering sarcasm, and sharp invective, a reputation upon 
which Ickes capitalized and which he apparently fostered 
in order to secure a wide hearing. The effective use of 
publicity was one of the strongest elements in Ickes* 
efforts as a campaign speaker.
DELIVERING THE ATTACK
Ickes’ prepared addresses were all read directly 
from manuscript. The final reading copy of the manuscript 
was typed double-spaced on half sheets of heavy paper, 
each half-sheet being designed for a reading time of one
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minute.22
Little distinction needs to be made between Ickes* 
delivery for broadcast speeches before a live audience 
and for those which were studio broadcasts. For the most 
part, Ickes paid little or no attention to the audience 
present. He very infrequently looked up from his manu­
script, and he seldom used any bodily action beyond head 
gestures. The only characteristic gesture recalled by 
informants who were present at Ickes' addresses was one 
used to halt audience applause. Fearful of running over 
his radio time, Ickes would raise one arm to request 
silence when applause threatened to be at all prolonged.23 
This gesture was necessitated by the fact that Ickes 
frequently rebelled at cutting his speeches sufficiently 
to get them comfortably Into radio time. Straus, Wolf- 
sohn, and Corcoran all observed that this was a serious 
problem to those attempting to revise Ickes1 manuscripts.
2 2Ickes» speaking rate was between I35 and 150 
words per minute. It was 14-7 for the June 7 address, 1 ^ 5  
for the August 3 address, and 135 for the October 9 ad­
dress. This compares with the average of 120 words per 
minute for representative college orators reported in 
William Norwood Brigance's "How Fast Do We Talk?",
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, XII (November, 1926), 
pp. 337-42.
23Mr. Straus, Miss Cunningham, and Mrs. Ickes all 
mentioned this use of a common gesture on Ickes' part.
Mrs. Ickes tried to get him to allow time for applause 
so the radio audience would be aware of the local res­
ponse. Interviews.
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Ickes hated to see anything cut and sometimes restored 
passages cut for time economy by his aides. He 
usually wound up trying to pack a thirty-minute or 
longer speech into twenty-seven minutes.
Ickes’ voice, while somewhat "dry,”2^ was strong,
and his articulation and pronunciation were considered
exceptionally good by some who heard him. His tendency
to have to rush his rate of delivery, however, made him
a little difficult at times to follow. Upon occasion,
also, his voice tended to beoome harsh and shrill. This
was only during the most denunciatory sections of his 
27speeches. '
Despite these faults, most of them because of a 
tendency to have to rush the reading of the manuscript, 
Ickes’ delivery was effective. His delivery had one 
important saving feature: a driving sincerity which
2**Personal interviews with Mr. Straus, Mr. Wolf- 
sohn, and Mr. Corcoran.
2^!!H1b voice is dry, without melting oadences or 
dramatic overtones.” Louisville Herald Post, October 26, 
1936.
26Mr. Straus and Mrs. Ickes both expressed this 
opinion of his articulation and pronunciation, and the re­
cording of his 1937 speech favoring the President’s Supreme 
Court plan supports that opinion. According to Straus, 
Ickes made almost constant reference to a large dictionary 
on his desk to confirm both word usage and pronunciation.
2?Straus Interview.
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carried conviction.2® Ickes was an enthusiastic partisan 
who believed in the Roosevelt oause and believed in his 
own speeches. His voice reflected this feeling and 
carried a certain contagious sincerity, even amid the 
saroasm and sometimes cruel humor. It was this animated 
presentation which compensated for delivery deficiencies 
which otherwise might have rendered him ineffective as a 
speaker.
In summary, Ickes1 preparation for his verbal 
assaults on the Landon camp were both systematic and 
thorough; his advance publicity was extremely well- 
handled; and his delivery, while suffering from several 
weaknesses, was generally effective.
2®Thoraas G. Corcoran believes this the outstanding 
characteristic of Ickes* delivery, and Miohael Straus 
also commented favorably upon it. Interviews. That 
quality of animated sincerity is unmistakable in the 1937  
recording previously cited.
CHAPTER IV
"WHAT SHALL THE REPUBLICAN PLATFORM BE?"
Ickes’ first important 1936 campaign address was 
delivered on June 7 and was broadcast over an N.B.C. 
network. Entitled "What Shall the Republican Platform 
Be?", this speech satirized and denounced the Repub­
lican party on the eve of its convention.
BACKGROUND AND SETTING OF THE SPEECH
The assignment to deliver the speech on the Repub­
lican platform came to Ickes on short notice. On June 2, 
he explained:
The President asked me whether I was willing to 
make a speech over the air on Sunday night for the 
purpose of somewhat taking the wind out of the sails 
of the Republican National Convention with respect 
to its platform. This convention will meet in 
Cleveland next week. He outlined one or two things 
that he thought I might develop In my speech. The 
plan appeals to me as being a good one, provided I 
can deliver on my end of it. The subject can be 
handled in such a way as to deflate the platform 
pomposities and insincerities of the Republicans to 
a considerable extent. It seems that Stanley High, 
who is now very close to the President in a confi­
dential capacity and who appears to be a highly 
Intelligent and certainly a progressive individual, 
first conceived the Idea. He approached Senators 
Norris and LaFollette to see whether either of them 
would make suoh a speeoh, but they did not get the 
point. They both said they would rather wait until 
after the convention and then oritloize the platform.
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Then thoughts turned to me, with the result that 
the President made the proposal to me and I 
accepted.
That afternoon, after discussing the proposed 
speech with Stanley High, Ickes set to work on it. By 
June copies of his once-revised draft were in the 
hands of four of his assistants: Straus, Slattery,
Taylor, and Falrman. On June 5> eaoh presented a memo­
randum containing suggestions for revision. On the basis 
of these suggestions, Ickes revised his speech and pre­
pared it for final delivery. Copies of the original
draft were also sent to the President and High, both of
2
whom expressed enthusiastic approval.
Ickes was also pleased with this speech. He had 
been chafing at the relative inactivity in the Democratic 
campaign. He considered the American Liberty League, 
William Randolph Hearst, Landon, and several other enemy 
targets to be extremely vulnerable, and this speech gave 
him an opportunity to get at most of them in a single 
effort. The Landon candidacy, in particular, he thought 
should be attacked; and the only direct referenoe to the
^Ickes, Secret Diary. Vol. I, p. 6I3 . 
2Ibld., p. 615.
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Kansas Governor so far had proved a mistake.^ It seemed 
evident at this time that Landon would secure the Repub­
lican nomination. On May 20, Herbert Hoover indicated 
that he would not be aotive in any "stop-Landon" cam­
paign, thus severely handicapping the efforts of con­
servatives who desired to rally about the ex-Presldent.^ 
On June 3, Landon1s prospects were further enhanced by a 
break in a three-state Eastern bloc which had been 
thought opposed to him. J. Henry Rorabaok, Republican 
leader in Connecticut, announced that his state's nine­
teen votes would go to the Kansan on the first ballot.
The next day, Charles Michael of the New York Times re­
ported that some Republican leaders were freely predicting 
his nomination on the first ballot.-’ It appeared that 
Landon was the candidate Roosevelt would face in November 
and that the time had come to open fire upon his party.
The problems the Republicans faced in drafting a 
platform made them appear vulnerable to the type of attack 
the President wanted. To maintain serious hopeB for
3ln May, Farley publicly referred to Landon as 
the Governor of "a typioal prairie state." This was 
pounced upon by Republicans as a slighting reference to 
a Midwestern state and the President considered the 
referenoe a definite error. Samuel I. Rosenman, Working 
with Roosevelt (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952)
p. 1.25:
^ e w  York Times, May 20, I936,.p. 15.
^New York Times, June k, 1936, p. 1.
victory, the Republican party needed to win back the 
support of the progressives of their own party, who had 
supported Roosevelt In 1932, and to appeal to liberal 
Independents. Yet, at the same time, they had to retain 
the wholehearted backing of the conservatives who consti­
tuted the bulk of the party's strength. To write a plat­
form guaranteed to appeal to these almost antipodal 
groups was indeed a herculean task. On the same day that 
Ickes was to deliver his address, Arthur Krock noted the 
extreme difficulty of framing a platform upon which 
Landon could run and yet upon which the supporters of 
Herbert Hoover, Arthur Vandenberg, and William E. Borah 
could agree.^
Some specific planks upon which Eastern business 
interests and Western agrarian factions were already 
divided before the Republican convention were those con­
cerning currency, business regulation, foreign policy, 
and the farm program. On June 1, the Supreme Court 
created another divisive factor; by a 5~^ decision, it 
invalidated the New York state minimum wage law. Pre­
viously, Republicans had been united in praising the 
Supreme Court in its defense against New Deal “assaults 
upon the constitution"; now the Court had rendered a
^New York Times, June 7, 1936, Seo. 4, p.
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deolsion manifestly unpopular with labor groups and 
liberal elements within the party. Hamilton Fish, Repub­
lican congressman from New York, asserted that this
7decision would cost the Republicans a million votes.
It undoubtedly presented another headache to the already 
beleaguered Republican platform framers. Into such a 
background, Harold Ickes projected his pointed and parti­
san observations about the forthcoming Republican platform.
PURPOSE AND THESIS OF THE SPEECH
The purpose of the June 7 address, as stated by 
the President, was "taking the wind out of the sails of
O
the Republican party with respect to its platform." In 
the face of such divergent interests within the Republican 
party, Democratic leaders felt certain that the platform 
adopted at Cleveland would be vague and fence-straddling 
on many difficult issues. It was possible, however, that 
these unresolved conflicts could be camouflaged beneath 
generalized language In some places and covered completely 
by strong attacks on the New Deal In others. It was Ickes' 
task to expose these conflicts to public view, indicating 
to voters what they should examine olosely in the finished 
platform. The emphasis upon irony and sarcasm whioh Ickes
7New York Times. June 3> 1936, p. 1.
8lckes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 613.
78
gave to the speech was not without purpose either. Making 
the efforts of the Republican convention an object of humor 
and ridicule was calculated to undermine the picture of a 
"crusade" against the New Deal which Republican leaders 
were painting.
Locating the thesis of this speech is much more 
difficult than analyzing Its purpose. At no place in the 
development did the speaker make any perceptible effort 
to clarify for the listener the proposition which he was 
supporting. A close study of the manuscript reveals no 
single, definite proposition, and Ickes’ own analysis of 
the speech Indicated none.^ As a later analysis of his 
forms of support reveals, the speaker seemed more intent 
upon creating oertaln audience attitudes than upon sup­
porting any specific thesis. That Ickes’ specific purpose 
in this address required support of no single proposition 
is a recurring factor in the further analysis of the 
speech.
LINES OF ARGUMENT AND ORGANIZATION
Briefing an IckeB speech is not a simple task. So 
numerous were the targets which Ickes attempted to hit 
and so varied the ideas which he injected during the course 
of a speech, that the organization was often loose and
9lbld.. p. 615.
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Indefinite. From the June 7 speech, however, four main 
lines of argument oan be seen:
(1) Republicans are trying to produce a platform 
which will appear new and progressive but which 
will, in reality, remain ultra-conservative.
(2) The Republican platform-makers must serve 
too many conflicting Interests to be able to pro­
duce a frank and definite platform.
(3) Republicans face serious dilemmas on several 
specific planks.
(4) The Republican convention, ostensibly free, 
will still be controlled by bosses and special 
interests.
Actually, since he was trying more to create
audience attitudes than to support a particular thesis,
Ickes probably considered these four lines of thought
less important than the treatment of personalities which
accompanied them. His own synopsis of the speech gives
weight to such a conclusion:
I gently kid the Republican leadership, the 
platform makers, and Governor Landon, who, from 
every indication, will be the Republican nominee, 
perhaps on the first ballot. I even poke fun at my 
old friends William Allen White, Clifford Pinchot, 
and Frank Knox. I do discuss possible Republican 
party planks in a serious vein, but I go no further 
than to point out the dilemma in which the Republi­
cans will find themselves at Cleveland. I comment 
on the fact that William Randolph Hearst was the 
discoverer of Governor Landon, and I picture him as 
the dictator of the Republican platform and the
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absentee boss who will determine the deliberations 
at Cleveland aB successor to former Republican bosses, 
such as Tom Platt, Murray Crane, Mark Hanna, Matt 
Quay, and Boise Penrose. I point out that an effort 
has apparently been made to select as the candidate 
of the Republican party the man who Is the least 
troubled by views on any subject and who Is least 
qualified, on the basis of experience, to be President 
of the United States.^-0
Always Jealous of his speech time, Ickes spent 
little of- It In introduction or conclusion. In this par­
ticular speech, the introduction proper consisted of one 
paragraph of three sentences:
You have all heard about the mountain that con­
ceived and brought forth a mouBe but have you ever 
heard about the mouse that conceived and brought 
forth a mountain? This may seem to be an Impossible 
achievement but nevertheless it Is about to be at­
tempted at Cleveland, Ohio. There, If you are 
sufficiently interested, you will be able this week 
to witness a supreme effort on the part of a politi­
cal mouse to produce a platform which will lift Its 
peaks in sheer rugged grandeur into the very heavens 
from an arid and barren waste.
Prom this point, Ickes went directly into a satiri­
cal description of the personnel charged with delivering 
and caring for "baby platform." Each man was assigned a 
role presumably based on his special funotlon at the 
convention. For example, Herbert Hoover was the obste­
trician; William Allen White was the plastic surgeon;
3-0Ibid. , p. 615.
■^All quotations from the speech are taken from the 
final manuscript from whloh Ickes read. A copy of this 
manuscript is in the Ickes Papers.
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William E. Borah supplied the anti-monopoly bib and 
isolation tucker; Gifford Pinchot donated a conservation 
romper; Frank Lowden supplied overalls and toy pitchfork 
for playing farmer; and William Randolph Hearst and 
Robert R. McCormick sponsored the baby. In this section 
of the speech, Ickes did more than set the stage for 
further argument. While apparently presenting it for 
humorous effect, he nevertheless made the point that the 
platform would be progressive in superficial appearance 
but conservative in reality.
Next, departing from figurative exposition, the 
speaker noted that the varied interests which the Repub­
licans would attempt to satisfy made a clear-cut platform 
impossible. Among the groups Ickes cited were, political­
ly, the "rugged individualists" of the Hoover line, and, 
economically, the "vested interests." Among the indivi­
duals whose views had to be considered were Andrew Mellon, 
William E. Borah, Ogden Mills, Gifford Pinchot, Frank 0. 
Lowden, and, finally, William Randolph Hearst. Ickes 
said he excluded Landon because "since first he was dis­
covered by William Randolph Hearst and his fellow wise men 
from the East, Governor Landon has had no clear-out, forth­
right view's— at least none that he has ventured to express 
openly."
After a brief digression to attack Hearst, considered
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by many a political liability to Landon, the speaker then 
took up the dilemmas of the Republicans on specific planks. 
The New York Times in a June 8 summary of the speech list­
ed these six planks: attitude toward the Supreme Court
(after the New York minimum wage law was struck down), the 
gold standard, balancing the budget, the farm program, 
social security legislation, and relief.12 To these six 
should be added the subjects of banking and federal 
housing. In each area, Ickes pointed up what he believed 
to be dilemmas from which the Republican platform could 
not escape with credit. On several points he challenged 
Republicans to present specific improvements over the New 
Deal.
Finally, Ickes charged that the convention would 
not be a "free” one, that Its platform and its candidate 
would in reality be dictated by William Randolph Hearst.
He added that the candidate selected would be the one 
"whose record is the most colorless, whose views on the 
burning-issues of the day are least known, and whose con­
victions are most accommodating."
The conclusion of the speech was even more brief 
than the introduction. Spending no time In summary, it 
concluded in a single sentence: "Of a truth, it does
ISflew York Times, June 8, 1936, p.
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appear that the Republican party la about to fare forth 
on a blind date, the location of which is unknown."
THE FORMS OF SUPPORT
For the purposes of organization and clarity, the 
analysis of Ickes• rhetorical forms of support is based 
on the Aristolelian classification of three types of 
appeal: ethical, emotional, and l o g i c a l . T h e s e  appeals
are not, to be sure, always used separately; a single 
argument may rest on a combination of elements of all 
three types of appeal. They do, however, present 
functional divisions of the basic character of arguments, 
and as such they have become almost stereotypes in 
rhetorical criticism:
Rhetoricians sinoe Aristotle have generally 
accepted his concept that the modes of persuasion, 
depending upon the effect they produce in hearers,
•are of three kinds, consisting either in the moral 
character of the speaker or in the production of a 
certain disposition in the audience or in the 
speech itself by means of real or apparent demon­
stration. • These, in the order mentioned by 
Aristotle, are usually called the ethical, the 
pathetic or emotional, and the logical. Most 
rhetorical estimates are based in some degree upon 
this classification, many being so firmly founded
3-3 “Of the means of persuasion supplied by the 
speech Itself there are three kinds. The first kind 
reside in the character /etho ~ r  ' e
attitude in the hearer; the third appertain to the 
argument proper, in so far as it actually or seemingly 
demonstrates." Lane Cooper (trane.), The Rhetorlo. of 
Aristotle (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1932),
p. tJ.
second consist In productlng
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upon it as to become noticeably stereotyped.1**'
In Ickes1 address entitled "What Shall the Repub­
lican Platform Be?", his argument, judged by rhetorical 
standards for logical demonstration, was weak; nor was 
the appeal through the character of the speaker especial­
ly strong. His strongest appeals were directed toward 
the emotions of his national radio audience.
The speech did not suffer greatly from demonstra­
ble inaccuracies of fact, from inconsistency, or from 
fallaoies in the reasoning process. It simply did not 
lay much stress upon logical proof. Little attempt was 
made, for example, to establish the validity of the 
factual matter involved in the speech. Facts for a 
speech are normally established by use of statistics, 
testimony, or example;1  ^to a very large degree, Ickes 
shunned two of these. A study of the text of this 
thirty-minute address reveals only one use of statistics 
and only one of authoritative testimony. These both ap­
pear in a single argument. When refuting the claim of 
Henry J. Allen of Kansas that Great Britain was achieving
^Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech 
Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1928),
P. 331.
■^Glles Wilkeson Gray and Waldo W. Braden, Public 
Speaking: Principles and Practice (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 195i)» P. 285.
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bettor recovery than the United States at a lower cost, 
Ickes presented this brief argument:
In his enthusiasm to make an onslaught on the 
New Deal, Mr. Allen did not tell all the facts. 
According to the Wall Street Journal’s London cor­
respondent, Great Britain paid more than two 
billion dollars last year, or about one seventh of 
its Income, for Its elaborate system of health, un­
employment, old age, widows and orphans1 pensions, 
grants to keep children in school, low cost housing 
and other projects. To equal this the United States, 
with three times England’s population and a present 
Income of fifty billion dollars, would have to spend 
about seven billion dollars a year, a figure far 
beyond the current outlay.
In this argument lay the only attempt In the 
entire speech to establish a conclusion by use of statis­
tics or testimony. The speaker was somewhat less stinging 
with the use of example. He used, in fact,a large number 
of examples, but In only one Instance were the examples 
used as "argument1 in the strictest sense of the word.
Most of the examples were used as exposition and ampli­
fication. Since, however, exposition and amplification 
can be, and often were, used as less direct forms of 
persuasion, these instances should not be entirely 
Ignored. The more obvious use of examples as argument 
occurred when Ickes attempted to demonstrate that the 
Republican record gave little reason to expect a favor­
able Republican agricultural program. First, he alluded 
to their recent record while in opposition:
It is to be taken for granted that a soft pedal 
will be put upon such men as Senator Daniel 0.
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Hastings, representing the State of the liberty- 
loving duPonts, who insulted several thousand farmers 
not long since when he declared that they had been
bribed to come to Washington to present their griev­
ances. It is to be doubted whether the platform will 
applaud the decision of the Supreme Court which put 
an abrupt stop to the farmer's production adjustment
programs. The Republicans will not point with pride
to their vote of 6^ against 19 for in the House of 
Representatives and of 11 against and 5 for in the 
Senate on the Soil Conservation and Domestic allot­
ment Act which represented an attempt to salvage 
whatever might be possible after the Supreme Court 
had declared the A.A.A. Act to be un-constitutional.
Then he turned to the record of the last Republican 
term in office:
They /the farmers/ remember how the Hoover-Wall 
Street steamroller flattened out Mr. Lowden and the 
farmers at the Republican Convention at Kansas City 
in 1928, even although//sic/ after Mr. Lowden and 
the farmers had gone home on that occasion, the Con­
vention paid its usual sardonic llpservice /slo7 to 
agriculture. They recall how after the MoNary-Haugen 
plan, which they wanted, had been Junked, the Farm 
Board plan, that they hadn't asked for, was enacted; 
how the Fordney-McCumber industrial tariffs were 
boosted still higher in the Smoot-Hawley Act; and 
how agriculture, along with the rest of the oountry, 
came to a grand smash in 1 9 3 2.
The ostensibly expository examples appear in sup­
port of three of the four main lines of argument. In 
demonstration of his belief that the Republican platform 
would be superficially progressive but basically conser­
vative, Ickes enumerated and characterized the men who 
■ he said would be key figures in determining the platform. 
Through his half-humorous, but usually "slanted," des­
criptions, he cited as examples of "progressive window- 
dressing" Gifford Pinchot and William Allen White, men
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respected by liberal and progressive voters; as the true 
powers in the platform determination, he cited Herbert 
Hoover and William Randolph Hearst, names which were 
politioal anathema to progressives of both parties.
In Ickes’ argument that the Republicans faced too 
many conflicting interests to come up with a frank and 
definite platform, he cited several examples of people 
and groups who would have to be pleased or appeased.
Again in his contention that specific planks presented 
difficult dilemmas, Ickes turned to the example to de­
velop his idea. He cited the specific problems, but, 
with the exception of that concerning farm policy, he 
merely explained the problem, making no forecast and 
drawing no conclusions.
While Ickes did little to prove his statements 
through logical support, it should be noted that he was 
dealing, in many cases, with rather generally accepted 
information. The platform problems of the Republicans 
had been aired in newspapers for several days preceding 
the speech. The New York Times had already mentioned 
these problems both in news oolumns and editorially. For 
example, Amos Pinchot had been quoted on the gold standard 
problem on June 1; Charles R. Michael discussed platform
•^New York Times, June 1, 1936, p. 2.
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difficulties in general on June more specifioally
IBon June 5» and Arthur Krook pointed up platform con­
flicts among the Landon, Borah, Vandenberg and Hoover 
forces editorially on the same day that Ickes spoke.^
More than once in Ickes1 speech he asserted that 
Landon had no stated views of his own on important ques­
tions and that both he and the convention were dominated
by publisher Hearst. The first of these two statements
20might have been sustained from other sources; concern­
ing the second, certainly Hearst was vigorously supporting 
the Kansas Governor, but the assertion that Hearst con­
trolled Landon and the convention required proof. An 
analysis of the validity of this charge will be reserved 
for the chapter dealing with the speech “Hearst Over 
Topeka," in which Ickes attempted to prove his charge.
On June 7, however, it was not generally asserted or
l?New York Times, June 4, 1936, p. 2.
•^New York Times. June 5» 1936, p. 1.
l?New York Times. June 7, 1936, Sec. 4, p.
2®Krock__stated on June 3: "Little or nothing is
known of his /Landon’s/ views on the most acute public 
questions." New York Times, June 3> 1936. Senator 
Vandenberg was reportedly disturbed also by Landon’s 
failure to state his views. New York Times, June 7,
1 9 3 6, See. 4, p. ty.
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21believed,*• and it required proof to be sustained. Logical 
proof was, however, something relied upon very little in 
the speech hitting the unborn Republican platform. Ickes 
relied primarily upon partisan exposition of generally 
aocepted premises and upon repeated and varied assertion 
of more controversial conclusions. After all, he was 
more intent upon creating attitudes of suspicion and 
distrust toward the forthcoming platform than he was in 
logically demonstrating a specific proposition. For this 
reason, demonstrable fact and logical development played 
a secondary role to suggestion and innuendo.
One of the three most important means of persua­
sion, according to the Arlstolelian division, resides in 
the personality and character— the "ethos"—  of the 
speaker.22 This personal factor undoubtedly aided Ickes 
in his June 7 speech, though he made relatively little 
attempt to capitalize consciously upon it. It has been 
pointed out in Chapter II that Ickes had a good reputation 
as an honest and efficient public official and as a 
private citizen. He brought to the platform with him the 
prestige of an important man in the Administration and
2^Ickes himself later expressed dissatisfaction 
with the public reaction to the Hearst charge, especially 
with the almost unanimous newspaper rejections of it. 
lokes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 671.
22Cooper, ojo. clt. . pp. 8-9.
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the respect accorded an honest and efficient one. The 
major concern at present Is with his own efforts as a 
speaker— in this particular speeoh— to enhance his 
ethical appeal.
Any attempts Ickes made to lend weight to his 
words by the revelation of his own character were in­
direct ones. The speech was approached from the third- 
person point of view; at no time did the speaker refer 
directly to himself. Instead he referred to "this 
Administration," "the Roosevelt Administration," and 
"President Roosevelt." Ickes spoke as a representative 
of the New Deal, for it was the ethos of the Adminis­
tration that he sought to build. For example, Ickes 
said of the future Republican farm plank:
The farmers know what the Roosevelt Administration 
has done and is continuing to do to improve their 
economic and social lot. They know that while this 
Administration has made few promises it has tried in 
good faith to keep its pledges, despite constant 
Republican opposition and notwithstanding the bitter 
antagonism of Wall Street and those interests closely 
allied with the Republican party. . . .
A few paragraphs further on, the same type of appeal
appeared again:
This Administration has made an honest and deter­
mined effort to strengthen our banking system so as 
to prevent a recurrence of what happened during the 
preceding Administration, when thousands of banks 
toppled over, carrying with them the savings of 
millions of American citizens. We have also enacted 
legislation to protect those who buy securities.
These reforms have been effected in spite of the 
bitter opposition of men and interests influential 
in the councils of the Republican party.
These typical examples show how Ickes emphasized 
the “intelligence, character, and good wlll"^ of the 
Roosevelt Administration. It is worth noting that with 
the build-up for the Administration went a contrasting 
application of negative ethos to the Republican party.
This prooess of stripping from the Republicans those at­
tributes which win confidence was especially in evidence 
in those places where IckeB described, ridiculed, and 
derided individual Republican leaders. The insinuation 
of insincerity and the sardonic commentary upon past 
performance were well-calculated to undermine Republican 
prestige.
As he lauded the Democratic Administration and 
attacked the Republicans, Ickes remained simply an Ad­
ministration spokesman. The closest approach to a 
personal referenoe came at a point where his personal 
pride In PWA expressed itself:
They /the public/ know that useful, valuable, and 
sooially-desirable public works that have added great­
ly to the assets of the oountry have been built with 
a resultant uplift of business and Industry.
In the main, Ickes stuck to building up Adminis­
tration ethos and destroying that of the opposition. The
23These are the attributes, according to Aristotle, 
whioh gain belief through the person of the speaker.
Ibid., p. 92.
emphasis w.ae predominantly upon the latter.
The strongest appeals In the speech were directed 
to the emotions of the audience: to fear, to prejudice,
to the desire for security. In his efforts to create an 
air of uncertainty and suspicion, Iokes associated the 
Republicans with the dark days of the depression.
Following the same line adopted by most Democratic 
speakers in 1936> be cast the blame for the severity of 
that depression on the Republicans, especially upon the 
Hoover Administration:
The people remember all too well the vacillation, 
the ineptitude, the division of counsel and the actual 
cowardice that controlled the Republican party when 
the depression broke over the land in the fall of 
1929.
At other points In the speech, he referred to the "plunge 
toward the economic abyss that this Administration halted 
when it came into power in Maroh of 1 9 3 3»"‘fco “the pre­
cipitous road that we were following toward national 
ruin," and to "what happened during the preceding Adminis­
tration, when thousands of banks toppled over, carrying 
with them the savings of millions of American citizens."
Iokes alBo aroused the fear of "boss oontrol," 
both directly and by Innuendo. He charged that the plat­
form had been "drafted by a few men and approved in 
advance by the same interests that have controlled the 
Republican party since the days of Theodore Roosevelt," 
and that the convention would be controlled by an
93
"absentee boss," William Randolph Hearst. He managed, 
too, several occasions for injecting into his speech 
passing references to former Republican "Bosses" Tom 
Platt, Murray Crane, Mark Hanna, Matt Quay, and Boise 
Penrose. Nor did he neglect the naming of Warren Hard­
ing in a "meeting at midnight in a smoke-filled hotel 
room.!*
A third element of doubt and uncertainty was 
drawn from the likely Republican candidate. The absence 
of public information concerning Governor Landon's views 
on important issues was the weapon selected by Ickes. On 
three separate occasions, the speaker referred to Landon's 
unknown views. He asserted that Landon had "no clear-cut, 
forthright views," and labeled the Kansas Governor "a 
new political Messiah, than whom no Delphic oracle has 
been more abstemious or cryptic in his utterances."
Ickes dosed with a statement epitomizing the elements 
of doubt and uncertainty with which he had been stirring 
the fears of the voters: "Of a truth, it does appear
that the Republican party is about to fare forth on a 
blind date, the location of which is unknown."
Coupled with the stirring of apprehension concern­
ing the Republican platform and candidate were positive 
appeals to the desire for security. He referred to the 
Roosevelt Administration's record of economic recovery
in glowing terms. He cited the Democratic efforts to 
revive the Amerioan economy, to relieve the deprivation 
which depression had entailed, and to provide future 
security for the people individually and collectively. 
Special appeals were directed toward workers, farmers,
s'
and small investors. The running contrast of the Hoover 
Administration as a "do-nothing administration" with the 
Roosevelt Administration as a "do-somethlng administra­
tion" wac calculated to stir up vague fears on one hand 
and a feeling of confidence on the other.
A type of supporting device used by Ickes which 
can be included under the general heading of emotional 
proof was humor. While humor is probably used more often 
as a device for holding attention or for creating good 
will toward the speaker, it can also be used as subtle 
but effective persuasion. Ickes used it primarily in 
this way. His description of the personnel assisting 
in the birth of "baby platform" was, for example, 
satire gentle in degree but sharp in purpose. It was 
clever enough in wording and resembled reality enough 
in its implications to make the Republican convention a 
subject of ridicule. This paragraph helps to illustrate 
the method employed:
This expected progeny, the result of a mesalliance 
between the Republican party and the Liberal League, 
is awaited with hope-filled hearts, not only by the
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parents, "but by all the surviving members of a once
numerous family. Nothing has been spared In the way
of pre-natal oare. . . . Famous medicine men, skill­
ed in their several specialties, already have fore­
gathered in Cleveland, and are hurrying there, to 
chant their Incantations while introducing to the 
world a product which, if it lives up to advance 
notices, will constitute a new world prodigy.
Having thus set the slyly humorous tone of the satire,
the speaker proceeded to specific party leaders who would
be present. The following paragraph is typical:
Properly to clothe the infant, a layette has been 
carefully collected. After all, it would be an af­
front to good taste to expose the Infant in all its 
nakedness. William E. Borah, of Idaho, if still 
present, will be granted the privilege of supplying
an anti-monopoly bib, as well as a tucker to protect
against the chilling blasts of foreign alliances. 
Frank 0. Lowden, of Illinois, will present a suit of 
overalls and a toy pitchfork so that the child oan 
play at being a farmer. Gifford Pinchot, of Pennsyl­
vania, will supply a conservation romper done in his 
best style.
The close blending of fact and fancy enabled Ickes to 
suggest effectively by innuendo what might have been less 
graphic and more difficult to establish if attempted 
through more obvious forms of argument. His satirical 
approach struck Rt Republican ethos through gentle 
ridicule and, at the same time, argued against Republican 
sincerity and good faith. The same purposeful humor was 
also used in figurative references to Landon's discovery 
by "William Randolph Hearst and his fellow wise men from 
the East,” and to the monetary assistance expected by 
Republicans from Jouett Shouse, President of the Liberty
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League', as "wet nurse" and the duPonts as "pulmotor 
operators. "
Ickes told no funny stories and Introduced no 
humor simply for humor’s sake. He specialized In irony 
and broad satire. His was humor designed to persuade, 
not Just to amuse.
Although Ickes’ use of language Is dlsoussed 
later under another chapter sub-heading, it should be 
mentioned here that his use of word-symbols possessing 
emotive value2** contributed substantially to the emotion­
al proof of the speech. By the suggestion involved in 
carefully chosen language symbols, Ickes pictured the 
Republican party as the party of special interests, of 
political corruption, and of arch-conservatism. Ickes’ 
references to "the Liberty League," "the liberty-loving 
duPonts," "Andrew Mellon," "Wall Street," and "vested 
interests" were primarily emotive rather than referential, 
constantly associating the Republican party with special 
financial interests. By the same token, references to 
"Ballinger, Fall, and Sinclair," to the "Ohio gang," and 
to "a smoke-filled hotel room" were dearly intended
^According to Thonssen and Baird, words have both 
"referential" and "emotive" value, the former value being 
strictly denotative and the latter arising out of the 
emotional reaction the word calls forth from the reader 
or hearer. Thonssen and Baird, 0£. cit., pp. 368-6 9.
to picture the Republican party as a party of graft and 
corruption. Such terms as “Old Dealers," "rugged in­
dividualists," and "Republican reactionaries," taken in 
context, were intended to leave no doubt that the Repub­
licans were a party of political arch-conservatism.
Ickes' attack on the Republican platform placed 
heavy emphasis upon emotional proofs, and the use of 
"loaded" language stereotypes was one of the strongest 
manifestations of that emphasis.
USE OF LANGUAGE
Ordinarily, one of the most important criteria 
for rhetorical analysis of a speaker's language is 
whether the style is more characteristically oral than 
written. William Norwood Brlgance has emphasized the 
difference between these two styles:
There are sharp and important differences between 
the use of written words and the use of spoken words 
These differences grow out of the fact that one 
style is intended for the eye and the other for the 
ear. The reader may absorb at leisure; the hearer 
must take it on the wing. . . .
In short, the difference between written and 
spoken style is this: written style must be ulti­
mately intelligible to the reader. Spoken style 
must be instantly intelligible to the hearer.25
25willlara Norwood Brlgance, Speech Composition 
(second edition, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc 
1953)* P. 200.
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In Ickes* case, the finished manuscript needed both to 
read well and deliver well. As noted in Chapter II, 
Democratic campaign leaders were Interested in getting 
Ickes* attacks widely printed as well as widely heard. 
This particular speech revealed primarily characteristics 
of oral style, but, in one or two respects, it leaned 
toward a style more effeotive for readers than for 
hearers.
The "instant intelligibility" of which Brlgance 
speaks may be gained in several ways. Among these ways 
are the using of language which is both vivid and simple 
and of employing sentences and clauses which are rela­
tively short and uncomplicated in structure. Ickes' 
language was certainly vivid enough. His speech was 
dotted with illustrations, comparisons and contrasts, 
figurative language, and rhetorloal questions. His 
illustrations and comparisons have been previously 
noted in the discussion of forms of support. Of his 
extensive use of figurative language there can be no 
question. Indeed, almost the first ten minutes of the 
thirty-minute address was built around figurative ex­
position. The first paragraph treated the Republican 
party as "a political mouse" trying to create a
^Brlgance lists these as the main objective 
elements of vividness in language. Ibid., pp. 200-01.
"mountain,1 an imposing platform. Ickes then pictured 
the entire convention as a birth and post-natal occasion, 
with the platform as the baby and leading Republicans 
as attending personnel. Even after becoming more literal, 
Ickes Indulged in countless figurative and vividly des­
criptive words and phrases. He referred to the platform 
writers as "phrase mongers" and as "verbal tightrope 
walkers"; he called the depression an "economic abyss"; 
he accused the Republicans of "shadow-boxing" and of 
"spreading weasel-words"; he denounced "the Hoover-Wall 
Street steamroller" of the 1928 Republican convention; 
he likened the Republican overtures to farmers to the 
grandmother guise of Red Riding Hood’s big bad wolf; he 
sarcastically characterized Governor Landon as a "new 
political Messiah" and likened him to an alraost-silent 
"Delphic Oracle"; he likened the Republican convention 
to a "marionette show"; and he pictured the Republican 
selection of Landon to run on an indefinite platform as 
"a blind date, the location of which is unknown." Such 
striking and pictorial language helped Ickes to maintain 
the attention of his hearers and to make his thoughts 
"Instantly intelligible" to them. The language employed 
also read well enough to elicit chuckles from President 
Roosevelt as he read the manuscript of the speeoh.2?
2?Ickes, Seoret Diary, Vol. I, p. 615.
100
Ickes also made fairly extensive use of the 
question, another language form which adds rhetorical 
clarity and directness. Some of the questions employed 
were purely rhetorical. The opening sentence was of this 
type: "You have all heard about the mountain that con­
ceived and brought forth a mouse, but have you ever heard 
of the mouse that conceived and brought forth a mountain?1* 
Another rhetorical question was used after Frank 0. Lowden 
was referred to as a "show window" display for farmers:
"He is all dressed up but has he In fact any place to 
go? "
Many of the questions used by Ickes were put 
directly as challenging dilemmas to the Republican con­
vention, and they usually occurred in a series. In 
regard to social security, the Secretary posed these 
questions:
What will be the pronouncement of the platform 
on this subjeot? Will it be a vague, indefinite 
and meaningless generalization? Will the Repub­
licans declare for a national system of social 
insuranoe or will they say that it is a matter for 
the states? And If the states are to handle all 
questions of social insurance will the Republicans 
propose a plan that will work and which the states 
will adopt?
Both of these types of questions, those rhetorical and 
those directly challenging, added directness to the 
speaker's oral style.
In respect to sentenoe length and simplicity,
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Ickes1 style was occasionally more suitable to literary 
than to oral presentation. Some of his sentences were 
extremely long and somewhat involved. According to 
standards predicated by Brlgance in Speech Composition, 
about half of Ickes' sentences were longer than desirable 
for maximum hearer comprehension. Brlgance put it this 
way:
When any sentence gets over 20 words it starts 
to be 'fairly difficult', when it gets over 25 
words it becomes 'difficult', and when it goes be­
yond 30 words it becomes 'very difficult1.28
Brlgance adds, of course, that this general observation
does not rule out occasional long sentences.
Ickes' manuscript for "What Shall the Republican 
Platform Be?" contained a total of 133 sentences. The 
shortest used 8 words, the longest 12^. Forty-eight of 
his sentences were 20 words or less; 1^ sentences were 
between 20 and 26 words in length— "fairly difficult";
15 sentences were between 25 and 30 words in length—  
"difficult"; and 56 sentences were over 30 words in 
length— "very difficult." The average sentence length 
was 2 9 .8 w o r d s . vJhile many of Ickes' long sentences 
were the result of parallel structure, utilizing
28Brigance, op. olt. , p. 2 3 9.
^Thia compares with Sir Winston Churchill's 
average of 26 words per sentence and Franklin D. Roosevelt's 
1? to 27, depending on the type of audience. Ibid., p.
239.
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several semi-colons, it is also true that a few were 
simply too long and involved for immediate hearer com­
prehension. With these few exceptions, the sentences 
were appropriate for oral presentation.
One definite weakness showed up in Ickes1 choice 
of language in this, as in later, speeches. In his 
desire to he vivid and colorful, he occasionally neg­
lected to follow the dictates of simplicity in word 
selection. He sometimes used words and allusions which 
were beyond the immediate, and perhaps ultimate, com­
prehension of a large part of his audience. Among such 
words were these: mesalliance, quadrennium, accouch-
ment, emanations, inditing, effrontery, abstemious, 
progeny, and cryptic. Obviously, words or phrases less 
impressive but more immediately comprehensible could have 
been selected. Perhaps the best example of Ickes1 
occasional vocabulary parade was in this sentence refer­
ring to Governor Landon's candidacy:
The railroad sidings at Topeka, Kansas, no longer 
support the ostentatious display of the private cars 
of those humble American citizens who dutifully 
Joined in the pilgrimage thither of William Randolph 
Hearst in order to do homage to a new political 
Messiah, than whom no Delphic oracle has been more 
abstemious or cryptio in his utterances.
Ickes was extremely interested in words. He had 
been a student of Latin in his school days,^0 and in
3°Harold L. Ickes, Autobiography of a Curmudgeon 
(New York: Reynal and Hltchoock, 1943), p. i Z " ,
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later life he showed an obsession for vocabulary, keep­
ing always near and consulting constantly a large dic­
tionary.^1 His interest sometimes betrayed him into a 
violation of the simplicity of word choice necessary for 
audience understanding.
It may be said, in general, that Ickes showed a 
tendency in this speech to employ words Infrequently 
used and not widely understood, and that his structur­
ing of language was sometimes involved. These defects, 
however, were more than compensated by his use of vivid, 
expressive, and emotive language. His use of language 
was vivid and colorful enough to command the hearers’ 
attention, to be humorously and suggestively persuasive, 
and to make good newspaper copy.
REACTION TO THE SPEECH
Ickes1 first major attack upon the Republicans 
and their candidate was somewhat milder than that of 
subsequent speeches. Outside the New Deal, the reaction 
to it was also calmer than it was for later speeches.32
31This was stated by Michael Straus in a personal 
interview on January 2 3 , 1955. and confirmed by Mrs. Ickes 
in an interview of January 3 1, 1955.
32in analyzing reaction to all of -Ickes’ speeches, 
the writer has consulted the Washington Star, the St_. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, the Chicago News, the Chicago Tribune, the 
New' Vork' Times , and numerous weekly publications. The 
sources used most, however, were the Ickes sorapbooks in 
the Iokes Papers. These contain clippings from magazines 
and newspapers from all parts of the country.
Coming as it did when the Republicans gathering in Cleve­
land held the public eye and the air was full of pronounce­
ments from prominent political figures, Ickes1 speech 
received less newspaper publicity than did later radio 
addresses. None of the leading dailies carried the speech 
in full, though several carried reports of its arguments 
and quoted at some length from the speech. Both the New 
York Times and the Washington Post of June 8 carried a 
full-column report on page four. The St_. Louis Post- 
Dispatch gave a partial report of the speech but relegat­
ed it to page 7C. The Chicago Tribune carried no report 
at all. Many smaller newspapers gave their readers 
partial reports and alBo mentioned the speech editor­
ially.^ The reactions of the Hearst press and other 
Republican papers were, of course, hostile. Those which 
mentioned the speech carried with it the following 
Hearst-authorized comment: "Mr. Ickes* whole broadcast
is rather absurd, but his remarks about Mr. HearBt are 
particularly vapid."3^ Most of the unfavorable newspaper 
comment about the speech centered around the Hearst issue,
^^Typical of smaller newspapers from which clip­
pings found their way into Ickes* scrapbooks were the 
Winston-Salem (North Carolina) Sentinel, the Springfield 
(Missouri) Events, the Houghton (Michigan) Gazette, and 
the Santa Fe New Mexican.
^^Baltlmore Sun, June 8, 1936.
ignoring other issues in the speech. The Pueblo Star 
Journal labeled the Hearst charge "ludicrous" and said 
Ickes was "raudslinging."33 Even the Democratic Paducah 
Sun questioned the validity of the charge of Hearst 
domination, saying that Landon realized Hearst backing 
was "the kiss of death."3^ The Democratic Winston-Salem 
Sentinel, however, said that Landon might like to shake 
off Hearst but probably could not do so. 3? The Hearst- 
controlled San Diego Tribune denied that Hearst even 
started the Landon build-up, giving credit instead to the 
Kansas City Star.-^ The general consensus was that the 
Hearst charge had not been sustained. The rest of the 
speech, as might be expected, received generally favor­
able comment from the minority Democratic press and 
generally unfavorable reaction from the majority Repub­
lican press. Most of the letters, cards, and telegrams 
received by Ickes in the wake of the speech were similarly 
divided along obviously partisan lines.39
From the Administration point of view, the speeoh 
was apparently a successful effort. Partisan Democrats
35pueblo Star Journalt June 8 , 1936.
3^Paducah Sun, June 9, 1936.
37winston-Salem Sentinel, June 11, 1936.
3^San Diego Tribune, June 9, 1936.
39lokes Papers, Container 2k6.
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were enthusiastic, and many requested copies of the 
speech to he used as campaign m a t e r i a l . T h e  newspaper 
coverage was undoubtedly sufficient to focus some 
attention on the manner in which the Republican platform- 
framers met their problems, which was another purpose of 
the speech. Stanley High, who originated the idea of 
the speech, enthusiastically approved of it and, accord­
ing to Ickes, tried to claim credit for writing most of 
it.^1 That the President was enthusiastic about the 
speech has been previously noted. It might be added, as 
further evidence of his approval of Ickes' first major 
attack, that it was on July 1— three weeks after the 
initial Ickes speech— that the President indicated defi­
nitely to Ickes that his Job in the campaign was "to 
attack." The President had, by this time, had ample 
opportunity to assess the reaction to Ickes' first major 
performance in his role of 'hatohet-man.- He apparently 
considered it favorable enough to continue Ickes' 
rhetorical efforts along the same line.
^°Ibld.
^Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 619. 
^2Ibid., p. 627.
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SUMMARY EVALUATION
The Idea behind the attack upon the Republican 
platform efforts was strategloally good, and Ickes* 
analysis of the problems faced by the Republican con­
vention was sound. In presenting those problems and 
attempting to create a public attitude of suspicion 
and uncertainty about the convention's efforts, Ickes 
did little to establish his conclusions through logical 
demonstration. He relied primarily upon emotional ap­
peals, especially those built around effective use of 
humor and emotive language. He concentrated, too, upon 
undermining Republican ethos while strengthening that of 
the Roosevelt Administration. The speech was broadcast 
nationally and given relatively good newspaper coverage. 
Though press reaction to the first Ickes* assault was 
understandably divided, President Roosevelt and his ad­
visers considered the effort successful enough to warrant 
repetition. It had oheered partisans, had supplied many 
Democrats with campaign material, had secured publicity 
for attacks on Landon and his leading supporters, and had 
put the Republicans partially on the defensive on the eve 
of their convention. To consider whether it won any votes 
would merely be idle speculation. The speech appears to 
have been fairly successful at doing what the Administra­
tion, in the belief that it would affect the ultimate 
outcome of the oampaign, wanted it to do.
CHAPTER V
“GOVERNOR LANDON— PRACTICAL PROGRESSIVE“
On August 3 , Seoretary Ickes delivered his second 
major radio address of the 1936 campaign. This speech, 
entitled “Governor Landon— Practical Progressive," was 
broadcast by a C.B.S. network from 10:4-5 P.M. to 11:15 
P.M. Delivered as a reply to Landon’s July 23 acceptance 
address, it was the first direct attack upon the Repub­
lican presidential candidate by a member of the Adminis­
tration. 1
BACKGROUND AND SETTING OF THE SPEECH
In the period of almost two months between Ickes’ 
first and second major radio addresses, organized Demo­
cratic campaign activity was negligible. Democratic 
strategy originally called for only one month of full-time 
campaigning, and the President did not make his first 
avowed campaign speech until September 29. Meanwhile, 
the Landon boom appeared to make progress. On July 20, 
the farm poll conducted in thirty-two states by the Farm
^The President had ordered that no member of the 
Administration was to mention Landon by name in any speeoh 
given before the Kansas Governor’s speech of acceptance. 
Ickes, 3ecret Diary. Vol. I, p. 64-2.
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Journal showed Landon leading by a ratio of five to four. 2 
After other minor polls showed similar results, Democratic 
statistician Emil Hurja took sample polls of his own. The 
results indicated that Roosevelt support had dropped to 
barely over fifty per cent and that he was trailing on 
electoral votes. Hurja and Ickes both regarded the situ­
ation as serious.3
Ickes made six speeches during the interval between 
his first two major broadcasts, but only one of theBe 
speeches was frankly political in nature. On June 29, he 
was the prlnolpal speaker at a meeting of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People in 
Baltimore, Maryland.^ During the month of July, he made 
speeches in his capacities as Seoretary of the Interior 
and Administrator of PWA at four formal dedications.-*
On July 17, he addressed the University of Virginia's 
Institute of Public Affairs as the Administration's 
representative in a political debate. Republicans were 
represented by former Senator Hiram Bingham of Connecti­
cut. Each speaker had an advanoe copy of his opponent's
% e w  York Times. July 20, 1 9 3 6, p. 1.
3ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 6^1.
^This speech, in part emphasizing the value of the 
New Deal to colored people, was broadcast by N.B.C. and 
was reported in the New York Times, June 3 0, 1 9 3 6, p. 10.
5Text of these speeches, delivered on July 11, 
l^ f, and 22, are in the jokes Papers.
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speech and each used the title "Representative Govern­
ment versus Dictatorship." Bingham, speaking first, 
argued that Roosevelt was directing a trend toward 
dictatorship; Ickes contended that Republicans stood for 
economic dictatorship while the New Deal worked toward 
greater freedom for the common people.
Although this debate was broadcast only by local 
radio facilities, it received good newspaper coverage.^ 
Reaction, in general, followed party lines. However, 
some opposing papers, although not agreeing with all of 
Ickes1 arguments, oommented favorably upon his effort.? 
The President apparently did not express his reaction 
after the speech at Charlottesville, but William D. 
Hassett, assistant to Stephen Early, had conveyed en­
thusiastic White House approval of the manuscript prior
O
to delivery of the speech.
Ickes was active politically between his first
^The New York Times of July 20, gave a fairly 
complete report of the arguments on page 13; the Washing­
ton Star, also July 20, reported them on page 1; and the 
Ickes scrapbooks contain reports from newspapers all 
over the country.
?The Lincoln State Journal (Nebraska) of July 27, 
disagreed with Ickes'but said he “showed all the skill 
of the experienced lawyer,“ and the Washington Post of 
July 20, conceded hlB argument that koosevelt had no 
desire to establish dictatorial power.
^lokes Papers, Container 2*1-7 .
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two major speeches In one other way. At a June 18 press 
conference he attacked the Republican platform, terming 
it "ambiguous and weasel-worded.This post-convention 
comment, coupled with similar remarks in his Charlottes­
ville speech, served as follow-up to the charges made in 
his June 7 attack on the Republican party.
Ickes’ insistence that the Administration ought to 
level early and frequent attack upon Landon, and his own 
availability for the task, were noted in Chapter II.
For a time it appeared that he was to be denied the open­
ing assault. On July 20, Charles Mlchelson Informed the 
Secretary that he was to reply to Landon's July 23 ac­
ceptance address on the following evening. On July 21, 
the President changed the plans, seemingly reluctant to 
allow a Cabinet officer to initiate the attack. On July 
30, after Ickes had been urged upon him by Mlchelson, 
Farley, and High, and after he had seen the draft of the 
proposed speech, Roosevelt approved Mlchelson’ original 
plan. 10
Ickes' initial eagerness to make the reply to
9New York Times, June 19, I9 3 6 , p. 7. The same 
edition, on the’ same page, oarried almost identical oora- 
ment by Norman Thomas, Socialist candidate for president.
10These developments are all related in the lokes 
diary. Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, pp. 6^2-53*
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Landon was whetted by the Kansan* s speech of acceptance. 
On July 24, after listening to that speeoh, Iokes wrote 
in his diary:
Landon, in my Judgment, has laid himself wide 
open to a devastating attack and I am eager to make 
it. Particularly in what he said about the Oil Ad­
ministration he played right into ray hands. We have 
in our files in this Department quotations from 
Landon's letters, telegrams, as well as a speech he 
made as ohairman of the oil conference here in 1933 > 
with which we could rake him fore and aft. . . .  I 
feel very keenly that Landon has let down his guard 
and that this is the time for a smashing blow. 11
The speech previously prepared was altered to meet the 
Landon address, radio time was seoured for the evening 
of August 3, and advanoe publicity was arranged. On 
August 1, the New York Times reported that the Seoretary 
of the Interior would "contrast the remedies which Gover­
nor Landon urged upon the Roosevelt Administration three 
years ago with the policies he is now urging as a candi­
date for President."-*-2 On August 3, the pro-Roosevelt 
New York Dally News carried what looked almost like a 
commercial advertisement, urging listeners to tune in 
on "one of the country's best radio talkers. ""*-3 The 
stage was set for what Ickes termed "a highly concentrat­
ed attack on Landon.
H lbld.. p. 649.
-*-2New York Times. August 1, 1 9 3 6, p. 4.
13New York Dally News, August 3 , I9 3 6.
^-^Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 653.
PURPOSE AND THESIS OF THE SPEECH
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The primary purpose of the August 3 speeoh was to 
discredit Landon; this was to he the “smashing blow" 
mentioned in the Ickes quotation previously cited. The 
thesis, alluded to in the title of the speech and de­
veloped in the first few paragraphs of the text, was that 
Landon was a “practical”— not a “true"— progressive.
Ickes oited the Landon record In several particulars and 
concluded after each that the Republican candidate was 
“practical" (the Webster definition “oapable of being 
turned to use or aocount" was cited), but that he was 
not a progressive. This was a double-barrelled thesis, 
serving two purposes. On one hand, the speaker denied 
the olaims of many Republicans that their candidate was 
truly progressive; this half of the thesis was directed 
toward progressive Republicans and liberal independents. 
On the other hand, the exposition of the Kansan’s former 
views and statements favorable to the New Deal was not 
likely to increase the confidence of conservative Repub­
licans in their candidate. This dual aspect of the 
speeoh was noted by the Detroit News:
There will be no question of Ickes' intent to 
keep the progressive vote in line for Mr. Roosevelt, 
but the Democratic Idea in putting him on the radio 
couldn't have failed to consider an effect in weaken­
ing Landon among the Eastern conservatives. The 
latter don't like Landon’s radical streak. That's 
as true as that most of the westerners won to his
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support because of his liberalism don’t like his 
association with the Old Guard GOP-ers.15
Both of theBe ideas were potentially harmful to Landon’s 
candidacy. The fact should be added, too, that the ex­
posure of the candidate’s apparent inconsistencies and 
vacillation was likely to decrease his standing with all 
groups.
The Miami News thought it saw still another pur­
pose in the “exposure" of the Kansas Governor's change 
of views between 1933 1 9 3 6:
Bear in mind that one of the anti-Roosevelt is­
sues of this campaign was to be President Roosevelt's 
departure from the platform of 1932, hi8 change of 
mind since 1932. Thanks to Ickes, we now have the 
opponents of President Roosevelt, in defending their 
candidate for his change of mind, defending Secretary 
Ickes’ candidate for his change of mind. The change- 
of-mind issue— the 1932 platform issue— is now out of 
the campaign, which might well have been exactly what 
the acute Ickes hoped and planned to accomplish by 
his speech.1°
That the Landon change of views influenced the effective­
ness of Republican charges of Roosevelt platform violation 
can be demonstrated. No evidence has been uncovered, 
however, to indicate that this was a planned purpose of 
the speech.
The speech’s primary purpose was to damage Landon 
prestige, especially with progressive and liberal voters.
■^Detroit News, August 5> 1936. 
loMlaml News, August 9, 1936.
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The thesis was that he was a political opportunist tied 
to a conservative campaign and was not, in 1 9 3 6, & pro­
gressive candidate.
LINES OF ARGUMENT AND ORGANIZATION
The lines of argument in this speech were more 
clearly organized and developed than in the speech on 
the Republican platform. The thesis, while not ex­
pressed in a single sentence, emerged clearly in the 
first two minutes of the thirty-minute address. The 
opening paragraph went right to the subject:
Governor Alfred M. Landon has decided that he is 
a ’practical1 progressive. That this is the desig­
nation that he would apply to himself is clear from 
his speeoh of acceptance in Topeka the night of 
June 23.1"
After referring to how "practical" was defined by 
dictionaries and commenting to the effect that Landon 
like the Republican platform, represented an impossible 
attempt at compromise, the speaker returned directly to 
his thesis:
Now, whether Governor Landon is fifty per cent 
’practical’ and fifty per cent 'progressive' or 
whether he leans more to the progressive West than 
to reactionary Wall Street might be a dose question
•^ ■7xn that address Landon had said: "Practical
progressives have suffered the disheartening experience 
of Beeing many liberal objectives discredited during the 
past three years by careless thinking, unworkable laws, 
and Incompetent administration." New York Times, July 2 k ,  
1936, p. 11.
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If in his Bpeeoh he had not himself thrown some 
light upon the subject.
At that point, introduction ended and the first argument
began.
These arguments, unlike those of his June 7 
address, could be sharply defined; they were Beven in 
number:
(1) Landon has swung from Theodore Roosevelt’s 
type of progressivism to a "States’- rights" 
philosophy.
(2) He is not a progressive in regard to civil 
service.
(3) He is obsoure, but not progressive, regarding 
labor unions.
(M His present views on executive powers represent 
a "practical" shift of conviction.
(5) He is a product of William Randolph Hearst,
who is not a progressive.
(6) He is supported by reactionary elements.
(7) He is running on a reaction&ry platfora.
These premises, if properly supported, constituted
an effective indictment of Landon and adequate argument 
for Ickes1 thesis. If Landon held a "States’ rights" 
point of view, opposed extensive exercise of executive 
functions, paid only lip-service to a merit system, and 
disapproved of strong labor organization, he was not in
line with historic principles of the progressive move­
ment. The last three premises were more circumstantial 
types of indictment, since a candidate for political 
office cannot always he fairly Judged by the views or 
the merit of his supporters, or even entirely by his 
party*s platform. If Ickes proved that Landon was sup­
ported by Hearst and by leading reactionary groups and 
that he had accepted a reactionary platform, claims that 
he was a progressive would oertalnly be open to sus­
picion. To give the indictments fullest significance, 
however, the Secretary would need to show strong 
presumption that Hearst and other "non-progressive”
Landon supporters were really going to exercise strong 
influence on the candidate in the event of his election. 
Ickes did conjecture upon that point, but devoted no real 
effort to establishing any commitments. In the oase of 
the Republican platform, such a commitment had been made. 
Ickes' premises, if adequately supported, were probably 
conclusive enough for the progressive Republicans and 
liberal Independents for whom they were primarily intended.
After a partial summary of his main arguments,
Ickes launched into an emotional philippic against "the
•^For a statement of Progressive party principles 
in 1912, see Louis M. Haoker and Benjamin B. Kendrick,
The United States Since I865 (fourth edition; New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1 9^9 ), pp. 385-8 8 .
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money power of America," which was purportedly hacking 
Landon, and asserted that the election’s real issue lay 
between this foroe and the President. His oonoluBion 
proper was brief:
Governor Landon cannot at the same time be the 
candidate of the exploiting and of the exploited. 
Not even a ’practical1 progressive ought to be 
able to run with the hares and hunt with the 
hounds.
FORMS OF SUPPORT
In the speech on the Republican platform Iokes 
had concentrated on emotional appeals while subordinat­
ing logical and ethical proofs. In his August 3 address, 
logical and emotional proofs were more nearly balanced, 
with ethical proofs almost ignored.
Most of the speaker’s premises had some element 
of logical support, with testimony and example being 
used most frequently. To support his conclusion that 
Landon "began as a strong nationalist but ended as an 
advocate of States' rights," Ickes used one quotation 
as sole evidence. That quotation was from Landon's 
acceptance address:
As a young man I was attracted to the idea of 
centralizing in the Federal Government full power 
to correct the abuses growing out of a more complex 
social order. When the people rejected this al­
ternative I was as disappointed as any one. But in 
spite of this rejection I have lived to see many of 
those views substantially corrected by the forty-eight 
State Legislatures in their fields and by the Federal 
Government in its field of interstate commerce.
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The Secretary concluded from this statement that "the 
Governor, In effect, is apologizing for having followed 
Theodore Roosevelt as a Progressive in 1912." He added 
that "the language itself is obscure, but the clear 
meaning is there to quiet the fears of the reaction­
aries." Quoting Landon himself on his altered point of 
view was an exoellent idea. Nor was the quotation taken 
out of context. Error lay, however, in the over-extension 
of the conclusion drawn by Ickes from the quotation. It 
obviously did not say, without subjective interpreta­
tion, all that the speaker concluded from it. Perhaps 
it was even intended to quiet conservative fears, but 
that the speaker did not prove. The quotation was 
Buffiolent to arouse doubt about Landon1s views, but it 
alone was not sufficient proof that the Kansan had com­
pletely abandoned all previous progressive ideas. The 
premise that Landon was not truly progressive on civil 
service was supported both by example and by comparison 
and contrast. Ickes, noting that the Governor had even 
gone beyond his party's platform in deolaring for a merit 
system, used the failure of Kansas to Implement a merit 
syetem as an example of Landon1s real inclination. The 
facts involved in the example had been confirmed by
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Harry Wooaring, Landon'8 predecessor as Governor of 
Kansas.^ The speaker then contrasted this failure with 
the aotlon of the President in regard to civil service.
The President had requested civil service legislation, 
which Congress had defeated. He then issued an executive 
order placing postmasters in three categories under civil 
service. Republicans charged that the President's move 
was purely political,^® but, disregarding motive, the con­
trast was valid on the basis of actual performance.
Ickes' argument that Landon did not take a progres­
sive view regarding labor organization was brief enough 
to be quoted:
He /EandonJ  believes that employees have the right 
to organize by plant, by craft or by Industry. He is 
for the closed shop and he also believes in the open 
shop. If there were any other forms of association 
in which employees could Indulge, it is a fair guess 
that Governor Landon would favor that also.
Certainly those great industries which, by fair 
means or foul, have prevented their employees from 
organizing aooording to their own wishes have nothing 
to fear from Governor Landon's attitude on this 
question.
The speaker used no actual evidence, but he was referring
-19^his information is contained in a memorandum 
from R. B. Armstrong, an Ickes assistant, to the Secre­
tary. Ickes Papers. Container 315.
^Joseph Martin, Republican congressman from 
Massachusetts, aired this charge as part of his reply to 
Ickes speech. New York Times. August 5, 1936, p. 12.
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Indirectly to Landon1a statements about labor In his 
speech of acceptance. The Interpretation made by Ickes 
corresponded closely with that of most labor leaders.
The Republican candidate's position was denounced the 
day after It was presented by John L. Lewis, President 
of the United Mine Workers, George L. Berry, Chairman of 
Labor's Non-Partisan League, Sidney Hillman, President 
of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, Arthur 
0. Wharton, President of the International Association
of Machinists, and Francis J. Gorman, Vice-President of
21the United Textile Workers of America.
Ickes' charge that Landon's expressed fears of 
Roosevelt's use of federal authority were politically 
motivated, and not sincere, was supported by 1933 and 
193^ quotations from the Kansas Governor. The use of 
testimony was, perhaps, strongest in support of this 
premise. Eight different Landon quotations were used 
to demonstrate his earlier support of Roosevelt1s use 
of federal authority: four from speeches, three from
telegrams, and one from a letter. Most of the state­
ments were specific and difficult to misconstrue. One 
1933 quotation was general. but gave definite approval 
of Roosevelt's actions:
21New York Times. July 2k, 1936, p. 1.
122
I desire to acknowledge, in a tangible way, the 
appreciation of the people of my State of the courage 
with which President Roosevelt has attacked the de­
pression. If there is any way in which a member of 
that species, thought by many to be extinct, a Repub­
lican Governor of a Middle Western State can aid him 
in the fight, I now enlist for the duration of the 
war.
More speolfic statements put Landon on record as favoring 
the Oil Code, price-fixing, and the National Industrial 
Recovery Act. This part of the argument was rather easy 
to support. Arthur Krock, who appeared neutral, if not 
sympathetic, to the Landon candidacy at this stage of the 
campaign, made this concession: "The other night, review­
ing some of Mr. Landon’s less recent activities, Secre­
tary Ickes made against him, and easily proved, charges
pp
of inconsistency." ** A New York Times editorial of 
August 5, while reacting unfavorably to the speech as a 
whole, drew the same conclusion:
Secretary Ickes had no difficulty on Monday night 
in proving that Governor Landon said things and took 
positions in 1933 and 193^ very different from what 
he is now saying and advocating.23
This premise was one generally accepted and one which
Landon’s early New Deal utterances made easy to support.
The premise that Landon had been nominated largely 
through the support of William Randolph Hearst, if not
22New York Times. August 6, 1936, p. 18.
23New York Times, August 5i 1936, p. 18.
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extended to Imply too much beyond that, was also relative­
ly easy to support. As proof for it, Ickes offered 
statements from two of the Kansan's leading supporters.
The first was from the Topeka State Journal, the news­
paper of Henry J. Allen:
With all due respect to the work of Governor 
Landon'b supporters and his personality and ability 
and*to his natural appeal to the nation, it was 
William Randolph Hearst who placed his name on the 
lips of the American people.
The second was from a William Allen White article entitled
"How Landon Won— The True Story of the Birth, the Boom
and the Climax of the Kansan's Nomination":
When the two private cars (carrying Mr. HearBt 
and his party) were parked in the Topeka switchyards, 
all Kansas knew that her Governor was beginning to 
be somebody.
These quotations, ooming from Landon partisans, consti­
tuted a type of authority about which Bryant and Wallace 
say: "Finally, does the opinion run counter to the
author's natural Interest and bias? If so, It can be 
given great weight."2^ That Hearst was influential in 
the Landon boom was then a matter of general knowledge 
and Is today generally accepted. Basil Rauch writes:
Early in the 1936 political season, Hearst made 
a visit of inspection to Governor Alfred Mossman 
Landon of Kansas, and presently his chain of
^Donald C. Bryant and Karl R. Wallace, Fundamen­
tals of Public Speaking (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, Lno., I9V/)1, p7 38I.
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newspapers began aggressively to support the Governor 
for the Republican nomination. . . . This was the 
first notice given the country as a whole of the 
availability of Governor Landon.
The two quotations used by Ickes, considering the lack of 
serious controversy on the point directly Involved, con­
stituted sufficient proof. They did not necessarily 
point to the further implication that Hearst would con­
trol Landon. This was implied when the speaker said of 
Governor Landon and Colonel Knox: "There is not any
doubt that they are Hearstlan." That implied premise 
was suggested, but it was not proved.
The elements which New Dealers would classify as 
"reactionary," banking and big business interests, un­
doubtedly supported the Republican candidate. If the 
listener or reader agreed that these interests were of 
the nature Ickes assumed them to be, proving that Landon 
had "reactionary" support was not only easy, but almost 
unnecessary. That they were reactionary and their 
support reprehensible was put merely as emotionally- 
colored assertion;
Since when did the liberty-loving duPonts, Andrew 
W. Mellon, Ogden L. Mills, Winthrop W. Aldrioh, J. 
Henry Roraback, Henry P. Fletcher, Senator Jesse H. 
Metcalf or John D. M. Hamilton, the latter an off­
shoot of the machine of the late Dave Mulvane and,
-^’Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal (New 
York: Creative Age Press, Inc., 194-4)7 P* 237.
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until recently, the bitter antagonist of that pro­
gressive group in Kansas which now fawns upon him, 
show any except a malevolent interest in a real 
progressive principle?
Can it be that Wall Street, The New York Herald 
Tribune, The Chicago Daily Tribune, the San Fran­
cisco Chronicle and the Los Angeles Times, to say 
nothing of the Liberty League and the papers of 
William Randolph Hearst and other wealthy re­
actionaries, out of a tender regard for the welfare 
of the plain people of America have suddenly de­
serted the special interests and have gone progres­
sive?
While the paragraphs Just quoted gave valid examples of 
conservative men and groups who openly supported Landon, 
Ickes' assumption that they were "reactionary” and 
"malevolent" was not supported by logical proof. Fur­
ther, while this line of argument did illustrate that 
Landon was supported by some men and groups certainly 
not considered progressive, it did not prove that the 
Kansan would necessarily reject all progressive ideas 
upon their insistence. The argument relied more upon 
emotional than upon logical proof for its appeal.
Ickes' last major premise was that Governor Lan­
don had approved a reactionary platform. To establish 
that the platform was reactionary, the speaker cited 
testimony from only one source: Dr. Nicholas Murray
Butler, President of Columbia University. Dr. Butler 
had called the Republican convention "the most react­
ionary in the party's entire history." The Secretary 
made the most of a good authority, noting Butler's
i
- — / .
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long servioe as a leader In the Republican party, his 
nomination for Vice-President in 1912, and his prominent 
mention as a presidential prospect In 1920. The quota­
tion was not out of context; Indeed, more Butler state­
ments could have been used, since the Columbia President 
had bitterly denounced the work, of the entire Republican 
convent i o n . T h e  statement used by Ickes did not 
specifically mention the platform, but Dr. Butler had 
clearly included It in his denunciation in the press.
The quotation was a good one. Some question must be 
raised, however, as to whether a single piece of 
testimony was sufficient to prove the opponent’s plat­
form “reactionary." This 1b especially questionable 
since Ickes' previous reaction had been that the plat­
form "looked both ways" and that it was "ambiguous and 
weasel-worded,"2? not that it was plainly reactionary.
Ickes1 logical Bupport for some of his premises 
was not sufficient to constitute conclusive evidence, 
and some of his conclusions went beyond both his 
original premise and his evidence. His rational proofs 
were, however, probably sufficient for the Republican 
progressives and Independent liberals in whom the speaker
2^New York Times. July 16, 1936, p. 9.
2?New York Times, June 19, 1936, p. 7.
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was espeolally Interested. Coupled effectively with 
emotional appeals, they were likely to prove adequate for 
creating doubts about Landon In the minds of other voting 
groups as well.
In this attack upon Landon, as in that on the 
Republican platform, Ickes1 emotional appeals were de­
signed primarily to create attitudes of fear, suspicion, 
and distrust. The arguments built around the thesis that 
Landon pretended to be a progressive, but was not, were 
certain, if given credence, to create fear of Landon’s 
policies among voters progressively inclined. The 
simple fact that the Kansan pretended to be something 
he was not, if true, would create suspicion and lack of 
confidence among voters who were not especially concerned 
about whether the Governor was progressive or not. The 
revelation of the Republican candidate’s reversal of 
opinion about the New Deal, coupled with Ickes' insinua­
tion that the change was politically motivated, was 
likely to create distrust and lack of confidence in some 
voters of all polltloal points of view. The basic pre­
mises of the speeoh were designed to create attitudes 
based partly upon emotional responses.
The Secretary also made use of emotional appeals 
which depended more upon selection of language than upon 
the ideas themselves. This language was directed, for
128
the most part, toward creating, or recreating, the fear 
and distrust many Americans were prone to feel toward 
big business, organized finance, and wealth in general. 
Emotionally "loaded" stereotypes, many of which had also 
been used in the first radio address, dotted the speech. 
Here are but a few of them: "reactionaries," "economic
royalists," "malefactors of great wealth," "concentrated 
wealth," "the money power of America," and "predatory 
interests." By the transfer device, the emotional con­
notations of these terms were applied to the Republican 
party and to Governor Landon.
Names of people and organizations were also used 
as a type of "loaded" language. Names associated with 
the Republican Administration during the crash of 1929 
seem to have been used almost solely to get "symbol" 
responses, such names as Herbert Hoover, Andrew W. 
Mellon, Wlnthrop W. Aldrich, and Ogden L. Mills.
Symbols of great wealth, such as the duPonts, Wall 
Street, and the Liberty League were also used for their 
psychological value.
Another psychological form of persuasion UBed in 
this speech was that of repetition. Brembeck and Howell 
say of this device:
The strength of a suggestion varies with the 
frequency with which it is met. Repetition serves 
to clarify and to hold attention to an idea until 
it becomes a part of us. It may appear in two forms:
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(1) The repetition may use the same words (exact 
repetition)., or (2) the same idea may be stated 
in different words (restatement).28
Many of Ickes1 ideas were repeated as restatement, but 
the use of repetition which stood out in this speech was 
the recurring reference to Governor Landon a3 a "practi­
cal progressive." Contained in the title, this- irony- 
tinged reference also appeared thirteen times in the text 
of the speech. It was most pointed at the conclusion of 
individual arguments. After supporting his first premise 
Ickes closed with: "As Governor Landon1s friends insist,
he is a 'practical1 progressive." The next argument 
closed with: "Governor Landon is indeed a 'practical1
progressive." Another argument concluded: "Indubitably
Governor Landon is a 'practical' progressive." These 
references to Landon's "practical" type of progresslvism 
appear in the title, in the first sentence, in the con­
clusion of most of the arguments, and in the final 
sentence. They represent the most obvious examples of 
Ickes* frequent use of persuasion through repetition.
Psychological appeals merely accompanied logical 
arguments during most of the speeoh. At the conclusion 
of those arguments, however, Ickes launched into a
^®Wlnston Lamont Bremleck and William Smiley 
Howell, Persuasion, A Means of Social Control (New York: 
Prentlce-Hall, Inc. ,“1952)', p. 17?.
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peroration dealing almost exclusively in the types of 
appeal Just discussed. The following passage is illus­
trative:
Concentrated wealth, the power of money, still 
dominates the Republican party. If you doubt this 
statement, count noses and see in whloh political 
camp the great bankers, the monopolistic industrial­
ists and the vested interests that have been built 
up by Republican favor and which flourish on special 
privilege have pitched their tents. . . .
It ought not to be necessary to point out that 
that man is to be avoided who openly or secretly, 
is being supported by the man who ruthlessly wield 
the money power of America. These men know what 
they want and it is seldom that they do not know how 
to get what they want. Their allegiance in this cam­
paign is known and there has been no denial of that 
allegiance.
Thus, the appeals to prejudice against wealth and big 
business and the insinuations of "guilt, by association," 
whloh had been subordinated to more logical forms of 
argument throughout most of the Bpeech, were given free 
rein in the concluding appeal.
The use of humor, which had been one of the strong­
est appeals in the June 7 address, was also in evidence 
in this speeoh. Less gentle and more sardonic than before, 
it was again used more for argument than for entertain­
ment. In every instance, it rldlouled Landon or his 
party.
In one Instance, Ickes called attention to the 
fact that Kansas had passed a civil service law. but that 
Governor Landon had never pushed through an appropriation
131
to effectuate It. Then he concluded:
It has been another Instance of 'Mother, mother 
may I go out to swim? Oh, yes, my darling daughter. 
Hang your clothes on a hickory limb, but don't go 
near the water.'
A few moments later, when he discussed Landon's fearB of
dictatorship, he engaged in irony at the Kansan's expense:
I do not think that this 'common sense' candidate 
believes for a moment in this claptrap. But we must 
make allowances for him. There is a campaign on.
Even if he cannot point with pride, we must allow 
him to view with alarm.
A short time later, when discussing Hearst's printed
claims that the Republican platform and candidates were
progressive, Ickes again engaged in irony and invective:
Of course, Mr. Hearst has every right to expect 
his most trifling dictum to be accepted by abject 
Republicans as a pontifical utterance. And if he 
says it is progressive, who would be so bold as to 
question that fact?
In the same editorial he laid down the law to 
the effect that the candidates for both President 
and Vice-President are also progressive. Well, who 
in the whole country, I may aBk, has a better right 
to name the children than their father?
As in the speech analyzed in Chapter IV, Ickes 
again gave little conscious attention to using or build­
ing his own ethos as persuasion in the speech. His 
emphasis was on reducing the reputation and prestige of 
Landon and his party, with some effort being made to 
enhance the standing of the President and the Administra­
tion. The entire argument was calculated to undermine 
confidence in Governor Landon. Both his independence
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and his sincerity were questioned, and he was subjected 
to ridicule. His party was accorded similar treatment.
Three references to the President were made In a 
way likely to Increase the ethos of the Secretary's 
candidate. The comparison of Landon's record on civil 
service with that of Roosevelt has already been noted.
In addition, Iokes attempted to capitalize upon the 
denunciation of Landon's "reactionary" supporters in a 
way which would raise the President's standing. After 
associating Landon with suoh men as the dePonts, Hearst, 
and the membership of the Liberty League, the speaker 
said:
To my mind It is a real tribute to President 
Roosevelt that he should have won the bitter en­
mity of such men as I have referred to. He must 
have struck some mighty blows In behalf of the 
people to have oalled forth the hymns of hate 
which have been chanted against him by the econ­
omic royalists and the malefactors of great wealth, 
if we may borrow a striking phrase of the late 
Theodore Roosevelt.
Near the end of the speech, these men were again refer­
red to, this time as "the same crowd through which there 
was circulated some months ago the slogan: 'Let's- gang
up on Roosevelt.'" This was but a brief repetition of 
the same technique used before.
Ickes' use of ethical appeals was directed chiefly 
toward reducing the reputation and prestige of Governor 
Landon and enhancing that of President Roosevelt. The
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subject matter of this speech gave Ickes unusual oppor­
tunity to capitalize upon his personal position. His 
recognized background as a leading progressive and his 
position as Administrator of the Oil Code, which figured 
prominently in the proof of the speech, gave him oppor­
tunity to inject himself into the speech. He spoke, 
instead, as an impersonal representative of the New Deal.
USE OF LANGUAGE
The language of the speech has already been dis- 
oussed from the point of view of emotional persuasive­
ness. It should be studied, too, from the point of view 
of style, especially regarding the requirements of ef­
fective oral presentation.
Ickes* choice of language again showed his 
awareness of the value of figurative expressions. His 
words and phrases often helped to give a striking and 
vivid mental image of the idea being presented. For 
example, when noting the Landon shift between 1933 an<l 
1936, Iokes pictured him as "A.W.O.L. from the war 
against poverty." He also referred to the "reallstio 
shudder" which Landon simulated when thinking about 
Roosevelt's dictatorial aspirations. Later he pictured 
the Kansas Governor driving "a four-in-hand made up of 
William Randolph Hearst, William Allen White, Gifford 
Plnchot and a duPont selected at random." He also
13^
depleted Landon going "down on his knees at the mourners1 
bench to ask forgiveness for his temporary aberration 
In 1912," adding that In 1912 the Republican candidate 
did not dream that "Wall Street and the Liberty League 
would one day take him to the top of a high mountain and 
promise him all the kingdoms of the world." In the con­
cluding sentence, Ickes used one last figure of speech 
on Landon, declaring that "not even a 'practical' pro­
gressive ought to be able to run with the hares and 
hunt with the hounds."
Ickes also used some vivid language when attack­
ing Hearst. Ickes referred to the publisher's "Bhrill 
editorials" pronouncing "dictum" which Republicans would 
accept as "pontifical utterance." In speaking of Hearst's 
recent ascension as a Republican boss, the Seoretary said 
that "he has not yet warmed the ohair that he has usurped" 
and that "the members of his adopted family are still a 
little nervous about his table manners"since he"may want 
more than his fair share of the good things of the board."
Ickes desorlbed the compromise platform of the 
conservative East and more liberal West as a "platform 
that faces both ways," a description he used often during 
the campaign. Perhaps his most descriptive language was 
used In analyzing the change in the Republican party in 
1936:
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The most that can be said for the Republican 
party la that it has been to a beauty parlor to 
have its face lifted. But a face-lifting does 
not make a new personality: it merely gives
temporarily a more pleasing appearance to an old 
face. There has been no character lifting in the 
Republican party. It still suffers from soul 
erosion.
Ickes interspersed his arguments with rhetorical 
questions which helped to give directness to his style. 
For example, after disclosing a shift between Landon's 
1933 views and those he submitted as a candidate in 
1 9 3 6, Ickes asked: "What caused this change?" When
he noted that the Kansan's supporters were mostly con­
servatives, he asked: "Does this prove him to be a
progressive?" Then he pointed to Landon's endorsement 
of an "ambiguous, tricky platform" written largely by 
"reactionaries" and again asked: "Was this the act of
a progressive?" After listing some of the Republican 
candidate's leading supporters from business and finance, 
the speaker asked if these had "suddenly deserted the 
special interests and gone progressive?" There were 
ten questions of this sort in the thirty-minute 
address.
Ickes used fewer unnecessarily long or infrequent­
ly-used words in this speech than he had employed in his 
first major radio addreBS. One such word did appear and 
received half-facetious, half-serious comment from the 
hostile Chicago Dally Tribune. The Tribune wondered how
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James A. Farley, who reportedly thought already that 
Ickes used too many big words in his speeohes, would 
react to his expression "the verisimilitude of progres- 
slvisra."29
The Secretary’s sentences were also better-adapted 
to effective oral style in this address. They were, by 
actual count, shorter in this speech, averaging about 
twenty-two words per sentence. Approximately half of 
them were less than twenty words In length, which, ac­
cording to the Brlgance standards outlined in Chapter IV, 
would make them easily comprehensible in oral discourse. 
The use of shorter sentences and less dlffloult vocabu­
lary simplified the oral style of Iokes’ second major 
campaign speech, but robbed it of none of its vividness.
REACTION TO THE SPEECH
Ickes was obviously pleased with the response to 
the speech. Three days after delivering It he wrote:
I am having a good many letters commenting on my 
radio speech last Monday night, and very few indeed 
are oritloal. I note that the approving ones are 
more enthusiastic and complimentary than I have ever 
received on a speeoh. There are many requests for 
copies for personal use and for distribution, and I 
am writing today to Charley Michelson to ask him 
whether it is the purpose of the Democratic National
29chloago Dally Tribune. August 5, 1936.
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Committee to print this speech.3°
Among the enthusiastic wires, letters, and personal notes 
were very congratulatory messages from Attorney General 
Homer Cummings, Ambassador Josephus Daniels, Senator 
Joseph Guffey, Governor Herbert Lehman, and publisher J. 
David S t e r n . S t i l l  more important was a wire from the 
President which read: ’That was a great philippic last
night."32 The President spoke to Ickes by telephone 
three days later to tell him the speech was "grand."
He congratulated his Secretary of the Interior again 
two days later when he oonferred with him at the White 
House.33
Ickes also found the reaction of Republican 
leaders gratifying. Of their comments he said:
Republican politicians and headquarters attaches 
have met the speech in a complaining tone of voice.
. . . they do not meet me on the Issues. All of 
which means to me that my speech really hurt.3^
3°lckes, Secret Diary. Vol. I, p. 65^. The speeoh 
was reprinted by the Demooratio National Committee.
August 7, 1936 letter from Michelson to Iokes. Iokes 
Papers.
3lNotes from Cummings and Daniels, letters from 
Lehman and Stern, and a wire from Guffey are in the 
Ickes Papers, Container 2*16.
32ickee, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 65^.
33ibid., p. 659-
3^Ibid., p. 665.
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That there was much truth In the Secretary's analysis of 
opponents' reaction Is Illustrated by some of their 
oomments. Congressman Joseph Martin, Republican cam­
paign manager In the East, appeared to have evaded and 
misconstrued the Issues raised:
From a Republican stand point the speech was 
most encouraging. It indicates how desperate the 
Democrats are. Like Chairman Farley, Mr. Iokes, 
pseudo-Republican, is whistling as he approaches 
the political cemetery where the New Deal is to 
be interred. Mr. Iokes, with ill grace for a man 
who was himself a so-called progressive, has 
attacked Governor Landon because of what he con­
siders to be progressive tendencies.35
This statement missed the point, of course, since Ickes 
was charging that the Governor had taken political 
departure from his former progresslvisra, not that he 
had retained it. Another reaotion o&me from Harrison 
E. Spangler, speaking for the Republican National Com­
mittee; he simply dismissed the speech as an attempt to 
"smear Landon." The same news column carried Ickes' 
retort: "Mayn't we say anything about their man?
. . . I thought they invited careful scrutiny of his 
record."3^ The Secretary's belief that Republican 
spokesmen failed to reply on the issues of his speech 
appears to have been Justified.
35New York Times, August 5, 1936, p. 12.
^ Washington Post, August 5, 1936, p. 2.
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The speech was given good newspaper publicity.
The neutral New York Times and the hostile Washington 
Post carried both news reports and complete texts on 
August The St_. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Chicago 
Dally Tribune, and the New York Herald Tribune reprint­
ed portions of the text, and most of the country’s other 
dally newspapers appear to have given the speech some 
kind of news or editorial notice.37
Editorial reaotlon was, of course, largely 
divided along partisan lines. However, those publica­
tions which supported the President were unusually 
enthusiastic, and many of those In the hostile group 
mixed disagreement with praise or made only complaining 
retorts.
Among the favorable editorial reactions was that 
of the Philadelphia Record, which said, regarding whether 
or not Landon was a progressive: “No man Is better fit­
ted to answer that question than Iokes. And he answered 
it brilliantly Monday night. . . ."38 The Beaumont 
Enterprise labeled the speech “one of the most effective 
since the campaign started" and said Iokes showed "a
3?Container 239 of the Iokes Papers has several 
pages of clippings from newspapers representing all 
sections of the country.
38phlladelphla Record, August 5, 1936.
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oaustio tongue, a sense of humor, and plenty of ammuni­
tion."^ The Sedalla (Missouri) Times. said he "made a 
case that will be difficult to a n s w e r . H e y w o o d  
Broun, In his "It Seems to Me" column, said that "Ickes 
scored strongly" and then added: "The reaction of Repub­
lican spokesmen to the address gives strong support to 
the charges which Mr. Ickes made."^-1- These are typical 
of the many favorable editorial reactions included in 
the Ickes scrapbooks.
Many of the papers supporting Landon roundly de­
nounced the speeoh. The Boston Transcript called Ickes1 
charges "so vicious as to be utterly unworthy of a 
Cabinet officer";^ the Indianapolis Star said it was "a 
radio tirade of 3,700 words" in which there was "no room 
for logic"; ^  the Yakima Herald called Ickes a "popgun"
39seaumont Enterprise, August 17, 1936.
^°Sedalla Times, August 7» 1936.
^ Washington News, August 24, 1936.
^2The Nation of August 8 , 1936 called the speech 
“shrewd, acid, and devastating." Still others whioh ex­
pressed praise were the Newark Ledger, the Brooklyn 
Citizen, the Miami News, the Louisville Courier-Journal, 
the Decatur Dally, the Wichita Publicity, the Camden Post, 
the Las Vegas' k'evlew Journal, the Pittsburgh Pilot, and 
the Mobile Register. Iokes Papers, Container 339.
^Boston Transcript, August 5, 1936.
^Indianapolis Star, August 4, 1936.
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who had fired ‘'only BB shots'1; ^  and the New London Day, 
the Washington Herald, and the Kansas City Times, all of 
August 4, said that the speaker "tried to smear" Governor 
Landon. '
None of the opposition papers mentioned so far, 
however, made a serious attempt to reply to the charges 
made by their New Deal opponent. The San Diego Tribune 
and the Portland Oregonian, both of August 5, did reply. 
Their answer was to cite the changeB in President Roose­
velt's ideas and program sinoe 1933. Oklahoma City
Dally Oklahoman of August 5 replied that no one had 
changed his mind In his political career more than 
Secretary Ickes.
Several smaller newspapers supporting Landon dis­
agreed with the speech Itself but had grudging words of 
praise for the speaker. An upstate New York editorial 
accused him of over-stating his oase but labeled him "a 
forceful speaker and campaigner";^ a hostile New England 
paper said that he brought into effective play "the full 
force of personalities which he, as an Inveterate re­
former, p o s s e s s e s " a n d  a paper in Landon's home state
^ Yakima Herald, August 5» 1936.
^ Watertown Times, August 5, 1936.
^Providence Bulletin, August 6, 1936.
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denounced Ickes but called his speech "one of the most 
effective speeches against Governor Landon yet made by 
the quaking Democrats," adding that the speaker "de­
serves and will get credit from the Roosevelt Adminis­
tration.
The New York Times remained uncommitted in the 
presidential contest at this time, and the opinions 
of Arthur Krock, one of its leading political comment­
ators, were still non-partisan. Krock's reaction to the 
speech was a mixed one. He said that "reviewing some of 
Mr. Landon1s less recent activities, Secretary Ickes 
made against him, and easily proved, charges of incon­
sistency"; but he added that the speech "probably did 
not have any great effect on those groups of voters who 
are still undetermined." Krock believed Ickes had not 
gone far enough in proving that Landon had changed his 
views purely for political opportunism. He concluded, 
however, that "the burden of proof is on Mr. Landon that
he did not do the latter."^
In general, the enthusiastic reception of it by 
partisans and the evasive or mixed response to it by 
opponents gave Ickes reason to be pleased with reactions 
to his speech.
^ Hutchinson Herald. August 5» 1936.
^ New York Times, August 6, 1936, p. 18.
1^ 3
SUMMARY EVALUATION
Judged both by Internal conformity to rhetorical 
standards and by the test of public reaction, the initial 
attack on Landon was a more effective speech than the one 
directed against the Republican platform. The August 3 
speech went into the very essence of Ickes' special task
in the campaign, that of reducing the stature of Landon 
aB a candidate. The Administration's hatchet-man was 
under way in his efforts to weaken the Republican candi­
date In the eyes of progressives and liberals in both 
parties and to undermine public confidence in that 
candidate's sincerity. His chief weapons were the words 
of Governor Landon himself and of his supporters.
The strength of the speech lay primarily in its 
effective blending of logical and emotional appeals. 
Examples and testimony were used as rational supports, 
but they were clothed in highly psychological language. 
Vivid Imagery and sardonic humor were effectively inter­
mingled with logical supports. Some stylistic weaknesses 
present in the first radio address were not noted in this 
speeoh.
The reactions to the speeoh pleased both Ickes 
and Roosevelt. Democrats were highly enthusiastic about 
it; it was well publicized; and the replies of Republican 
leaders and publications were relatively ineffectual.
Democratic strategists had reason to feel that Ickes' 
attack had damaged the prestige and standing of Roose­
velt's opponent and, at the same time, had weakened 
Republican charges of platform violations against the 
President.
CHAPTER VI
"HEARST OVER TOPEKA"
On August 27, at 9:45 P.M. (E.S.T.), Secretary 
Ickes made his third major radio address of the cam­
paign. This thirty-minute speech, sponsored by the 
Democratic National Committee, was broadcast over a 
Columbia Broadcasting System network. It was en­
titled "Hearst Over Topeka."
BACKGROUND AND SETTING OF THE SPEECH
Between August 3 and August 27, Ickes made no 
speeches. He was not, however, entirely out of the news 
during that time. On August 18, several newspapers 
carried reports of the Secretary's verbal blast against 
the Winchester, Massachusetts policeman who had arrest­
ed Robert Ickes, the Secretary's foster son, on a charge 
of driving while under the influence of liquor. The ar­
resting officer was accused of playing politics "through 
a young lad who is an innocent bystander." The New York 
Times carried Iokes' charge and also the denial by 
Police Sergeant Charles J. Harrold.'1' Of potentially more 
serious consequence to Iokes politically was the published
^ e w  York Times. August 18, 1936, p. 13.
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charge that hia book Baok to Work: The Story of PWA was
prepared In large part by government personnel and at 
government expense. This charge appeared In Hearst pub­
lications on August 24, and was made a front-page story 
by many of them. Ickes' press-conferenoe reply was that 
he had simply availed himself of the research services 
which were supplied, upon request, to any taxpayer, 
Including Hearst correspondents. 2 After this brief ex­
change, the matter was apparently allowed to drop.-^
During this period between Ickes' addresses,
Governor Landon began his expected Eastern tour. On
August 21, at West Middlesex, Pennsylvania, he called
4for a return to "the American way of life"; on August 
24, at Ghautaqua Lake, New York, he discussed education, 
declaring against the Hearst-supported teacher loyalty 
oaths and favoring keeping education "free of all con­
trol by the Federal Government";^ and on August 26, at 
Buffalo, he hit "reckless spending" and promised repeal
2Ickes, Seoret Diary. Vol. I, pp. 668-69; and 
New York Times, August 28, 1936, p. 8 .
3This conclusion is based on the absence of edit­
orial or further news comment in the New York Times, the 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Chicago Tribune, the Washing­
ton Post, and the newspaper clippings (usually very 
thoroughly collected) in the Iokes Papers.
**New York Times, August 2 3 , 193b, p. 1.
^New York Times, August 25, 1936, p. 1.
wof the Surplus Tax Bill.^ A statement released by the 
Democratic National Committee Indicated that Secretary 
Ickes1 August 27 address would ’'discuss some of the 
questions raised in Governor Landon’s talks at Chau­
tauqua Lake and in Buffalo."^ Although the Ickes' 
speeoh dealt with those questions very briefly and only 
indirectly, this announcement probably served to stimu­
late the desired interest.
Much closer to the actual oontent of the speeoh 
was a later announcement by the Democratic National 
Committee. It promised that the Ickes speech would dis­
close "hitherto secret documents revealing how orders
Q
went from William Randolph Hearst to Alfred Landon."
This was a speeoh Ickes had been eager to make for a 
long time. He had urged upon Michelson, Farley, High, 
and the President the delivery of an attack linking 
Hearst and Landon before Landon*s aooeptance speech. 
Aooordlng to Ickes, everybody approved the Idea except 
the President, who preferred waiting until after the 
Kansan's speech of acceptance.^ The President expressed 
the fear that Landon might then disavow the politically
6New York Times, August 27, 1936, P* !•
?New York Times, August 24, 1936, p. 6 .
®New York Times, August 27, 1936, p. 11.
^ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, pp. 639-40.
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risky Hearst, a fear which his Secretary of the Interior 
regarded as "downright silly.
Ickes did win approval for making minor attacks 
on Hearst In his June 7 and August 3 speeches. After 
the latter attack, according to Ickes, Roosevelt seemed 
more enthusiastic about "going after" Hearst:
He /Roosevelt/ said he had heard that Hearst 
didn’t like the attacks that were being made upon 
him and that there were indications of a willing­
ness on his part to compromise. He added that it 
might be neoessary to go after him once more to 
bring him to time. 11
On August 1 9 , Charles Michelson called the Secre­
tary to tell him that the President had decided to 
schedule the speech on Hearst and Landon for the evening 
of August 27. Ickes polished up the partially-prepared 
speeoh that week end while a guest of his friend, and
Hearst’s publisher of the Washington Herald. Mrs.
12Eleanor Patterson. At an August 24 private luncheon 
with the President, final approval of the speech was 
reoeived:
He /Itoosevelt/ told me that Charley Michelson 
had said to him that ray speech for Thursday night 
was fine. I handed a oopy of It to him and he 
read It. He liked It and did not suggest a single
10Ibld., p. 639.
11Ibld., p. 657.
12Ickes diary relates this interesting event with 
obvious pleasure. Ibid., p. 6 6 5.
1^
correction. He did suggest one or two things that 
might be added, and these I put in later in the day, 
to the improvement of the speech.^3
PURPOSE AND THESIS OF THE SPEECH
An original purpose of the attack on Hearst, that 
of embarrassing Landon Just prior to his acceptance 
speech by linking him closely with Hearst, was gone; 
others, however, remained.
Hearst publications were in vigorous opposition to 
the Roosevelt Administration; therefore, any attack which 
undermined the Influence of the publisher, or his news­
paper? ,periodicals, and other news outlets, was sound 
political strategy. Governor Landon, however, and not 
Hearst, was the chief target of the assault. As Hugh 
Johnson was to point out after the speech: "Mr. Hearst
is not the candidate. Landon is the narae."'1'^  Ickes 
and the President undoubtedly realized this, but they 
further realized that a candidate must often carry the 
weight of those supporters with whom he is closely 
associated in the public mind. Ickes was attacking 
Landon through Hearst. This is about what Landon-sup- 
porter William Hard said in a rather subjective way
13lbld., p. 6 6 6.
^Newsweek, VIII (September 5, 1936), 12.
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when he aooused the Secretary of trying "to blacken the
character of Governor Landon by blackening the character
of Mr. Hearst.
Some evidence undeniably pointed to the conclusion
that Hearst was not regarded favorably by the voters
whose favor Landon sought- to capture. In the election
year of 1936 he was placed under especially persistent
attack. In that year, two new Hearst biographies, both
16unsympathetic to their subject, appeared. In an
editorial entitled "The King is Dead," New Republic
said that these books threw Hearst under "a lurid
spotlight" and then quoted in part from Charles A.
Beard’s introduction to one of them:
Hearst, despite all the uproar he has made and 
all the power he wields, is a colossal failure. . , . 
He will depart loved by few and respected by none 
whose respeot is worthy of respect.17
Just a few months prior to publication to these two
biographies, Hearst had figured prominently in Raymond
Gram Swing’s Forerunners of American Fascism. In his
chapter on Hearst, Swing wrote:
^-5New York Times, August 28, 1 9 3 6 , p. 8 .
•^Oliver Carlson and Ernest Sutherland Bates,
Lord of San Simeon (New York: Viking Press, 1 9 3 6); and
Ferdinand Lundberg, Imperial Hearst: A Social Biography
(New York: Equinox Cooperative Frees,”"1936).
^ New Republic, LXXXVH (September 5. 1936), 35.
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Waging war on professors, contemptous of aca­
demic freedom and of the rights of free speech, 
hostile to the 'alien' ideas of labor (particular­
ly to the Newspaper Guild in his own offices), 
apologetic for big business, admiring of the 
fascists of Europe for having suppressed communism, 
and sensing in his very bones the decadence of the 
democracy he once served, that is Hearst today.18
In July of 1936, the Fortune poll took up the 
subject of Hearst. Their results showed widespread 
apathy or lndeoision but also revealed that many con­
sidered Hearst publications a bad influence on American 
politics. When asked the question "Do you think the 
influence of the Hearst papers upon national politics 
is good or bad?" over 10 per cent replied "good," 
almost 28 per cent thought it "bad," and the majority 
had no opinion. In the areas where Hearst papers were 
published, 10 per cent thought their Influence good 
and those considering it bad rose to over 43 per cent.
On August 21, a resolution by the American Federation 
of Teachers, convened in Philadelphia, labeled Hearst an 
"enemy of academic freedom," the "chief proponent of 
fascism" and the "outstanding Jlngoist" of the country. 
They also quoted Senator Norris' statement that Hearst 
publications were "the Bewer system of American
ISRaymond Gram Swing, Forerunners of American 
Fascism (New York: Julian Messner, Inc., 1935), P* 151*
^ Fortune, XIV (July, 1936), p. 148.
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Journalism," and their resolution to boycott these pub-
20lioatlons passed unanimously.
Much of the American public quite obviously did 
not approve of Hearst or his publications. If Ickes 
succeeded in associating Landon closely with Hearst, this 
might seriously hamper the Governor’s bid for public 
favor. This purpose was accompanied by the further aim 
of striking at one of the most persistent and bitter 
critics of the Administration.
The thesis of the speech went beyond the simple 
association of candidate Landon with supporter Hearst.
It developed the theme of a "boss-candldate" relation­
ship. The subject was the Landon-Hearst relationship; 
the proposition which eventually emerged was that pub­
lisher Hearst strongly influenced or even controlled 
Governor Landon. The subjeotwhs announced in the 
opening sentence of the speech: "What of Governor Lan­
don and William Randolph Hearst?"; the proposition Was 
plainly implied in the dosing sentences:
Hearst over Topeka J Do the American people want 
it to be Hearst over the White House?
This is one of the most important issues, if not 
in fact the transcendent issue of this campaign.
20New York Times, August 22, I936, p. 5*
LINES OF ARGUMENT AND ORGANIZATION
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The broad organization of thiB speeoh was clear. 
The speaker posed a question in the introduction, gave 
his answer to it in the body of the speeoh, and drew his 
conclusions in the closing sentences. The internal 
organization in the body of the speech conformed less 
to any logical pattern. The arguments, in order, were 
these:
(1) Landon owes his nomination to the support and 
direction of Hearst.
(2) Landon does not Intend to discard Hearst 
after the election.
(3 ) Landon's present relationship with Hearst is 
a very close one.
(4-) The "Old Guard" has not been removed from 
power in the Republican party.
(5) Hearst dominates most of the American press.
(6 ) Landon is conducting an evasive campaign.
It will be seen that these last three arguments do not 
directly support the main thesis of the speech, nor is 
there any obvious pattern to their arrangement. The 
tendency already noted in Iokes' speeches to Btrlke out 
on all fronts to discredit candidate, supporters, or 
party is much in evidence in this speech. The speeoh
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maintains a semblance of unity, but only by the constant 
injection of references to the Hearst-Landon relation­
ship and by the persistent attitude of attach.
FOBMSOF SUPPORT
As in previous speeches, some of Ickes1 premises 
were supported primarily by assertion and psychological 
appeals, almost not at all by logical proof. His first 
premise-, for example, was supported by no logical proof 
at all. In contending that Landon owed his nomination 
to Hearst'8 support and direction, the speaker used as­
sumption, assertion, and slanted narrative, but no 
logical proof. He began by saying:
Everyone knows that it was the result of a care­
fully planned Hearst build-up that made it possible 
for the pleasant gentleman who is Governor of Kansas 
to appear upon the national stage in the character 
of a Presidential candidate.
If boiled down to its purely factual content, 
this assertion was perhaps Justified. As noted in 
Chapter V, the belief that Hearst support was very 
Instrumental in securing the necessary publicity and 
backing for Landon1s nomination was rather generally 
held. The narrative which followed next, however, went 
beyond the bounds of general agreement. Throughout his 
exposition, Ickes wove in assertions and implications of 
a highly controversial nature. His narrative, stripped
of all slanted description and Implication, told of 
Hearst's break with the Administration, his decision 
to support the Kansas Governor, the publicity campaign 
which followed, and the eventual nomination of Landon 
and approval of a platform. While delivering this 
narrative, however, Ickes worked in unsupported as­
sertions or implications (1) that Hearst's break with 
Roosevelt was solely because the Administration “denied 
certain special privileges" to him in regard to tax 
procedures; (2) that Landon balanced the budget so he 
would not "render himself liable to impeachment," and 
that he did so by cutting expenses "at the cost of the 
schools and other public welfare institutions"; (3 ) 
that Landon, at the direction of Hearst, "gradually dis­
carded every conviction that would link him with the 
Progressive movement of the country or the New Deal of 
President Roosevelt"; and (^) that the Republican plat­
form was "weasel-worded."
The paragraph describing the results of the 
Republican convention illustrates the nature of the 
lakes’ narrative:
In due course the Republicans assembled in a 
national convention at Cleveland, where they 
adopted a weasel-worded platform that was en­
thusiastically approved by Mr. Hearst and formally 
ratified candidates for President and Vice Presi­
dent who had been selected by him. The greatest 
build-up in the politioal history of America thus 
far had been successful. A well-meaning, pleasant
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but inexperienced Governor In the make-up of a man 
of transcendent abilities and of truly heroic mold 
had been nominated for President by the major 
minority party.
The easy assertions and clever but unsupported implica­
tions in this paragraph are typical of those found in 
the first third of the Secretary's speech, the portion 
devoted to what "every one knows" about the nomination 
of Landon.
The second argument rejected the idea that Landon 
might, after election, drop Hearst. It did so by psycho­
logical suggestion tinged with a trace of irony. The 
argument was brief:
People of generous minds are loath to believe 
that these gentlemen /Tandon and Knox^ are willing 
to accept the support of Mr. Hearst and at the same 
time, by their silence, refuse to acknowledge their 
obligation to him. Least of all do they wish to 
credit the story that is going the rounds to the 
effect that Governor Landon will accept the support 
of Mr. Hearst until after the election and then 
repudiate him, win or lose. No one wants to have 
such an opinion as that of the Republican candidate.
Embodied here also was the suggestion of a dilemma: 
either Landon welcomed and would show appreciation for 
Hearst's aid, or he would prove ungrateful and treacher­
ous. Ickes rejected the latter alternative in favor of 
the more "generous" one which, of course, supported the 
thesis of his speeoh.
The third argument dealt with the most advertised 
portion of the speech: the charge that sworn testimony
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before an Illinois court furnished documentary proof of 
the Hearst Influence on Landon. The testimony occurred 
in a case involving George P. Harding, Republican National 
Committeeman from Illinois. Harding had wanted, for 
reasons upon which Ickes speculated, to see Hearst.
Through Frank Knox, he secured an appointment with Hearst 
and flew to California during the last week in June, 1936. 
After that conference, Hearst sent to Harding a memorandum, 
from which the speaker quoted in part:
Memorandum for Mr. Harding from Mr. Hearst: I was
very much impressed by what you had to say about 
Governor Landon not making too many speeches. If you 
will write me to that effect, expressing your views 
as frankly as you did when we were talking, I will, 
with your permission, send the letter to Governor 
Landon. It cooperates with and supports what I have 
already told the Governor, and I feel that suoh 
views coming from an important man as yourself would 
have a great and valuable Influence. I think the 
Governor naturally feels this himself, but the average 
politician around him is continually urging him to 
get out and talk. Talk is the method of the average 
politician, but as you very truly said this is a 
oampalgn in whloh speech-making might do more harm 
than good. At present the Democrats have nothing to 
orltiolze Governor Landon about. You can see that 
in their attempts to criticize him. Too many speeches 
might give the Democrats their eagerly wanted oppor­
tunity. Others try to combat or at least try to off­
set the influence of those politicians who are 
continually demanding more speeohes.
This was the documentary evidence upon which the speaker
based his premise that Hearst was exeroislng powerful
influence over Landon. A simple reading of the memorandum
does not offer convincing proof that it documents the
charge. It seemed almost as though Hearst needed help in
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putting across a suggestion to the Republican candidate.
It expressed some Hearst points of view which were not 
likely to endear him to the public, and It did not re­
flect favorably upon his supporters* private views of 
Landon as a candidate; the memorandum did not, however, 
prove that Landon was under the domination of Hearst.
It was good campaign material, but It does not appear to 
have proved the speaker's premise.
Ickes made the most of his document and of the 
circumstances leading to its writing. He Inferred that 
Harding went to see Hearst because he was "practical" 
and therefore "wished to go to the highest source of 
power and authority In the Republican party," that he 
visited Hearst instead of Landon because "he wanted to 
get to the man at the top," and that if you want to get 
to Landon “the surest way is through Mr. Hearst." Suoh 
Inferences appear to have been the result of partisan 
speculation; they were not warranted by the evidence.
The Secretary also quoted from the memorandum to 
prove that Hearst had silenced Landon on the issues of 
the campaign. Regarding Harding's suggesting that Lan­
don say very little, Hearst had said "It cooperates with 
and supports what I have already told the Governor." This 
statement proved, according to the speaker, that Hearst 
was responsible for silencing Landon:
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Mr. Hearst early In the game had cautioned him 
against talking too much, and a word of caution 
from that source was all that Governor Landon 
needed. . . . Has any aspirant for the high office 
of Chief Executive ever said so little that Is 
worth listening to?
From the point of view of evidence and reasoning, the
speaker's conclusion simply over-reached his proof.
Tho next argument was that the Republican party, 
far from ridding Itself of the "Old Guard," was still a 
party of loose ethical standards. The evidence was 
drawn from a statement of Harding In the same case 
previously olted. This statement, as quoted and inter­
preted, did not paint a very savory picture of Harding's 
concept of political honesty. Again, however, the evi­
dence was hardly adequate. A questionable, or even 
valid, charge of poor political ethics against one Repub­
lican, while It may be psychologically telling, is not 
logically sufficient to Indict an entire party.
Ickes next argued that Hearst exeroised control 
of a large section of the American press. The argument 
is brief enough to be quoted In Its entirety:
Another significant aspect of the campaign, in 
addition to the pregnant taciturnity of Governor 
Landon and Colonel Knox upon this Important Hearst 
Issue, is the almost equally impenetrable silence 
of a certain part of the American press with refer­
ence to it.
It would almost seem that to some the cherished 
right of freedom of the press, about which Mr. Hearst 
and Colonel MoCormick can become so exlcted when 
there Is no occasion for It, is often merely freedom 
to distort news and to supress newB. It might not be
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unreasonable to affirm that a seotion of the Amerloan 
press, to the degree to which It wears blinders upon 
this and other Issues Involving Mr. Hearst, regards 
him not only as Its politioal but as Its Intellectual 
and ethical leader.
Be the explanation what It may, it Is noteworthy 
that what In other circumstances would be regarded 
as Important news cannot break Into the columns of 
some newspapers which today, like the Republican party, 
have surrendered their Judgment and their conscience 
to VJllliam Randolph Hearst.
Little in thiB argument would meet the tests of sound
evidence. The conclusion was based upon an assertion of
fact— that many newspapers were ignoring the New Deal side
of the news, especially on the Hearst issue— and a causal
inference from that assertion— that they had aocepted
completely the leadership of Hearst. The opinion that
many pro-Landon newspapers carefully selected and even
distorted political news was widely expressed by Democrats.
Numerous letters in the Ickes1 files expressed such an
21opinion, as did President Roosevelt and Charles Michelson.
It Is difficult to say whether undecided voters accepted 
it as general knowledge. If they did not, the entire 
argument rested on unsupported assertion of a dubious 
"fact.u
That Hearst was the acknowledged leader of the 
Republican press was an inference not clearly indloated
2^Ickes Papers. Containers 246-52; Rosenraan, Public 
Papers, VoY. V, p. 3; Charles Michelson, The Ghost Talks 
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1944), pp. 49 and JJ12.
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by the previous assertion and probably not a statement 
of generally accepted fact. Only one printed opinion 
which supported that stated by the Secretary has been 
found. Heywood Broun, pro-Roosevelt columnist wrote:
For more than a year Hearst has set the pace and 
defined the issues for practically all the attacks 
made upon the Roosevelt Administration. Even such 
bitter newspaper rivals of Mr. Hearst as the Chicago 
Tribune, the Los Angeles Times and the New York 
Herald Tribune have taken their tone from San Simeon. 22
Iokes1 final argument was that Landon was a vague 
and evasive candidate, one about whom the voters actually 
knew little in regard to vital issues. He said, in part:
The farm question, the labor question, the question 
of social security, taxation, relief, peace and many 
other burning Issues may be all right in their way, 
but the Republican candidate has a more important 
matter to discuss.
He wants the country to conform to 'the American 
way of life1. Well, who doesn't? He reiterates this 
phrase as if he meant something by it, but in his 
mouth it is only a catch-phrase, a bit of empty 
rhetoric, a tinsel object designed to attract the at­
tention of the unthinking.
I haven’t attempted to count the number of times 
that the Republican oandidate and his running mate 
have used this expression— which also is a favorite 
one of the Hearst press— but when Governor Landon, 
in particular, reaches a point in a speech where hope 
runs high that he is at last going to say something 
about the real issues of the campaign he can always 
be depended upon to wind up with Borne inanity.
Here, ignoring for the moment the subjective language,
Ickes was upon more solid logical ground. Landon had
been more general than specific, and he had frequently
22Nation, GXLII (June 17, 1936), 779.
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called for a return to "the American way of life." This 
expression had been especially In evidence In Landon's 
addresses at Omaha, Nebraska, on August 20 and at West 
Middlesex, Pennsylvania, on August 22.23 Arthur Krook, 
who had treated the Landon candidacy rather favorably, 
noted Landon’s failure to spell out his stand on the 
issues:
We must begin to detail and amplify the vague 
promises and professions of the platform and his 
own speech of acceptance or run the extreme risk 
of being set down as having no amplifications to 
Impart.24
On his Eastern tour, Landon began to be somewhat 
more specific. At Chautauqua Lake he announced his op­
position to teacher loyalty oaths,and at Buffalo he 
promised to repeal the Surplus Tax Bill and to reduoe 
federal spending. However, a New York Tiroes editorial 
observed on the day of Iokes' speeoh that Landon 
"remains vague regarding Just where he would apply the 
k n i f e . T h e  charges which Ickes made regarding the 
Republican candidate's vagueness on many important 
issues were well-grounded in fact. However, in conclud­
ing th^ argument, the speaker said:
2^See reports and texts in New York Times of 
August 21, and August 23, 1936.
2^New York Times, August 2 3 , 1 9 3 6, Sec. A, p. 3 .
^ New York Times, August 27, 1936, p. 20.
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There isn’t a responsible person in the United 
States, unless it be William Randolph Hearst, who, 
at this moment, would underwrite what Governor Lan­
don, if elected President, would do in any given set 
of circumstances.
Ickes simply let his conclusion go somewhat beyond what
his basioally valid proof Justified.
As in the case of the speech on the Republican 
platform, Ickes relied much more upon emotional appeals 
than upon logical proofs. This was true despite the 
great emphasis placed, especially where publicity was 
concerned, upon the documentary aspect of the speech.
The documentary proof actually had limited value as 
evidence; the persuasion of the speeoh rested in the 
psychological use which the speaker made of the docu­
ment presented. He used inconclusive evidence, from 
which he drew questionable inferences, upon which he 
built emotional appeals.
Most of the psychological support in the speeoh 
was built upon "guilt by association." For Ickes* pur­
pose, it was not really neoessary that he prove Landon 
to be under Hearst domination. It was sufficient that 
he get Landon closely associated with Hearst, even though 
vaguely, in the votei's* minds. This strategy would create 
an impression upon "the unthinking" to whom Ickes had 
said Landon appealed with his "American way of Life."
The antipathy which many felt toward Hearst might then 
extend to the Kansan as well. Too, the charge of Hearst
domination, while never proved, was likely to arouse 
some suspicion and distrust simply by suggestion and by 
dent of constant repetition. The speaker did not really 
have to prove anything to his listeners to damage the 
landon candidacy; he needed only to arouse their sus­
picions. While his evidence was Inadequate as logical 
proof, Ickes did cleverly suggest that Landon was domi­
nated by Hearst, that he was a political opportunist 
without film convictions, and that he was being deliber­
ately vague and evasive; he did suggest, further, that 
the Republican party was led by corrupt men and that 
Hearst dominated an unfair hostile press. If these 
suggestions took firm root, they were, strictly from the 
point of getting political results, Just as effective as 
the most valid logical proof. This Ignores, for the 
moment, the ethical consideration involved.
The two psychological devices Ickes used most 
were emotionally suggestive language and repetition.
Some emotionally suggestive or loaded language from 
previous speeches reappeared in this one. “Reactionary 
Wall Street,“ “Old Guard," "weasel-worded,“ and "prac­
tical," for example, were back. A new approach to re­
ducing the stature of Governor Landon by the language 
applied to him appeared also. Ickes sought to create a 
picture of a mediocre, second-rate man by referring to 
Landon as "a well-meaning, pleasant but inexperienced
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Governor" and as "the pleasant gentleman who Is Governor 
of Kansas." In context, the word "pleasant" took on a 
suggestion definitely apart from its denotative meaning. 
As an example of the speaker's use of repetition to im­
plant a suggestion, this word "pleasant" appeared three 
separate times to describe the Republican candidate. The 
word "boss," In reference to Hearst, was also repeated 
several times. As noted previously, many key words used 
in other speeches were repeated in this one. The main 
ideas of the previous two radio addresses were also 
repeated in very condensed form.
Less use of humor as a persuasive device appeared 
in this speeoh than in previous ones. The general tone 
was more business-like, and a light note was less fre­
quently sounded when ridicule was being employed. Some 
humorous references, however, did appear. The irony of 
the following passage, dealing with Hearst‘s "discovery" 
of Landon is Illustrative:
Mr. Hearst looked upon Governor Landon and found 
him good. Wherupon Mr. Hearst let it be known to 
the world that he had discovered a veritable poli­
tical prodigy, a nugget of great value, a simple but 
rugged soul, whom he proceeded to offer, with his 
approval, to the Republican party as its candidate 
for President.
The same type of humor appeared in the discussion of
Landon1s discarding all previous progressive ideas:
To some people it might have appeared to be a 
large order to dig a hole in the back yard large
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enough for the interment of so many vigorous ideas 
on governmental policy, but the 'strong1 and now 
silenced man of Topeka, with a Presidential nomina­
tion dangling before his eyes, undertook the task.
Another illustration of Ickes* effective use of irony
occurred when he referred to George Harding’s concept of
political morality as expressed through his opinion of
an Illinois politician-named Van Meter. The Seoretary
epitomized a Harding quotation this way:
Van Meter was appointed because he was honest 
and could be depended upon to split the swag 
equitably among the politicians. And he was honest 
'because he was born on father's farm. 1
Ridicule and saroasm were used a great deal in this
speech, but most of it was more deadly serious than
humorous in aspect.
An extended analysis of the ethical proof in 
"Hearst Over Topeka" is hardly necessary. The discus­
sions of lines of argument and of persuasive techniques 
illustrate clearly that again in this address, as before, 
the Secretary concentrated on a negative approach to the 
ethos of the opposition rather than upon a positive one 
toward his own. All of his arguments were directed 
toward diminishing the stature of Landon, Hearst, the 
opposition press, and the Republican leadership. No 
effort was made to capitalize on his own reputation or 
position and apparently very little to win the favor of 
listeners by the personal virtues and attitudes reflected
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In the speech. After this speech, Newsweek noted that 
Iokes undoubtedly had been given the Job of "Chief De-
26nouncer" and assigned the "pummeling of the opposition."
He stuck close to that task in "Hearst Over Topeka."
Two brief references were made which might have 
been Intended to help support Ickes' attack by using the 
prestige of the President he represented. One was a 
statement that the Hearst press was "venomously misrep­
resenting the hard-working, able and statesmanlike 
President of the United States." This assertion not 
only capitalized upon the President's office but also 
referred very subtly to Roosevelt's "non-political" 
functioning in it while Landon was campaigning. Later, 
in asserting that Landon, not Roosevelt, was the "pig in 
a poke," the speaker referred to "President Roosevelt, 
whose policies have been frankly disclosed to the country 
as they have been developed." These were half-hearted 
attempts to utilize ethical proof as a persuasive factor 
when compared with the larger efforts to destroy the 
standing of the opposition's candidate and of his leading 
supporters.
USE OF LANGUAGE
The language in "Hearst Over Topeka" had the same
^ Newsweek, VIII (September 5> 1936), p. 12.
vivid and striking quality noted in previous speeches.
This has been apparent in sections of the speeoh already 
quoted for other purposes, especially those illustrating 
the speaker’s use of irony. The language is noted for 
its expressively figurative quality, from the title it­
self to the final threat of "Hearst over the White House." 
For example, Ickes said that Landon became "uncommunica­
tive as the sphinx," that he became a "strong but silenced 
man," that making him a presidential candidate was like 
"making bricks without straw," and that no one before 
had "pussyfooted his way into the White House." He also 
referred to Landon's "oracular utterances" and his "auto­
biographical phrase 'pig in a poke'," and he noted 
Hearst's "styptic effect upon the vocal organs." The 
Republican party he called "the major minority party."
Such figures were not only slantedly descriptive but 
gave life and vigor to the speech.
The speaker's oral style was given foroe by 
frequent use of short, blunt sentences and by rhetorical 
questions. Illustrative of the injection of an occasion­
al concise, blunt statement was this paragraph:
But notwithstanding his hurry, apparently he did 
not think it worth while to stop at Topeka to confer 
with Governor Landon as he flew over that city on 
his way to San Simeon. No, he wanted to get to the 
man at the top. Mr. Harding is a realist.
Several questions, mostly rhetorical, lent added force and
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directness to the speaker's style. His opening sentence 
asked: “What of Governor Landon and William Randolph
Hearst?" This question was posed again, rephrased, only 
a few seoonds later. At one point, a series of questions 
was used:
While there is no written evidence to prove that 
Mr. Hearst also has told Governor Landon that he 
should say as little as possible, and then only in 
unctious inanities on those occasions when he could 
not avoid making speeches, who can doubt that he has 
done so?. How otherwise explain the Republican's 
elocutionary efforts? Has any aspirant for the high 
office of Chief Executive ever said so little that 
is worth listening to?
Four other direct questions were posed, culminating in
his final "Do the American people want it to be Hearst
over the White House?" Ickes employed language that was
vividly descriptive and psychologically persuasive, and
he usually structured it in a direct, forceful manner.
REACTION TO THE SPEECH
Ickes was pleased with the news space given his 
speech by the press. Of this press coverage he wrote:
I got a big newspaper play on my Thursday night 
speech. The New York Dally News, which has the 
largest circulation in the country, printed it in 
full, beginning on the front page, and carried some 
seotione of the photostatic copy of the record in 
the Harding v. Harding case. It is very unusual for 
a tabloid newspaper to print so much of any one story. 
The New York Times carried it in full with a front- 
page s'i'ory, while even such papers as the Baltimore 
Sun and the New York Herald Tribune gave it large 
space.
. . . the Hearst papers gave a reasonable
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amount of space to my Thursday night speech. They 
all carried the Associated Press story, I am told.2'
Less pleasing were some of the negative reactions 
to the speech.. One reaction occurred, oddly enough, an 
hour before the Ickes speech was delivered; at that time 
William Hard "replied" on behalf of the Republican 
party.2® The Secretary, though misinformed as to its 
time of delivery, frankly admitted the effectiveness of 
the reply:
The Republicans did one clever thing last night. 
Although I had withheld all copies of my speeoh until 
one o’clock yesterday afternoon, except a few that 
were sent by mail that would not reach newspaper 
offices until about the same hour, the Republicans 
managed to get one for William Hard, who is on the 
radio every night. Usually he is on early in the 
evening, but last night, although it must have oost 
them a lot of money, they put him on following /.sic/ 
my speech and he replied to it. It was well done 
and cleverly done. I must admit that. °
Hard's speeoh ridiculed the charge of Hearst con­
trol on three counts: (1) that Hearst had supported a
willing Roosevelt in 1932 but obviously had not dominated 
him thereafter; (2) that Charles Michelson did not ap­
parently think Hearst so insidious, having worked for him 
for many years; and (3 ) that Elliot Roosevelt was under 
Hearst employ at the very moment, managing Texas and
27lckes, Seoret Diary. Vol. I, pp. 670-71.
2®New York Times, August 29, 1936, p. 12.
29iokes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 670.
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Oklahoma radio stations for him.3° This speech also waB 
widely reported in the press. The Chicago Tribune, the 
Washington Post, the St^ . Louis Post-Dispatch, and the 
New York Times all carried Hard's speech on the same 
page as that of Ickes.
Governor Landon made no reply himself, hut James 
Hagerty, newsman traveling with his party during the 
campaign, reported the oonsensus in the Republican inner 
camp. It was that Landon's Chautauqua opposition to 
teacher loyalty oaths, a stand directly opposing that of 
Hearst, had already refuted Ickes before he spoke.^
This was the position taken too, by some nominally in­
dependent newspapers. The Cleveland Plain Dealer and 
the New York Times. both of August 29, took suoh a 
position editorially. The latter said, in part:
This address had the appearance of being pre­
pared a week or ten days earlier and, although 
Intervening events had taken the heart out of it,
Mr. Ickes proceeded grimly to read it to the bitter 
end.
. . . the whole attempt to represent Mr. Hearst 
as the political creator and controller of Governor 
Landon was from the first artificial and now has 
become little short of ridiculous.32
3°These arguments were summarized In Time, XXVIII 
(September 7, 1936), 9.
33-New York Times, August 29, 1936, p. 1.
32New York Times, August 29, 1936, p. 12.
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Newsweek noted that: "Even Democratic writers called
the speeoh effective campaign ammunition— had it come a 
week e a r l i e r . "33 it was true that several pro-Roosevelt 
newspapers had failed to respond favorably to the charge 
of Hearst control. The Richmond NewB Leader of August 28 
said that Hearst was only a political "weather vane"; 
the Tupelo Journal (Mississippi) of August 29 expressed 
disappointment in Landon but put no stock in the Ickes 
charge of Hearst domination; the Montgomery Advertiser 
of September 1, called the charges “balderdash"; and 
Hugh Johnson's column, "One Man's Opinion," while still 
supporting Roosevelt, termed the Ickes1 attack "an un­
fortunate error."3^
The usual partisan reaction, however, came from 
many Democratic papers. The Brooklyn Citizen of August 
28 called the speeoh "devastating"; the Nashville Tennes­
sean of August 29 thought it "perfectly timed"; the 
Paduoah Sun of August 30 Bald it could not "be laughed 
off and ignored"; and further editorial support came 
from the Chloago Times of. August 3 0 , the Beaumont 
Journal of September 5» and the Glasgow News of Sept­
ember 1 0 .
^Newsweek, VIII (September 7, 1936), p. 12.
3^Washington News, August 28, 1936.
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From several Republican leaders emanated hostile 
statements In whloh lay little actual reply. Melvin C. 
Eaton, New York Republican Chairman, called Ickes only 
"a ventriloquist’s dummy" and struck out at the President:
Comrade Harold L. Ickes, Overlord of the Interior 
and Commissar of PWA, has apparently again heard his 
master's voice and, rushing to the radio,has at­
tempted to divert to himself the Republican attaoks 
on President Roosevelt. This, of course, is an old 
New Deal custom: Whenever the going gets too tough
for the celebrity himself, a Cabinet member invar­
iably steps into the conflict and takes on the general 
aspect of an administration decoy or bell cow.35
In Chioago, George F. Harding said he could not "immediate­
ly" recall the conversation with Hearst and then added: 
"However, I do not care to dignify the charges with an 
answer. It seems that this is the only way they can 
attack Governor L a n d o n . C h a i r m a n  John Hamilton 
brushed the speeoh aside with the comment "Why answer 
the popguns?" Congressman Joseph Martin replied more 
extensively:
Secretary Ickes apparently has been glad to come 
to the front as the chief mudslinger in the present 
campaign. . . . But when a fighter hits below the 
belt he generally pays the penalty. Mr. Ickes has 
not helped Mr. Roosevelt by his unfair and unjust 
attack.37
Had the Secretary's attack "helped Mr. Roosevelt"?
35nbw York Times, August 29, 1936, p. 5*
3^New York Times, August 28, 1936, p. 8.
37n6W- York Times, August 29, 1936. P» 5»
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Ickes h'imself was not sure. Three days after the speech, 
he wrote:
The editorials on this last speech that I have 
seen generally take the position that the Hearst 
issue is an old one that fills the editorial writers 
with ennui.
This leads me to the conclusion either that the 
Hearst issue is not as important as I had thought it 
would he or that the newspapers are unwilling to 
cheer on an attack against the greatest publisher, 
in point of newspapers, in the country. Both may be 
true. However, I believe that there is more wide­
spread anti-Hearst feeling among the people than 
there has been for a great many years, if ever. . . . 
On the other hand, there is a good deal to what the 
newspapers say, but not to the extent to which they 
would like to have it appear.3°
While much of the editorial comment of the press 
could be discounted, the composite reaction was not very 
favorable. Landon*s break with Hearst on the issue of 
loyalty oaths and the effect of Hard’s reminder that. 
Hearst had once supported Roosevelt were both factors 
which dulled the sharpness of the Secretary's attaok.
The reaction of independent newspapers and writers, and 
also of some Democratic organs, Indicated that "Hearst 
Over Topeka" would probably produce less influence upon 
undecided voters than Ickes' two previous attacks.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
This speech had two primary purposes: (1) to
attaok William Bandolph Hearst and the Hearst press and
38lckes, Secret Diary. Vol. I, p. 671.
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(2 ) to -weaken the Landon candidacy by closely associat­
ing the Kansas Governor with Hearst. The Hearst-Landon 
association was the more important of the two. The 
speech was based upon the well-founded belief that pub­
lisher Hearst was an unpopular and distrusted public 
figure.
From a logical point of view,the speech was rela­
tively weak. The proposition that Landon was controlled 
by Hearst was not amply demonstrated by the evidence 
presented. It was this proposition that most of the 
press refused to credit and upon which those Republi­
cans who replied at all based their answers. From a 
psychological point of view, a more successful effort 
resulted. Through techniques of suggestion, the speaker 
enforced the association of Hearst with Landon and brought 
the Hearst issue into full public view. The association 
not only waB not denied, but the very act of refuting 
Ickes’ claims of actual Hearst control publicized the 
undented elements of that relationship. Republicans 
were able to refute the speaker’s rather weak logical 
proofs, but it was more difficult to reply to the sus­
picions and prejudices Implanted by suggestion and sup­
ported by emotional appeals. In these lay the
effectiveness of the speech.
The press coverage of the speech was good; the
press reaction was somewhat disappointing. The proposi­
tion of the speech was unproved; its purpose was at 
least pai’tlally fulfilled. The speech probably proved 
less effective than the attaok on Landon’s progres- 
sivism; but it was by no means a complete failure.
While the Democrats had yet to establish that Landon 
was dominated by Hearst, there was definitely now a 
HearBt issue. From that issue, the Republicans could 
not possibly gain. The Democrats might.
CHAPTER VII
"LANDON, COUGHLIN, 'ET AL'"
The tempo of the campaign gradually increased 
during the month of September. Then, after the Presi­
dent made his first frankly political speeoh at Syra­
cuse on September 2 9 , the final drive of both parties 
really began in earnest. The President’s Syracuse 
address to the New York State Democratic Convention 
replied to the charge of communist support with which 
the Hearst press had attacked him on September 20. On 
October 1, the President spoke at Pittsburgh, this time 
on the deficit and federal spending. On the same night, 
Frank Knox also spoke in Pittsburgh and Alfred E. Smith 
endorsed Landon in New York City.'*' On October 8 , Smith 
attacked Roosevelt again, this time from Philadelphia.
On the same day, while Monseigneur John A. Ryan, in 
Washington, was defending the President from previous 
attaoks by Father Charles E. Coughlin, the Detroit 
priest lambasted the President again in Pittsburgh. On 
Ootober 9, ’the air waves were really filled with campaign 
oratory, as Roosevelt spoke in St. Paul, Minnesota,
^Secretary Ickes listened to all three by radio 
in Washington. Ickes, Seoret Diary, Vol. I, p. 6 8 8.
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Landon In Chicago, the 1920 Democratic ^presidential 
nominee, James M. Cox, in Dayton, Ohio, and Harold Ickes 
in Columbus, Ohio. The Secretary's address, entitled 
"Landon, Coughlin, 'et Al'," was delivered at a rally of 
the Good Neighbor League in the Columbus Municipal 
Auditorium and was broadcast from 8 :3 0 to 9**0° P.M. by 
N.B.C.
BACKGROUND AND SETTING OF THE SPEECH
The October 9 speeoh was Ickes' first major 
political address since August 2 7. He had, however, 
made three non-political addresses: a welcoming speech
at the World Power Conference in Washington, a dedica­
tion speeoh at the University of Syracuse, and another 
speeoh at the dedication of the New York City Mid-Town 
Tunnel. He reluctantly declined to speak to a large 
Negro rally at Madison Square Garden on September 21 
because of the very recent death of his step-son,
Wilraarth Ickes. This invitation came through Stanley 
High, who said he found that Ickes had the highest stand­
ing in the Administration with Negro leaders.2
The Secretary of the Interior also appeared to 
hold high standing as a speaker with Democratic
2Ibld.. p. 680.
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campaign strategists. On September 18, Thomas G-. Cor­
coran reported to the Secretary that a campaign tour was 
being planned for him. According to Corcoran, Sam Ray­
burn, Democratic Congressman from Texas, said that there 
were more requests for Ickes as a speaker than for anyone 
else; Corcoran further reported that Farley thought 
Ickes’ speeches "went over big."3 Although most of the 
press had expressed boredom or distaste for the August 
27 attack on Landon and Hearst, Democratic leaders ap­
parently had not shared such a response.
In early October, the entire Democratic outlook 
was brighter than it had been at the start of the cam­
paign. On October 8 , Krock noted that the only encour­
aging sign Republicans had was the Literary Digest poll. 
Other polls showed Roosevelt leading, and Landon's lead 
was gradually being cut in the Literary Digest sampling.^ 
With Roosevelt finally taking the political stump, Demo­
cratic prospects were almost certain to Improve. Perhaps 
that was one reason why New York bettors, in the face of 
extravagant vlotory claims from Chairman Hamilton and 
publisher Hearst, were making the October odds on the 
President's re-election 2-1 . ^
3lbid., p. 682.
^New York Times, October 8, 1936, P* 22.
5New York Times, October 6, 1936, p. 22.
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As pointed out In Chapter I, some of the obstacles 
to the re-election of Roosevelt were not Republican 
obstacles. An opposition third party, Father Coughlin’s 
Union Party, and a dissident Democratic conservative 
wing, led by Alfred E. Smith, both threatened to capture 
votes normally Democratic. The Union Party's candidate 
was William Lemke of North Dakota, while bolting con­
servative Democrats supported Governor Landon. Having 
previously concentrated on Landon and Hearst, Ickes 
turned In "Landon, Coughlin,'et Al'" to two new targets, 
Coughlin and Smith. Both appeared formidable to some 
observers. Father Coughlin estimated the Union Party's 
vote at no less than ten million, and of this estimate 
Basil Rauch later wrote:
Father Coughlin promised to give up his radio 
speeches If Lemke polled less than ten million 
votes. The size of the membership of the Union 
Party's constituent organizations seemed to make 
this a fair gamble. Some observers saw the pos­
sibility that the Union Party would take away enough 
votes from the Democratic candidates to ensure a Rep­
ublican victory.®
While Coughlin forces were capturing some of the New
Deal's more radical support, Alfred E. Smith and other
conservative bolters wooed Democratic voters of the
right wing. According to Joseph W. Martin, Eastern
^Basll Rauoh, The History of the New Deal (New 
York: Creative Age Press, Ino., 194577 P. 253^
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manager for Landon, the bolt of Smith alone would take
7
away over three million Democratic votes. For his new 
rhetorical targets, Ickes had at Columbus not only an 
N.B.C. microphone but also a partisan Good Neighbor 
League audienoe. Thirty thousand invitations were sent 
to Columbus citizens and the eventual audience was 
estimated at eight to ten thousand people.®
For this speech, Ickes worked on three different 
drafts. He was assisted by Straus, Taylor, Fairman, 
Slattery, and Armstrong; Presidential Secretary Early 
also made at least two suggestions which were reflected 
in the final draft.9 On October 7, Ickes showed the 
final draft to the President. He said that the Presi­
dent "liked it and asked me to send him a copy. 1,10 
After six weeks on the sidelines, the New Deal’s "Chief 
Denouncer" was ready to return to the attack.
PURPOSE AND THESIS OF THE SPEECH
Neither in any of Ickes’ papers nor in his diary
?New York Times, Ootober 3, 1936, p. 1.
®Estiraate of W. T. Dickerson, chairman of the 
Columbus chapter of the Good Neighbor League. Ickes 
Papers, Container 225.
9lbid.
lOickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 692.
is there a statement revealing the specific goal or 
goals of this speech. The advance publicity given the 
speech, as well as press reports following its delivery, 
indicated that its objective was to show an informal 
union between Republicans and Father Coughlin. The 
press release printed by the Baltimore Sun said that 
the speaker would offer "documentary proof" of such a 
connection.^ A later section of this chapter will 
show that this part of the speech was all that most of 
the press reported. If establishing a Coughlln-Landon 
connection had been the speech's only goal, it would 
have been a valid one. The ten million left-of-center 
votes which Father Coughlin promised Lemke would draw 
would almost oertainly have oome at the expense of the 
Democrats. If the speaker could convince the voters 
concerned that a vote for Lemke was actually a vote for 
Landon, he was likely to weaken the Union Party's poten­
tial support.
Another purpose may have been to weaken several 
Roosevelt foes, especially Coughlin. The Detroit cleric 
was probably the most vehement of Roosevelt's critics, 
having called him in various speeches: "betrayer,"
"soab," "anti-God," "communist," and " l i a r . O t h e r s
•^Baltimore Sun, October 6, 1936.
•^Rauch, o£. olt. , pp. 261-62.
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strongly attacked by Ickes were Landon, Smith, Knox, 
Hard, Hoover, and Hearst. One of the Secretary's goals 
was but a smaller version of his larger campaign goal: 
to strengthen Roosevelt by weakening public respect for 
his foes and detractors.
This speeoh apparently had also a more positive 
purpose. Almost half of the twenty-seven minutes of 
delivery time went into a defense of the New Deal, an 
identification of it with the Interests of the common 
people. At the same time, Ickes pictured all special 
interests as "ganging up" on Roosevelt. The speech 
attempted to represent the real issue of the campaign 
as one of oppressor and privileged against oppressed 
and underprivileged. The champion of the latter group 
was, of course, the President. This idea came closer 
to being the one thesis of the speech than any other, 
and its establishment in the listener's mind was prob­
ably one goal of the speech.
Discovering one paramount goal and a single 
thesis for "Landon, Coughlin,'et Al'" is extremely dif­
ficult. The speeoh was roughly divided into two parts. 
The first twelve and one-half minutes were devoted to 
the Coughlin-Republican connection and to added attaoks 
on Hard, Landon, Knox, and Smith; most of the remainder 
of the time was spent in developing the "Roosevelt for 
the common man" theme, with, attacks on Republican
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lalssez falre philosophy injeoted occasionally.
Moat of the ideas developed by the speech appear 
to have been directed toward two principal goals: (1 )
undermining the Union Party by linking Coughlin to Landon, 
and (2) associating the cause of Roosevelt with that of 
the common man. The thesis with which Ickes sought to 
unify a wide variety of ideas was that the issue of the 
campaign was Roosevelt and the common man against the 
ganged-up forces of special interest. Perhaps the best, 
though somewhat diffuse, statement of this thesis oc­
curred as Ickes concluded:
Let Landon and Father Coughlin and Lemke and the 
Smith Brothers— Alfred E. and Reverend Gerald K . ~  
and their ill-assorted following 'gang up1 on Presi­
dent Roosevelt. He has nothing to fear, for back of 
him are arrayed those who hate war, the idealistic 
youth of the land, independent business men and the 
great mass of the people— farmers, workingmen and 
white collar folks in whose bodies he had kept alive 
the spark of life during the terrible years of the 
depression and, more important still, in whose souls 
he has restored morale and revived faith in the 
future of America.
LINES OF ARGUMENT AND ORGANIZATION
The introduction and conclusion of this speech were 
clearly discernible as functional units. They both ad­
hered to the general thesis Just desoribed, thus giving 
an appearance of unity to the entire effort. Between 
introduction and conclusion, however, the pattern of 
organization was much less clear or unified. The listen­
er who tried to organize IckeB1 speech by the sequence of
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ideas presented would have discovered, with some effort, 
lines of argument something like this:
(1) Many forces of special privilege are combined 
in opposition to President Roosevelt.
(2) A "common understanding" exists between Repub­
lican leaders and Father Coughlin’s party.
(3) The real campaign issue is between "Hooverisra" 
and the New Deal.
(4) The "massed wealth of America" is lined up 
behind Landon.
(5) Economio security for all should be the object 
of the American Government.
(6 ) Even in 1929 , "Hoover prosperity" did not 
provide this security.
( ? )  Citing these facts is not to "array class 
against class," but to get something done.
(8 ) The Roosevelt Administration seeks a real 
"American standard of living."
It is not entirely clear whether Ickes organized 
his speeches around a sequence of Ideas, or whether he 
built the speeoh organization around the various targets 
for attaok. This speech, for example, could almost be 
outlined like this:
(1) Attaok on the whole opposition "team"— two 
minutes.
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(2) Attack on Father Coughlin— six minutes.
(3) Attaok on William Hard— thirty seconds.
(ty) Attaok on Father Coughlin again— thirty seconds.
(5) Attack on Governor Landon— one minute.
(6 ) Attaok on Frank Knox— one minute.
(7) Attaoks on the Liberty League and Alfred E.
Smith— one minute.
(8 ) Attaok on "Hoover prosperity"— two minutes.
(9) Attaok on William Randolph Hearst— two min­
utes.
(10) Concluding attack on the whole group again—
thirty seconds.
Except for the omission of the constructive support of 
New Deal aims, a ten-minute appeal broken only by a brief 
diversion toward Hearst, this topical organization would 
accurately describe the developmental pattern of the 
speech.
The most effective feature of the arrangement of 
Ideas and subjects In this speech was that Ickes placed 
his attacks on the opposition first and arranged his more 
constructive appeals last. The final appeal was devoid 
of humor and had a ring of earnestness and sincerity not 
always so apparent in earlier portions of the speeoh.
Unity and clarity of thought organization were 
partially sacrificed In this speech, as they had been In
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others, to assure that all desired targets for attack 
were included. The lack of real unity was somewhat 
camouflaged by a consistency of introduction and con­
clusion. The broad psychological pattern of the speeoh 
was good.
FORMS OF SUPPORT
Although the emphasis was again heaviest upon 
emotional appeals, Ickes achieved in this speech a fair 
balance of emotional, ethical, and logical proofs. The 
logical appeals were more varied in nature than in most 
of the Secretary's previous addresses, and the forms of 
inference which he employed were more readily evident 
than usual.
The first argument, that special interests had 
teamed up against Roosevelt, actually appeared in the 
guise of introductory exposition. Since it was support­
ed psychologically, and not by evidence or reasoning, it 
will be discussed later in more detail.
Ickes* second argument, that "there is a common 
understanding between the Republican high command on the 
one hand and Father Ooughlln and Lemke on the other," 
was supported by testimony, example, and varied forms 
of inference. His first of four supporting arguments 
was that Father Coughlin and Lemke often echoed the
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criticisms of Roosevelt made by the Republican high 
command. Though this was only asserted, it would have 
been easy to prove. It is certainly not uncommon for 
different opponents to voice like criticisms. The crux 
of the argument lay in the premise upon which the infer­
ence of collusion was drawn. Did like criticisms 
necessarily imply a “common understanding11? If so, 
Republicans could well have charged that Thomas and 
Browder were in collusion with the President. These 
candidates of the Socialist and Communist parties 
respectively had echoed or preceded many Democratic 
attacks on Landon.^ By the same token, Father Cough­
lin could have been considered in oollusion with 
Roosevelt forces. He had charged, as had Ickes, that
1/j,
Landon was a Hearst product. The speaker's inference 
was unsound because his major premise was Invalid.
Ickes' second supporting argument for his Landon- 
Coughlin tie was supported by assertion of a generally 
accepted premise and by testimony. He said first that 
“The Detroit cleric is too astute a politician not to
x^For example, on September 8 , Thomas had oalled 
Lemke “a stooge for Landon and Hearst." New York Times, 
September 9, 1936, p. 19. On September 20, !Browder had 
restated previous charges that Hearst exercised oontrol 
over Landon. New York Times. September 21, 1936, p. 2.
•^-^New York Times, August 2, 1936, p. 12.
know that the next President will be either Roosevelt 
or Landon. . . ," a statement which Father Coughlin would 
not have challenged in the face of his own claim for 
only about ten million Lemke votes. The speaker then 
quoted an October 6 Coughlin statement, made in an 
Associated Press interview, that "he would rather be 
with the Republicans." Though this statement was in­
complete as quoted, it did express Father Coughlin’s 
sentiments. His attacks on the President were muoh more 
vehement throughout the campaign than those on Landon. 
For example, Father Coughlin, in a July 16 address to 
the Union party convention, had called Roosevelt "the 
great betrayer and liar," asserted that he was com- 
munisticly inclined, and called for the defeat of any 
oandidate supporting him; of Landon he said only that he 
was "forced to repudiate him" for his adherence to the 
gold s t a n d a r d . T h e  statement that the Detroit priest 
favored Landon over Roosevelt was expected to bring, and 
brought, no denial.
The heart of the evidence of Landon-Coughlin col­
lusion was in the letter from William Hard, paid Repub­
lican broadcaster, to Gardner Jackson, Washington 
correspondent. This letter, relied upon so heavily in 
the speeoh, is quoted here as Ickes read it over the air;
15New York Times, July 17, 1936, p. 6.
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Dear Gardner:
Are you free to take on a little more Journalistic 
work? It would be quite left-wing. Will you let me 
hear from you?
On second thought, I might as well let you know 
straight off who the publisher Is. It Is Father 
Coughlin. He wants some Washington correspondents 
for his new magazine. Would you be available?
There Is not any too much money In it because the 
magazine goes gratis to the members of the National 
Union for Social Justice. Still there will be some 
compensation. And a good deal of activity.
The fact is that Father Coughlin wants three or 
four Washington correspondents. I am writing to you 
first. If you are not available, could you suggest 
some writers in Washington that would be? The number 
of words that they would have to write each week 
would be small. The magazine is to be a tabloid of 
sixteen pages. The articles would not run more than 
five hundred or seven hundred and fifty words. The 
writers could use pseudonyms but Father Coughlin 
insists that they be first-class men. He wants no 
second-class duds.
In short, will you write me straight off and let 
me know what you can do about it? The magazine 
begins coming out in March. It may have a lot of 
influence on the politics of this year.
A photostatic copy of this letter, together with a letter 
from Jackson confirming the circumstances involved, is 
still in the Ickes Papers in the Library of Congress. It 
certainly was the most striking piece of evidence in this 
particular speeoh, but how valid was it as support for 
the speaker's premise? While not conclusive, it did 
constitute oircumstantial evidence of a common bond be­
tween Roosevelt's foes; and It was bound to prove slightly 
embarrassing to Father Coughlin and to Hard, especially 
to the latter.
Hard's position as a paid political commentator
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for the Republican party was an unconcealed one.1^ His 
quoted letter made It clear that he was also on familiar 
political terms with Father Coughlin. To identify that 
relationship further, Ickes quoted that Hard had further 
written to Jackson: "I am one of his (Father Coughlin's)
closest friends and advisers and, while I am not on his 
staff officially, he asks me for counsel and advice." 
Ickes1 evidence showed that Hard, a paid speaker of the 
Republican party, was also an unofficial agent of Father 
Coughlin; and It strongly implied that he believed 
serving one cause also served the other. It did not 
definitely prove the speaker's contention beyond its 
application to Hard. It only suggested that others in 
the Republican camp shared Hard's views. Ickes, however, 
was more careful than upon some occasions not to extend 
his premise too far. He made this clear in his argument 
about Coughlin:
I have not charged him with 1 selling out to the 
Republican party'. I do charge that there is a 
community of interest, a common objective, between 
him and the Republican party.
This evldenoe presented by Ickes did show that Hard and
Father Coughlin believed such a community of interest
existed.
The fourth piece of evidence used to support the
3-^ New York Times. July 1*J>, 1936, p. 9.
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alleged Republioan-Coughlin connection was very brief:
Further on the friendly cooperation between the 
Republicans and Father Coughlin, information has 
come to me that the Republican National Committee 
spent about a thousand dollars in decorating the 
Coliseum in Des Moines, Iowa, in which Father 
Coughlin spoke on the afternoon of September 19.
This information was accurate; it vras documented by a
notarized statement which is still retained in the Ickes
Papers. However, that same information revealed that the
Republican National Committee had spent the money in
question because of confusion about speaking dates, not
through any original intent to finance Father Coughlin’s
rally.^ The facts were not distorted, but the speaker's
implication constituted a distortion of them.
After brief but very derisive references to both 
Landon and Knox, Ickes advanced his next line of argument: 
that the real issue of the campaign was "Hooverlsm 
versus the New Deal." The issue was declared, after ac­
cusation that Republicans sought to avoid it, in a single 
paragraph:
The real issue in this campaign is whether we are 
going back to the laissez faire, Hoover policy of 
rugged individualism or forward to the establishment 
of suoh a social order as the Founding Fathers en­
visaged when they enunciated the political philosophy 
of equality of opportunity under the law for every 
American citizen, regardless of race or creed or 
color. Two philosophies of Government are at death 
grips with eaoh other in America today.
^7lckes Papers, Container 250.
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The speaker next asserted that "the massed wealth 
of America, almost without exception, is lined up today 
behind Governor Landon." The only proof offered was the 
example of the Liberty League. A less extreme statement 
would not have been questioned. Leaders of industry and 
finance and many wealthy people, like the duPonts, were 
openly supporting Landon. As a New York Times editorial 
pointed out, however: "There are, in spite of Secretary
Ickes,a few rich Democrats left in the land. . . .
That most of the nation's wealthy supported Landon was 
generally accepted. The Secretary's tendency to over­
state his case, sometimes unnecessarily, was in evidence 
again.
The speaker diverted briefly to imply that Alfred 
E. Smith, according to Ickes the Liberty League's "fore­
most spokesman," opposed Roosevelt primarily because of 
Jealousy and envy. Then he advanced his next premise: 
that assuring economic freedom and security for all was 
a legitimate function of government. This argument was 
developed partially by amplification and partially by 
comparison and contrast:
l^This editorial asserted, without naming him, 
that the campaign's largest single contribution was made 
by a wealthy Democrat. It agreed, nevertheless, that 
most of the wealth lay with Landon supporters. New York 
Times, Ootober 13, 1936, P* 26.
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What is government for if it is not to secure 
the greatest degree of happiness for the greatest 
number of its people? We talk about our political 
freedom and this hardly-won boon is indeed precious 
to us. But of what avail is political freedom un­
less we have economic freedom? How many citizens 
were there during those last terrible yearB of deep­
est depression that came upon us after twelve years 
of Republican misrule who would not have been willing 
to surrender their right to vote if, by so doing, 
they had been able to achieve economic security for 
themselves and their families? It is small comfort 
to a man whose ohildren are crying for bread and 
whose wife lacks proper clothing to reflect that in 
a few months it will be his privilege to help decide 
who shall be the mayor in his town.
Mbst of the appeal in this excerpt from the argument was
directed toward the emotions, and the speaker’s language
in such expressions as "Republican misrule" assumed a
great deal. Ickes1 use of example, however, in which he
used the depression years for his comparison of political
and economic freedoms, was well-chosen; and the premises
in his enthymeme were generally accepted by the groups to
whom he wished most to appeal.
More controversial was his next argument: that
the so-called "American standard of living" of the Hoover 
era was a fraud. The speaker noted Republican olaims of 
comfort and luxury during that period and then launched 
into one of the most forecful passages in the address:
Misrepresentations ! Frauds I Misstatements of 
factJ The truth is, and those Republicans who 
promise us a Utopia if we will only retrace our 
steps to Hooverlsm know it full well, that the 
picture Intended to be conjured up by the expression 
'American standard of living' constitutes a cruel 
hoa.x so far as the majority of our people is concerned.
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In this great and rich land of ours there is a small 
peroentage of the people who own or control the over­
whelming mass of the wealth of the country. From 
this limited but very rich group there is a sharp 
graduation down until we come to the actual majority 
of the people. According to that non-partisan and 
conservative fact-finding organization, the Brookings 
Institution, more than 60%  of the people of the United 
States in that most prosperous of years, 1929, were 
living at or below the margin of a decent existence. 
According to this same reliable authority, 1/10 of 1 %  
of the families, at the top of the economic scale 
receive approximately as much Income as of the 
families at the bottom.
This was valid evidence. The authority was indeed re­
putable and the statistics were taken from a year which, 
while hardly typical, was certainly a fair one. While 
the speaker oould not deny that general living standards 
were higher during the century's second decade than they 
were in 1 9 3 6, he could and did illustrate that a large 
number of Americans had not shared much of the "American 
standard of living" during that era.
Ickes next took oocasion to reply to the common 
charge that Democrats in 1936 were stirring up class 
hatreds:^
I realize that the mere statement of these facts 
will lay me open to the accusation by Republican 
orators and the Republican press of trying to appeal 
to class prejudice. But is it statesmanlike to close 
one's eyes to a condition that must be remedied if 
we are to save our institutions? Does a calm state­
ment of sobering fact make one a rabble rouser? Was
^Thls frequent Republican charge had been strongly 
stressed by Alfred E. Smith in his October 1 speech at 
Carnegie Hall. For text, see New York Times, October 2, 
1936, P. *h
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the Brookings Institution trying to array class 
against class when it ascertained these facts and 
published them? Does one bring on a storm by point­
ing out that lightning is flashing from dark clouds? 
Do we meet an epidemic of typhoid fever by refusing 
to admit that our water supply is being polluted?
Is the way to put out a fire to refuse to sound the 
alarm?
The inferential proof in this series of six rhetorical 
questions was vividly presented. The first three ques­
tions dealt in causal reasoning, clearly Implying that 
Democrats were motivated toward contributing to solu­
tions to class problems, not toward inflaming them.
The last three questions were concisely-put analogies, 
designed to reduce the Republican charge to an absurdity. 
They were effectively presented, and, if Ickes' previous 
analysis of motives was the correct one, the reasoning 
was valid.
The last main argument of the speech was that the 
New Deal sought a true "American standard of living," 
one in which all could share. As support for this con­
tention, the Secretary discussed New Deal policies which, 
according to him, were examples of the Administration's 
efforts to produce economio freedom. For the most part, 
exposition was employed as the means of development. 
Among policies so presented were those concerning equal 
opportunities, adequate wages, and social security of 
various types. In discussing education and principles 
of taxation, the speaker contrasted New Deal policy .
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with views of two of its opponents, Landon and Hearst.
The reference to Landon and the frequent charge that 
education lagged in Kansas was thinly veiled:
The New Deal, which has to its credit the finan­
cing of some 1 0 ,0 0 0 sohool construction projects in 
all parts of the country, including the state of 
Kansas, during the past three and a half years, 
Indignantly rejects the theory that future genera­
tions of American citizens should pay in the coin of 
an inadequate education for the immediate balancing 
of a set of books.
When postulating the theory that "the cost of 
government should be assessed on the ability to pay," 
Ickes contrasted this New Deal viewpoint with his own 
construction of the view of Hearst. He asserted that 
"the principal reason" for Hearst opposition to Roose­
velt waB that the latter had denied him special privileg­
es in filing tax returns. This exercise in effect-to- 
cause reasoning was given no support beyond assertion.
As a matter of fact, Rauch's The History of the New Deal 
inclines toward the view that the President's foreign
20policy was a more likely cause for Hearst opposition.
Although weak in spots, Ickes* logical support 
in the October ^  speech was, generally speaking, better 
than that in "What Shall the Republican Platform Be?" 
and "Hearst Over Topeka," and on a par with "Governor 
Landon— Practical Progressive." The strongest appeals,
20Rauch, oj>. olt. , p. 2 3 7 .
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however, were again more psychological than logical.
Most of the speech*s attacks were supported by 
appeals directed toward feelings of class prejudice and 
of fear and insecurity. The constructive arguments were 
most often based on appeal to security, patriotism, and 
the desire for freedom. The appeals to economio class 
prejudice ran throughout the speeoh. The association of 
the Republican party with the wealthy interests of the 
nation, strong in power, but a distinct and often re­
sented minority in numbers, pervaded the speeoh. One 
of the lines of argument previously cited was that 
"massed wealth" was lined up behind Governor Landon.
But the appeals to class prejudice were embedded most 
effectively in the connotatlve, loaded, and often question- 
begging language employed. Making repeated appearanoe 
were such expressions as "special privilege," "massed 
wealth of America," "ruthless, rugged individualists,"
"this array of pomp and power," and "men and women out 
of whose labor the wealth that again seeks to exploit 
them has been built up."
The appeals to fear recalled vividly the condi­
tions prevalent when Roosevelt took office in 1933. The 
speaker referred to "these last terrible years of deepest 
depression," to children "crying for bread," and to "the 
gnawing pangs of hunger, the bite of cold and the loss of 
morale." And he kept the suggestion that Republicans
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wanted "to return to the Hoover era" constantly before 
his audience. He also raised the specter of fascism by 
referring to Father Coughlin as "the Detroit Fascist" 
and to his ideas as "the Fascist Ideals of that gentle­
man. "
On the positive side, Ickes visualized for his 
listeners the coupling of real freedom with security 
guaranteed by a continuation of the New Deal program.
One passage, built largely upon this theme of freedom 
and security for all, is illustrative:
As I understand the purpose of the New Deal, it 
is to bring about a condition that will at least 
approximate what we have been boasting of as the 
‘American standard of living*. The New Deal be­
lieves in equality of opportunity under the law for 
every man, woman and child, regardless of race or 
creed or color. It has as an objective the employ­
ment of every man or woman ready and willing to work, 
at a task commensurate with his ability, for a wage 
that will sustain life in comfort. The New Deal 
believes that labor has a right to organize acoording 
to its own free choice. It stands for the principle 
of security— security for the workman during periods 
of Involuntary unemployment, security against the 
casualties of our industrial system, security for 
mothers during periods of childbirth, security for 
men and women after they have readied the age when 
they can no longer hope to be employed gainfully.
Another positive appeal was to patriotism and, 
as a corollary to it, the prejudice toward our own 
democratic institutions. Such expressions appear as 
"every Araerioan who loves liberty and Justice," "our 
Democratic institutions," "the Founding Fathers," 
"equality of opportunity," "regardless of race or color
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or creed," and "faith In the future of America." This 
patriotic type of appeal had not appeared in previous 
Ickes* attacks hut was very evident in the more con­
structive portion of this one.
To the four basic appeals Just enumerated should 
be added certain question-begging appeals which asserted 
through language what was not necessarily proved by the 
argument Itself. Such terms Included reference to Lemke 
as a "Father Coughlln-Landon stooge," to "twelve years 
of Republican misrule," and to "discredited Hooverism."
Humor was also used as Indirect persuasion. The 
opening minute of this speech resembled the attack on 
the Republican platfonn in its use of a figurative but 
pointed introduction. Where previously Ickes had used 
the "birth of a baby" theme, this time he pictured a 
football team:
An Interesting game of political football is in 
progress. Trying to stop the victorious march of 
the team that is lined up under the captaincy of 
President Roosevelt Is an Incongruous and ill-as­
sorted a combination as could well be imagined. In 
the backfield we see Governor Landon, light and in­
experienced, but withal a clever dodger, who is hard 
to pin down; Herbert Hoover, back on the gridiron 
after an enforced stay on the bench for four years; 
Father Coughlin, the great triple threat, who does 
the kicking for the team; and A1 Smith, one time 
•All American', now turned professional. The ends 
are Frank Knox and John Hamilton. From tackle to 
tackle crouch the well-known duPont brothers— Pierce, 
Lamraot, A. Felix, Irenes, and Henry. William Ran­
dolph Hearst, as coach, through a megaphone, calls 
signals from the sidelines. The string of substi­
tutes contains some notable names— Mellon, Mills,
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Rockefeller, Aldrich, G-rundy, Dr. Townsend, Plnchot, 
Lemke, as well as an assortment of Liberty Leaguers 
of high and low degree. The Republican voice of the 
air, William Hard, occupies the dual role of water 
boy and Jeer leader.
Here was Ickes at his best, combining a flair for 
language with a biting sense of humor. Beneath the humor 
lay ridicule of men who wished to be taken very seriously 
and a suggestion of a combination whioh had vague but 
unwholesome intentions.
The same acid humor was later turned on Governor 
Landon when the speaker accused him of evading the real 
campaign issues:
He /Landon/ would much prefer to tell where he 
buys his maple syrup, to talk about what he calls 
the 'American way of life', to confide the marvelous 
news that wherever he goes in America he finds Ameri­
cans, to disclose the hitherto unknown fact that 
elderberry pie is his favorite, to announce impres­
sively that the way to destroy monopoly is to destroy 
monopoly. But it simply will not work. Governor 
Landon will not be able to nibble around the edges of 
the issue Indefinitely. Sooner or later he will have 
to bite into it, bitter as the taste may be.
Two humorous sallies in the direction of Alfred E. Smith
subjected that Roosevelt foe to ridicule. After assert­
ing that Smith's desertion was caused by envy and 
Jealousy, Ickes quoted two lines of poetry in reference 
to him:
"Just for a handful of silver he left us,
JuBt for a riband to stick in his coat."
These lines from Browning's "The Lost Leader" were sug­
gested to the Secretary by Stephen Early especially for
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21Smith. ^ Near the end of the speech, reference was made 
to "the Smith Brothers— Alfred E. and the Reverend Gerald 
K . a  reference which probably did not amuse the former 
Governor of New York.
Through humor, loaded language, and appeals to 
basio motives, Ickes blended strong psychological appeals 
with his more rational forms of argumentative support. 
Ethical appeals, too, were given close attention in this 
speech. In addition to the reduction of opposition by 
the varied attacks which had keynoted all previously re­
ported speeohes, the New Deal’s hatchet-man built upon a 
more constructive type of ethical proof. He associated 
the aims and record of the President and the New Deal 
with almost every humanitarian motive; he contrasted the 
New Deal's social consciousness with the selfishness and 
callousness he attributed to the Hoover Administration; 
and he pictured the New Deal as hated by selfish and un­
scrupulous economic groups, but beloved by the oommon 
people of America. Contrary to his usual habit, Ickes 
even Inserted a personal note which attributed praise­
worthy motives to himself:
To say that it is the aspiration of the New Deal 
to make possible for the average Amerloan a richer 
and fuller life is to subject oneself to the Jests
^ Ickes Papers, Container 250.
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and sneers of many of the supporters of Governor 
Landon. For one, I willingly proclaim that I am 
Interested in the New Deal for the precise reason 
that its ambition is to improve the lot of the 
common man.
The ethical appeal in this speech was more balanced 
between its destructive and constructive parts and was, 
for that reason, probably more effective than usual.
USE OF LANGUAGE
In addition to being selected for its persuasive 
value, the language employed by Ickes was clear enough 
to be easily comprehensible and vivid and direct enough 
to hold listener attention. Both of these qualities of 
the speaker's style have, perhaps, been amply demon­
strated by the liberal quotations from the speech text. 
The sentences were not unusually long or difficult, and 
only two words which might not be familiar to most of 
his listeners were drawn from Ickes' extensive vocab­
ulary. These infrequently-used words occurred when the 
speaker referred to William Hard as "the friend, the 
associate and the political coadjutor of the man who, 
in the habiliments of the National Union for Social 
Justice. . . . "  The relatlvely-unfarailiar words were, 
of course, "coadjutor" and "habiliments."
Most of the time, Ickes' language was strikingly 
expressive without indulging in infrequently-used words.
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For example, he labeled Hard his party's "Jeer leader," 
oalled Lemke a Father Coughlln-Landon "stooge," and 
referred to Smith's "Intellectual nakedness." He played 
upon a familiar phrase In striking manner when he accused 
Republicans of believing In "a government of the dollar, 
by the dollar, and for the dollar." This expressive, 
and often figurative, language showed itself,not Just 
in single phrases, but in the vivid expression of a whole 
idea. For example, the speaker epitomized his version 
of the "Joint" but "undercover" efforts of the Presi­
dent's opponents this way:
Thus when Landon, with Hard cheering him on, 
tries, on a delayed pass to Hoover, to get around 
the right end, Father Coughlin, in a different 
uniform and with a ball hidden under his sweater, 
attempts to skirt the left end of the Democratic 
team.
Even upon those who missed the subtler connotations of 
some of the wording, the broad meaning could not have 
been lost.
One of Ickes1 most commonly-used stylistic de­
vices for achieving directness with his audience, the 
rhetorical question, has been noted in the three pre­
ceding chapters. Thirteen such questions were posed 
in the October ^  speech. Two of them occurred Immediate­
ly at the conclusion of the two-minutes required to read 
William Hard's letter. Ickes ended the quotation by 
asking: "Could language be plainer? Could Intent have
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a clearer meaning?" Then he Interpreted the language 
and the meaning. Another question was used to Intro­
duce his denunciation of Hard, when he asked: "Just
who Is William Hard?" and proceeded to Identify him In 
most unsympathetic terms. The other ten questions oc­
curred In series of four and six each. The first series 
developed the function the New Deal thought government 
should have. It did so by leading the listeners through 
a series of rhetorical questions which embodied the "yes 
response" technique. The last series of six questions,
quoted earlier in this chapter, posed analogies through
22rhetorloal questions. The thirteen questions, while 
varied in purpose, all appear to have been effective In 
producing directness and force in the presentation of 
ideas.
Ickes' language was, as usual, one of the most 
effective features of his speech. It was, generally 
speaking, simple, vivid, and direct.
REACTION TO THE SPEECH
This speeoh is noteworthy partly because of the 
absence of widespread or heated reaction. Press coverage, 
for example, was less than that of previous major ad­
dresses. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch failed to mention
22See pages 195-96.
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the speeoh at all; the Chicago Tribune reported It very 
briefly on page five; the Washington Post gave the 
speeoh almost a full column, but relegated It to page 
six; and the New York Times reported It on page four.
Of the leading newspapers, apparently only the Democratic 
Philadelphia Record carried the complete text. The 
Record reported the speech very favorably on October 10 
and reprinted the text, together with a photostatic copy 
of the Hard letter, on October 11. If other leading 
newspapers gave space to the speech, Ickes did not In­
clude their comment In his scrapbooks, which would be 
somewhat unusual.^
There was, likewise, little editorial reaction. 
Most leading dailies had none; the New York Times had 
two rather casual references to the speech. On October 
1 3 , a previously-oited editorial on campaign expenses 
took passing Issue with Ickes' assertion that wealth
oh,
was solidly behind Landon. Previously, on October 11, 
a oartoon had appeared on editorial pages which might 
have been oonstrued as belittling the Ickes speeoh. It 
showed Chairman Hamilton and Secretary Ickes as little 
boys In short pants scribbling on opposite sides of a
23For clippings oovering pertinent dates, see 
lokes Papers, Container 341.
2**New York Times, October 13, 1936, p. 26.
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fence. Hamilton wrote "Roosevelt loves Browder," and 
Ickes wrote "Landon loves Coughlin. 1 The two ideas 
appeared to be equated and neither taken very serious­
ly.
Republicans took little heed of the Ickes address.
The day before the speech was delivered, Congressman
Joseph Martin issued brief denial of the expected theBls,
calling it "absurd." He said that "the only possible
similarity or connection between us /Republican and
Union party adherents/ is that we are both against the
re-election of President Roosevelt. Hamilton,
usually quiok to reply, and Landon, who seldom did,
made no comment on the speech. Nor, indeed, did Father
Coughlin. Ten days after the attack, the priest’s
weekly publication, Social Justice, mildly depreciated
the implications of the Hard letter.2^ Father Coughlin,
however, made no direct reply.
Administration adherents who expressed views to
Ickes were enthusiastic about the speech, but fewer than
usual did so. The President expressed approval of the
27manuscript before the speeoh was delivered. Later,
25New York Times, October 8 , 1936, p. 16.
2^Soolal Justice, October 19, 1936. Copy in 
Ickes Papers, Container 3*fl.
2^Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 692.
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Daniel C. Roper, Secretary of Commerce, and Josephus 
Daniels, Ambassador to Mexico, sent very congratulatory 
notes, Daniels calling the speeoh as good as any he had 
heard "since 1884-. "2® Several of the usually numerous 
partisan letters were received. One of the favorable 
ones said: "Your voice came over the air in very clear
and effective fashion." This was, characteristically 
enough, countered by a very hostile letter which accused 
the Secretary of "stuttering and mispronouncing."29
Why was there comparatively little reaction to 
this Ickes attack? One answer is undoubtedly that the 
President was, by this time, dominating the Democratic 
campaign scene. It was only natural that during Roose­
velt's whirlwind final month, after his previous absti­
nence from strictly political speaking, other Democratic 
speakers would recede into the background. Too, Iokes1 
"Landon, Coughlin, 'et Al'" was delivered on the same day 
as addresses by Roosevelt, Landon, and former-Governor 
Cox of Ohio. This served to deorease the press attention 
and publlo interest given to his speech.
A significant conclusion may, perhaps, be drawn 
about the nature of the news reporting which this speech
2®Ickes Papers, Container 250.
29lbld.
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did receive. Although Ickes did not, as he had pre­
viously done, devote full time to attacking the 
opposition, this was the only aspect of the address 
given real coverage by the press. The approximately 
ten minutes which the Secretary had devoted to con­
structive support of New Deal philosophy was almost 
completely ignored. The only report which heeded the 
constructive arguments was that of the New York Times.
It quoted only one sentence of such argument while 
making a full column report. It quoted the first two 
minutes, the football metaphor, in its entirety; and it 
went into detail regarding the attacks on Coughlin and 
Smith. Only in the final sentence did it recognize the 
other portion of the address. It quoted, in closing:
Because President Roosevelt has enlisted on the 
side of the people and is determined that, in ad­
dition to political freedom, they shall have econ­
omic fair play, Is the reason why every American 
who loves liberty and Justice should enlist under 
his banner.
The implication of this coverage appears clear.
It was the hatohet-man role of Ickes which made news 
and which would find its way even into enemy papers.
The bold attacks, the biting irony— these were what put 
Ickes into print. Unless the newspapers were mistaken 
about what the public wanted, these were also the factors 
which won radio listeners for the New Deal's "Chief 
Denouncer. 1 The aspect of his oratory which drew
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criticism and complaint from the opposition was, 
apparently, the same aspect which caused the press, 
largely Republican, to publicize his speeches.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
This speech attempted to show (l) that there was 
a dose association between Father Coughlin and the 
Union party on one hand and the Republican high command 
on the other, and (2) that President Roosevelt repre­
sented the common people of America. The speech combined 
the usual denunciation of Republicans and their allies 
with constructive support for the New Deal program.
Although several unsupported assertions made 
their usual appearance, the logical proofs of this 
speech were stronger than in most of Ickes1 previous 
attacks. Ethical appeals were also stronger, for the 
speaker devoted more attention than usual to the ethos 
of the President, the New Deal, and himself. Emotional 
support, however, continued to be the Secretary's main 
source of persuasion. Persuasive language and purpose­
ful humor were his best psychological weapons, and 
class prejudice, fear, seourity, and patriotism were the 
basic motives to which he most frequently appealed.
Reaction to the speech was, no doubt, disappoint­
ing to lokes. Newspapers gave it less coverage than
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most of his major efforts received; there was little 
editorial comment; and Republican leaders almost ignored 
the attack. Ickes had been pushed into the background 
by the emergence of the President as an active campaign­
er. There was, however, one very interesting feature 
about the newspaper reaction to the Bpeech: the press
virtually ignored the speaker's more constructive efforts 
and reported only his denunciatory arguments. They were 
apparently interested in Ickes only as the New Deal's 
hatchet-man, not as Just another speaker.
CHAPTER VIII
"IS LANDON SINCERE?"
The last, and perhaps the sharpest, of Ickes1 
five major radio attacks was delivered on October 20. 
Entitled "Is Landon Sincere?", it was broadoast from 
10:30 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. by a national C.B.S. network.
BACKGROUND AND SETTING OF THE SPEECH
Between Ickes1 October 9 and October 20 radio 
addresses, President Roosevelt made an extended speak­
ing tour through the West. He covered over 5 , 0 0 0  
miles and delivered over sixty speeches within ten 
days. 1 Included among these was the Chicago speech 
which he directed primarily toward winning the small 
businessman, an address which a New York Times edltor- 
al called "the most effective and vote-winning thus 
far." 2 While this tour was in full swing, the ill- 
fated Literary Digest poll published its first returns 
based upon samplings in all forty-eight states. These 
returns showed Landon still leading by a 3-2 margin 
but registered steady gains for Roosevelt.3 The day
^New York Times, October 19, 1936, p. 1.
2New York Times. October 16, 1936, p. 20.
3New York Times, Ootober 16, 1936, p. 20.
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before these returns were announced, Washington politioal 
newswrlters, by a vote of nineteen to one, had selected 
the President as the probable winner.** The consensus of 
their opinion was that the President would achieve a 
plurality of over three million votes and would more than 
double Landon’s vote in the electoral college. New York 
bettors’ opinions coincided with the newsmen’s,and Roose­
velt was made a 1 2 - 5 favorite.-*
After his Western tour, the President rested and 
worked on future speeches for two days before starting 
a swing through New England. During these two days, 
his Secretary of the Interior delivered two important 
addresses. One was the October 20 attack with which 
this chapter is primarily concerned; the other was a 
thirty-minute address at the Academy of Music in Phila­
delphia. This address, entitled "Landon’s Angels," was 
broadoast only by local stations. Its chief targets 
were Landon, Hoover, Smith, and the duPonts, the latter 
family being put into the title role. Ickes adapted 
this speeoh well to his audience and occasion. He 
satirically set himBelf to "review the opera bouffe" 
which he said Republicans were staging, and the
**New York Times, October 15, 1936, p. 23.
5Baltlmore Sun, October 17, 1936.
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"dramatis personae" received the full benefit of biting
/*
humor. 0 In addition to adapting to his immediate physical 
surroundings, he acknowledged his presence In Pennsyl­
vania by paying his respects to Democratic Senator Guffy 
and by giving attention to quite another sort to Gifford 
Pinchot and the Pennsylvania duPonts. Ickes was well-
pleased with the size of the audience and with its
7
"enthusiastic" reception of his speech. Michael Straus, 
who accompanied the Secretary, was also pleased, although 
he thought the audience missed much of the subtle irony 
of the attack.® Only the Philadelphia Record of October 
20 carried the full text of the speech, but the New York 
Times and Washington Post of the same date reported its 
lines of argument. The letter files and scrapbooks in 
the Ickes Papers indicated that this speech received 
little editorial comment and aroused little public re­
action outside Pennsylvania.^
The Philadelphia address illustrated Ickes1 
constant awareness of the value of advertising a speech 
in advance. In it, after a brief reference to Landon1s
^For the text of this speech, see the Philadelphia 
Record. October 20, 1936.
^iokes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 695.
Q
Straus interview.
9
Ickes Papers.
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record, he said: "Tomorrow night from Washington, over
a national radio hookup, I propose to probe further into 
Governor Landon’s record. My subject will be ’Is Landon 
Sincere?'." The speech for whloh the Secretary was pro­
viding advance publicity had been prepared even before 
a definite date had been set for it. Straus sent a copy 
of the speech to Early on September 3 0  for his sugges­
tions; Early sent word of his approval on October 2:
Bill /Haesett7" and I think this is a masterpiece 
of ironical and logical analysis of the issues of 
the campaign. Let me know when he goes on the air 
with this. I don't want to miss it. 10
By October 15, the date for delivery had been set 
as October 20, and Ickes released an announcement to the 
press. . He said, in part:
Certain pages from Governor Landon’s record that 
will make the American Liberty League sorry it con­
tributed bo much money to his Presidential campaign 
will be presented Tuesday night in a political 
speeoh.
A New York Times editorial of October 1? gave the speeoh 
further advance notloe. After observing that ex-Senator 
Heed of Missouri and ex-Governor Smith of New York had 
"played body-snatchers" with portions of the President’s 
1932 speeches in order to show inconsistencies, the
l°The September 30 memorandum from Straus to Early 
and Early’s October 2 reply are both on file in the Frank­
lin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York.
New York Times, October 16, 1936, p. 1*K
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editorial said that Ickes and Hopkins were reportedly
preparing to "exhume" some of Governor Landon1s earlier
utterances. Landon's record, it was noted, would make
him vulnerable:
. . . the well-known kindness and charity which 
Secretary Ickes displays in his political speeches
would find a congenial field in gently arraying 
Candidate Landon against Governor Landon.12
PURPOSE AND THESIS OF THE SPEECH
The purpose and thesis of this speech were both 
easy for the listener or reader to discover. While the 
purpose may have required some analysis, the thesis was 
plainly implied in the title of the speech, in the 
Introduction, and in the conclusion. Ickes indicated 
that the title was going to be more than Just a catch- 
phrase when he began: "The question that I shall
discuss briefly tonight is this— Is Governor Landon 
really sincere in his campaign?" Throughout the body 
of the speech, Ickes employed numerous summary and 
transitional statements that Landon was not sincere.
Then he concluded: "Is Landon sincere? The case is in
the hands of the Jury. On the face of the record only 
one verdict can be brought in: Not guilty of fcinoerity." 
No question could exist in the listener's mind about the
12New York Times, October 17, 1936, p. 17.
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thesis of the address; It was stated early, plainly, and 
often. -
The basic Intent of the speech was also very clear: 
the speaker Intended to undermine public confidence In 
the Republican candidate. As a study of lines of argument 
will demonstrate more clearly, Ickes struck at Landon 
through every element of his potential support. For the 
conservatives, he quoted the Kansan's sympathy for govern­
ment operation of oertain utilities; for the liberals, he 
clearly aligned him with wealthy and ultra-conservative 
supporters; and for the "middle-of-the-roaders," he 
pictured a candidate who was opportunistic, insincere, 
a "changeling." Ickes* purpose was to destroy confi­
dence In Landon, and, in line with that purpose, he 
used tactios which he often accused the Kansas Governor 
of using: he offered at least one appeal for everybody.
LINES OF ARGUMENT AND ORGANIZATION
Unlike some of the Secretary's other political 
addresses, this speech was clearly organized. The intro­
duction stated the issue concisely, the conclusion was 
a reassertion of that thesis, and the arguments in the 
body of the speech were sharply defined. The speech 
contained three main lines of argument. The first was 
that Landon*s reoord as Governor was inconsistent with 
his campaign insistence that business should be kept
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relatively free of government regulation and Intervention. 
To this argument, half of the time of the speech was de­
voted. It was supported by two illustrations, both a 
matter of record. The first was Landon's recommendation 
for State telephone systems, and the second was his plan 
for putting Kansas into the natural gas business.
Upon completion of this first argument, Ickes 
cited very briefly other areas in which, according to 
him, Landon had tried to be on both sides of the Issue.
A passing Jab was also made at "reactionary" Interests, 
represented by the Sloans, Rockefellers, Morgans, and 
duPonts, who supported financially the Governor's efforts 
to "rededlcate" Maine to "good government." These two 
premises were not built Into major arguments. The 
seoond major argument was that the Republican candidate, 
while he contended that Roosevelt was likely to lead the 
nation into war,*^ was himself supported by those who 
had most to gain by armed conflict. The speaker cited 
the duPonts, Interested In munitions and chemicals, the 
duPonts and Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., interested in auto­
motive sales, the Morgan firm, deeply entrenched in 
international banking, and other lesser figures in oil 
and chemical production. Approximately five minutes of
•^ ■3gee text of Landon's September 12 address at 
Portland, Maine. New York Times. September 13, I9 3 6,
P- 36.-
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the total of twenty-seven were devoted to this argument.
The speaker’s last major argument was briefer 
than the others. It,too,dealt with the type of backers 
behind the Republican candidate. Ickes quoted a 1933 
Landon statement condemning Insull, Morgan, and Van 
Sweringen as financial and industrial "racketeers"; 
then he noted that at least two of these three were, in 
1936, avowed Landon supporters.
All three of the major arguments supported the 
speaker’s thesis, and all three were well-adapted to 
his purpose. The first was directed primarily toward 
conservatives, the last two primarily toward indepen­
dent liberals and Republican progressives, and all 
three toward the "middle-of-the-roader" who wanted an 
honest, sincere candidate. It is interesting to note 
that the strongest and most sensational argument was 
placed at the beginning of the speech and the weakest 
at the end, a praotlce Ickes often followed. Since he 
was addressing an audience, who could simply change a 
dial or turn a switch, not a relatively "captive" 
audience, this was probably a sound arrangement. As 
Brlgance puts it:
Remember that your first topic must draw a 
strong response. Will your least impelling topic 
get that response? If so you can follow the 
climaotic order of arrangement. If not, one of
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the.stronger topics must be drawn from the ranks 
and sent to the front.i^
Ickes’ arguments were apparently arranged with the idea
of capturing the attention and Interest of the radio
audienoe.
FORMS OF SUPPORT
IckeB* strongest appeals were, again, more
emotional than logical. Only in the firBt of the three
main arguments were logical proofs dominant. It was in
support of that argument that Ickes employed evidence
from the PWA files. Before the speech had consumed
much over a minute, the speaker was reading the 1935
Landon letter concerning State telephone systems. He
quoted it as follows:
Dear Mr. Ickes:
If you do not have the authority under the Public 
Works Administration to make loans to States for 
public, State-wide telephone systems, may I suggest 
that it would be a sound public policy to obtain 
that authority.
With highest personal regards, I am,
Yours sinoerely,
(Signed) Alf. M. Landon, 
Governor.
This documentary evldenoe was of a definite nature, but 
the Secretary, ostensibly to impresB its authenticity 
still further upon his listeners, added with a touch of
l^Wllliam Norwood Brlgance, Speeoh Composition 
(second edition; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.,
1953), P. 6.
221
sarcasm:
I suspect that the Governor will find a copy of 
this letter In his own files, hut If he wants to 
Inspect the original to satisfy himself of its 
authenticity, I will he glad to submit it to his 
most careful scrutiny.
The letter proved Landon's interest in a public telephone 
system, and, to those who kept abreast of the campaign, 
its significance in regard to Landon's sincerity was 
obvious. The Republican platform and the candidate's 
speeches both called for less government activity in 
business and industry. To be sure that everybody under­
stood this connection, Ickes said upon completion of the 
reading of the letter:
Within the week the man whose signature is ap­
pended to this letter proclaimed himself the 
champion of private initiative and attacked the 
President as merely 'giving lip service to our 
system of free enterprise'. Is Landon sincere?
Before reading the letter, the Secretary had noted
Landon's announoed opposition to "regimentation" and his
insistence that business "be kept free." The evidence
was well used. The speaker made clear the point with
which his evidence dealt, gave the evidenoe, and then
pointed up the conclusion from it.
The second piece of documentary evidence was used 
in much the same way, though the argument depended less 
upon it than upon simple narration. Ickes told his 
listeners about the plan for a State-owned natural gas
system in Kansas as it was expressed to him and his PWA 
assistants by the Governor and by William Allen White.
The narrative was detailed enough to be fairly convinc­
ing, but the speaker threw in as documentation a direct 
quotation from the proposed charter of the State corpo­
ration. After noting that his office had copies of the 
charter, Ickes read from it a section on the purpose of 
the State corporation:
The full nature and character of the business 
in which said corporation proposes to engage is to 
purchase, prospect for, obtain and produce natural 
gas and to operate and control pipe lines, stations 
and plants for the transportation, distribution, 
marketing and sale of said natural gas and the by­
products and to lease, hold, purchase, sell and 
oonvey real estate for the purpose of procuring, 
producing, transporting, selling, and distributing 
the said natural gas and the by-products thereof.
This quotation left no doubt that Landon was planning to
put his State into the gas business. For the Implication,
however, that Landon dropped his plan so he would be more
available as a candidate for the Republican nomination,
the speaker offered no proof. He simply asserted that
the plan was dropped about the same time that Landon
"first began to be talked of as a possible Republican
candidate for President."
The support for the last two main arguments was 
not primarily logical. Both of these arguments rested 
on the technique Ickes had often used in previous speeches 
of implying that whatever was true of Landon’s supporters
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was true of him. In the second argument, for example, 
he noted that such Republican supporters as Morgan, 
Sloan, and the duPonts were engaged In businesses which 
stood to profit from war. This was, no doubt, quite 
true. It required more partisan conjecture than logical 
Inference, however, to reach the subsequent conclusion 
that these men would, therefore, work to involve their 
nation in war. Ickes made no effort to prove it; he 
simply implied it, asserted it, and repeated it. The 
speaker, in closing that argument, did put himself on 
somewhat stronger inferential ground when he compared 
Landon and Roosevelt on the war issue:
In trying to force the United States into another 
war, it goes without saying that war munitions, oil, 
and International banking would be much more influ­
ential with Governor Landon, whom they are unani­
mously supporting, than with President Roosevelt, 
whom they are viciously fighting.
If the earlier premise that these interests might en­
courage war for profit, a premise assumed in this 
statement, were accepted, the comparison would be a 
reasonable and effective one.
The final argument, assoolating Landon with busi­
ness “racketeers," was not based on sound reasoning or 
evidenoe. It was the familiar “guilt by association" 
idea: that since Insull and Morgan were supporting
Landon, who had once termed them “racketeers," the 
Kansas Governor must have changed his mind about
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racketeers. Whatever may have heen Its psychological 
value, this argument was not based on a logical founda­
tion. Both candidates, as Ickes knew, undoubtedly had 
some supporters of whom they did not personally approve.
After the first argument, there was little re­
liance on evidence and sound reasoning in this speech; 
psychological appeals were emphasized much more. As 
Just indicated, the last two arguments rested primarily 
upon suggestion and emotional association. The second 
one, identifying Landon with so-called "war lords," 
used scare tactics, and both of the final arguments 
played upon the prejudice of many against wealthy and 
powerful men in business, finance, and industry. Names 
like duPont, Morgan, and Insull were designed to have 
undesirable emotional connotations for many listeners.
Even in the first argument, despite its support 
by excellent documentary evidenoe, Ickes used psycho­
logical appeals of this type. In offering to produce 
the Landon letter from which he had quoted, the Secre­
tary managed to work in the names of a few of his 
favorite moneyed targets:
If any of the Rockefellers or the duPonts or the 
Sloans or the Colonel McCormicks or the Pews or the 
Grundys or the William R. Hearsts or the Andrew W. 
Mellons, who are so generously pouring their money 
into Candidate Landon’s campaign fund, are curious 
about it, I will be glad to furnish them with 
copies.
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As usual, Ickes used language, particularly 
epithets and loaded descriptions, as psychological 
forms of assertion. For example, he referred to Landon 
as a "changeling" candidate and as the "friend of the 
common millionaire"; Knox was referred to as "that 
windmill-tilting gentleman of grotesque and absurd 
statements"; and men like the duPonts and Morgans were 
labeled "war lords."
The persuasive element of humor, present in one 
or two of the phrases Just noted, was another psycho­
logical form of support which Ickes employed. He 
referred, for example, to "the late A1 Smith" and to 
"Governor Landon's little pipe line dream." Of Lan­
don's visit to the PWA Administrator regarding a loan, 
he said: "We had long since learned that when Governor
Landon called the United States Treasury needed extra 
guards." When discussing Landon's charge that Roosevelt 
might lead the nation to war, he noted that the Kansan's 
supporters were the groups which had most to gain from 
war; then he concluded: "The Jam is too apparent on
Governor Landon's apparently innocent face to esoape 
detection." As the tone of these examples would in­
dicate, the humor in this speech, while pointed, was 
lighter and less bitter than in one or two previous 
addresses.
In all four of the radio addresses previously
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analyzed, Ickes bent more effort toward reduoing the 
ethos of his opponents than toward building and capital­
izing upon his own. By the very nature of its thesis 
and purpose, this speech was also devoted more to 
negative than to positive ethical appeals. However, the 
speaker did devote more attention to his personal ethos 
in this than in any previous address. It is significant 
that the proof Iokes used of Landon’s inclination toward 
State ownership and operation of business was all from 
the Secretary’s own files as PWA Administrator. The 
quoted letter and the narration of events surrounding 
both it and the proposed natural gas corporation charter 
pictured a state official petitioning a superior federal 
officer. Landon was petitioning Ickes. This subtly 
underlined relationship boosted the speaker’s standing, 
even as it mitigated Governor Landon’s.
The speaker also utilized an opportunity to at­
tribute characteristics of virtue to himself and his New 
Deal associates, while implying a deficiency of those 
attributes in the Republican candidate. Discussing the 
negotiations concerning the loan for a State corporation 
in Kansas, he said:
The public works administration never presumed 
to dictate policy to a Sovereign State applying for 
money to finance a project. Neither was it our 
habit to conduct official business in secrecy. But 
at the insistence of the man who now, as a candidate 
for President, demands that all public business be 
conducted in the open, we agreed in this instanoe to
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secrecy in the preliminary stages of the negotiation. 
It was our expectation that in due course a formal 
application would be made for a PWA loan and grant, 
at which time full publicity would be given to the 
proposal and public hearing held if desired. During 
these confidential conversations with Governor Landon 
and his agent it was suggested that the Governor 
secure legislative authority for his plan. This idea 
was always met with the plea that Governor Landon did 
not want the people of Kansas to Know what he was up 
to until it was too late to block his plan.
Ickes knew how to use ethical appeals and could, upon 
occasion, blend positive and negative approaches into a 
two-edged weapon. His failure to depend more upon con­
structive ethical appeal should probably be attributed, 
first, to the nature of his role in the campaign and, 
second, to his obvious enjoyment of a more destructive 
approach.
USE OF LANGUAGE
Ickes* language in this speech was, as usual, 
vivid and imaginative. It gave full play to his af­
fection for figurative expression. For example, he 
spoke of Landon's willingness to "tear his principles 
from the shallow soil in which they were rooted," of his 
"kaleidoscopic" changes, his "quick-silver policies," 
and his "boxing the compass" on the Issues. He spoke, 
too, of Landon's record which "literally bristles with 
question marks respecting his own sincerity." In 
speaking of the change in Landon when he became a possible 
candidate, he said that "Candidate Landon was about to
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burst forth from his State-Socialist chrysalis as a 
bright and multi-hued conservative butterfly that would 
delight the Wall Street individualists of the Hoover 
sohool. 1
It has been noted in previous chapters that, with 
his flair for the figurative, Ickes sometimes failed to 
resist the temptation of very expressive but not very 
widely-understood language. Several examples of this 
failure to adapt his vocabulary to many of his listeners 
occurred in this attack on Landon. He accused the Kansas 
Governor, for example, of "Lochinvarlng it to Maine;" It 
is doubtful that most of his radio audience was familiar 
enough with Scott's character in Marmlon to immediately 
appreciate the meaningful allusion. Again, when he 
spoke of the "Morganatic marriage between the war lords 
and the Republican party," it is doubtful that the term 
"Morganatic marriage" was understood by most of his 
listeners. It was perhaps typical of the paradoxical 
Secretary of the Interior that he used expressions like 
this one in the same speeoh in which the most simple and 
down-to-earth expressions also appeared. In the latter 
category would definitely fall the very Informal outburst 
which occurred when the speaker said that the Republicans 
were "desperately in need of a candidate— Oh Lord, any 
candidate !" In almost the same category was his statement 
that he was "tolerable familiar" with Governor Landon's
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signature. Nor was there anything very ornate or un­
usual about the reference to "Jam on Governor Landon's 
face" or his "biting the hand that fed him." Ickes' 
language, always colorful, was usually strikingly 
familiar. Occasionally, however, it over-reached the 
comprehension of the audience and failed in its primary 
function of clear communication.
To help make his oral style more direct,the 
Secretary again, as in previous addresses, turned to the 
use of questions. In several plaoes, Including the intro­
duction and the conclusion, he posed the title question: 
"Is Landon sincere?" He also used the interrogative form 
to introduce ideas, asking a question and then answering 
it. For example, he Introduced his comment about Insull's 
support of Landon simply by asking: "But what of Samuel
Insull?" Most effective, however, were his rhetorical 
questions Intended as persuasion. He constructed a series 
of such questions when he was punching home his contention 
about Landon's reversed policies:
How does it happen that the State Socialist of
1935 Is the Republican candidate for President in
1936 on a platform of uncontrolled private Initia­
tive? Is It possible that the Governor of Kansas 
was willing to tear his principles from the shallow 
soil In whioh they were rooted because of the lure 
of the greatest office in the world? And what as- 
suranoe is there that such a man, who apparently 
sways easily to every passing political breeze, would 
remain the advocate of private Initiative and of rug­
ged individualism, if by chance he should become the 
President of the United States?
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The interrogative structuring of language for introduc­
tion, for repetition, and for argument helped to give 
to the speech the directness required for an effective 
oral style.
Ickes* frequent use of exceptionally short and 
blunt sentences, noted in previous chapters, added a 
forcefulness to his structuring of language for oral 
presentation. The first minute of his speech, for ex­
ample, consisted of seven sentences, only two of which 
had over twenty words in them; three had fewer than ten 
words:
The question I shall discuss briefly tonight is
this— Is Governor Landon really sincere in his cam­
paign? The burden of his- speeches so far has been 
a demand that we return to what he calls *the 
American way of life. ’ He is for the rugged indivi­
dualism of Herbert Hoover. He believes in cut-throat 
competition. He is for the aggrandizement of the few 
at the expense of the many.
Governor Landon Inveighs against what he calls 
’regimentation. 1 Business must be made free and kept 
free, declares the pleasant gentleman from Kansas in 
the very severest tones that he is able to marshal.
Such short and simple sentences produce a blunt forceful­
ness much less easily achieved with longer, complex
sentenoes. Not all of the sentences, to be sure, were 
short. Many consisted of over thirty words and the 
longest sentence contained seventy-eight words. At 
frequent intervals, however, especially when con­
clusions to an argument were being stated, the series 
of short, simple sentences appeared. As he concluded
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his final argument, for example, Ickes said: "ThiB la
the record. Let Governor Landon explain it if he can.
Let him deny it if he dare. Let him ignore it if he 
must."
The language of this attaok upon Landon was color­
ful, usually direct, and often very forcefully phrased. 
Despite an occasional use of relatively unfamiliar 
vocabulary, Ickes' choice of language made a definite 
contribution toward the effectiveness of the speech.
REACTION TO THE SPEECH
Considering the fact that Governor Landon, Gover­
nor Lehman, Senator Vandenberg, and John ¥. Davis, 
former Democratic nominee for President, all delivered 
campaign addresses on the same day, and that the Presi­
dent commenced his New England tour on that day, news 
coverage of Ickes' October 20 address should have been 
gratifying to him. His speech shared the page one head­
line of the October 21 Washington Star with Landon's 
Los Angeles address; the Chicago Tribune, which often 
Ignored Ickes' speeohes, reported this one briefly and 
impartially on page nine of its October 21 edition; the 
New York Times of the same date devoted more than a 
column on page thirteen to a fairly complete report; and 
the St.. Louis Post-Dispatch made it the subject of an 
editorial on page one, section C.
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Only three leading city dallies commented editori­
ally on the speeoh. The Post-Dispatch, In the Landon 
oamp politically, noted that Ickes1 evidence regarding 
the Kansas Governor's vlewB on public ownership were 
designed to "chill conservatives." The editorial said 
that it might, on the other hand, appeal to liberals who 
favored government ownership.^ This was possible, but, 
In view of other announced positions of Roosevelt and 
Landon on business regulation, hardly likely. A very 
favorable commentary was written by Robert S. Allen and 
appeared in the pro-Roosevelt Philadelphia Record. Allen 
called the speech "the most scorching address of the cam­
paign," and said, In part:
Ickes, famed as the New Deal's most acid-tongued 
and hardest hitting fighter, reached new heights in 
both tonight. He belabored Landon with devastating 
irony, sarcasm, direct haymakers and solar plexuB 
blows. J-o
The Republican Washington Post. commenting only briefly, 
said that Ickes was reading so many letters over the air 
as evidence that future correspondence to him ought to 
be addressed: "Dear Mr. Secretary and my friends of the
radio audience."'1'^
^St. Louis Post-Dispatch. October 2 1 , 1936. 
Section CTp.T:----------- -----
•^Philadelphia Record, October 21, 1936.
■^Washington Post, October 22, 1936.
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Probably the most Important reaction oame from 
the Republican candidate himself. Although Landon later 
said In Tulsa, Oklahoma, that "During this campaign I 
have made no effort to answer personal attacks that have
lO
been made upon me," he replied at some length to this 
attack by Ickes. This reply, quoted in most oases along 
with the report of the Secretary's speech, said in part:
Up to date, the administration's spokesmen have 
been attacking me on the ground I was a puppet of 
big business. Now they attack me on the ground that 
I am a Socialist and the enemy of big business.
This Is typical of the confusion and contradictory 
policies that have characterized this administration 
from its beginning. This attack is like the losing 
team throwing the ball around wildly attempting to 
score. . . .
I am glad the administration has seen fit to make 
these negotiations public. They show I was determin­
ed to bring lower gas rates to Kansas, even to the 
extent of resorting to public ownership on a State 
basis.
I have always been In favor of public ownership 
of a gun behind the door in the adjustment of proper 
and fair utility rates. . . .
Naturally I asked Mr. Roosevelt's Secretary of the 
Interior to keep our discussion secret. If it had 
been given publicity the private gas interests would 
have pre-empted all the available gas reserves and 
we would have been out of luck.
But we were finally able to obtain the lower 
rates, with a large saving to the gas consumers of 
Kansas, without resorting to the last weapon that 
should be resorted to— public ownership.
Landon went on to say that "very much the same situation"
was true of his letter regarding a State telephone system.
18n©w York Times, October 24, 1936, p. 1.
19New York Times, October 21, 1936, p. 13.
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Then he launched an attack on the New Deal for "getting 
into ‘business" on a national scale.
This reply was clever, although It missed the 
point In some respects. Ickes had never really charged 
Landon with being presently in favor of public owner­
ship; he had, In faot, contrasted Landon’s views aB 
Governor with his views as a candidate. Landon accepted 
his detractor'8 facts but rejected his Implication of 
motive. He put himself back on record as a friend of 
business, while picturing himself also as a champion of 
the consumer. It was not a complete answer, but it prob­
ably sufficed for his supporters. From Ickes’ point of 
view, a significant fact was that he had forced Landon 
into a reply.
No other Republicans replied directly, but an in­
direct response came from Republican National Committee 
headquarters. They attacked Ickes' PWA on the ground 
that its funds from September 8 to October 10 had gone 
mostly to "so-called doubtful States." The Administrator 
replied by press conference that "not much" of the avail­
able fund had even been allocated and that "if we were 
playing politics we would be spending it all over the lot 
like the duPonts are doing in the Republican campaign. 1,20 
The Republican statistics on actual expenditures were not
20New York Times, October 21, 1936, p. 1A.
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denied. Stripped to Its essentials, the Secretary’s 
reply proved only that PWA was not playing politics as 
muoh as it could he doing. This exchange probably had 
little Influence on a public already saturated with 
charges and denials of politics in WPA.
The only unusual feature about the reaction to 
this speeoh was that Ickes had finally forced a reply 
from his principal target. In view of his previous 
policy of ignoring attacks, Landon’s reply would seem to 
indicate that he feared the effects of this Ickes' ad­
dress and decided that it could not safely be ignored.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
On August 3 , Ickes had ostensibly used candidate 
Landon's platform and campaign statements to refute the 
claim, made on the basis of his record in Kansas, that 
he was a progressive. On Ootober 20, he ostensibly used 
the Kansan's record as Governor to question the sincerity 
of some of his 1936 views as a candidate. In reality, he 
hoped to do the same thing in both addresses: to demon­
strate that Landon was opportunistic and insincere. His 
October 20 speech supported this thesis by three argu­
ments: (1) that Landon, who now urged free enterprise,
had favored State ownership of utilities before he was a 
candidate; (2 ) that Landon, who charged that Roosevelt 
might lead the nation to war, was actually supported by 
those who would gain most from war; and (3) that Landon,
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who as Governor had labeled certain financiers "rack­
eteers,” was being supported by those very men.
For the first of these arguments, evidence of a 
documentary nature was the chief form of proof. The 
second and third were supported almost entirely by psy­
chological appeals to fear and prejudice. In the speeoh 
as a whole, Ickes used more constructive ethical appeal 
than in any previous effort.
The language of the speech was vivid and forceful. 
It suffered in a few places from use of vocabulary 
probably unfamiliar to many listeners, but it was, in 
general, very effective. The use of rhetorical questions 
and short, simple sentences contributed to the directness 
and force desirable for oral presentation.
News coverage of the speech was good, and even op­
position editorials were only mildly critical. With this 
speech Ickes managed, for the first time, to goad Landon 
into a reply. Since that reply was in explanation, and 
not denial, of some of the facts alleged by Ickes, it can 
be inferred that the Republican candidate feared the ef­
fect which the speech, if ignored, might produce. The 
speaker assigned the role of keeping the pressure on 
Landon had succeeded in putting him on the defensive.
The retort even helped to publicize the attack. From 
the Democratic point of view, this speech must be re­
garded as an effective effort.
CHAPTER IX
CHARACTERISTICS OF ICKES' PERSUASION
The special function of Ickes in the 1936 campaign, 
as described In Chapter II, was to act as the Administra­
tion's hatchet-man, its "chief-denouncer. 1 His Job was 
to keep the pressure on the Republican party and to 
prevent the rise of Landon to a seriously challenging 
position. Ten speeches designed to fulfill this assigned 
task were delivered, five of which have been analyzed in 
detail in preceding chapters. 1 It Is the purpose of this 
chapter to observe and describe briefly the persuasive 
methods and techniques which characterized the speaking 
of Ickes in the campaign.
The speaker's methods and techniques can best be 
viewed in the light of his basic purpose. Ickes' purpose 
was to prevent Landon from gaining the confidence of most 
of the American public. To fulfill his purpose, it was 
not necessary that he definitely prove anything about
10nly seven of these ten speeches have been dis­
cussed in this study. The three which followed the speech 
"Is Landon Sincere?" were as follows: On October 21, in
Evanston, Illinois, an attack aimed chiefly at the Chicago 
press and entitled "Only Thirteen More Days to Save 
America," on October 27, in Altoona, Pennsylvania, an 
attack aimed primarily at Gifford PInchot and entitled 
"Why Pinchot Ran Out," and on October 28, in New York City's 
Carnegie Hall, a ooncerted attack on Landon called "At the 
Crossroads." None of these addresses were broadcast 
nationally.
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Landon. He needed only to implant by suggestion atti­
tudes of uncertainty, suspicion, and doubt. In this 
task, Ickes became essentially a propagandist, for his 
speeches constituted “a systematic attempt . . .  to 
control the attitudes of groups of individuals through 
the use of suggestion. . . .
The tendency toward merely suggesting, rather than 
proving, is reflected in several facets of Ickes' per­
suasion. It may be seen, first, in the vagueness of many 
of the speaker's theses. Discovering in some of Ickes' 
speeches a definitely stated or clearly implied thesis 
or proposition is an almost impossible task. This ab­
sence of clear thesis has been noted particularly in the 
speech attacking the Republican platform and in the one 
devoted partially to Father Coughlin. In the case of 
other attacks, It has been noted that the stated thesis 
did not necessarily embody the real Intent of the speech. 
In his attack on Landon's progressivism, for example, 
lokes' real purpose was not as much to deny that Landon 
was progressive as It was to imply that no one could be 
sure where Landon stood from one moment to the next.
When the propagandist aims at creating attitudes, it is
2See definition of "propaganda" by Leonard W.
Doob. Propaganda (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1935), PP_. 75-76.
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not neoessary— it may, in fact, be disadvantageous— to 
present a real and definite thesis. Ickes' true purpose 
was not always embodied in a definite or stated thesis.
The nature of the Secretary's purpose apparently 
Influenced his organization in much the same way. As 
it has been noted in the study of individual speeches, 
this organization was seldom ordered from a logical 
point of view. Quite often little or no logical con­
nection existed between the ideas which were developed 
in sequence. Suoh loose organization was especially ap­
parent in the speeches devoted to the Republican platform, 
to the Hearst-Landon connection, and to Father Coughlin's 
relationship to the Republican party. Since Ickes* pri­
mary purpose was neither clear exposition nor logical 
demonstration, a logical arrangement of ideas was less 
neoessary than it would otherwise have been. Further, 
well-organized attacks upon Landon would have been easier 
for Republicans to answer than was the Secretary's loosely- 
structured campaign of suggestion and innuendo.
The nature of Ickes' proofs showed a greater em­
phasis upon persuasive techniques embodying suggestion 
than upon those built upon reasoning and evidence. Ickes 
used evidenoe, sometimes excellent evidenoe, in every 
speeoh analyzed in previous chapters. It is significant, 
however, that his evidence was usually selected for its 
psychological effect or its sensation or expose value.
240
His evidence by testimony, for example, was almost 
always from Landon's own words or from those of a Landon 
supporter. His documentary evidenoe was usually from 
private correspondence or from previously unpublished 
documents. His examples were selected more for their 
emotional connotation than for their logical value.
Even Ickes1 logical proofs were selected and construct­
ed, at least in part, to command attention and to per­
suade by suggestion.
The real essence of the persuasion in Ickes' 
speeches, however, lay in his skillful use of those 
psychological techniques commonly associated with the 
propagandist. Some of the most common of these tech­
niques have been enumerated and described by the 
Institute for Propaganda Analysis, a non-partisan 
organization created in 1937 to study propaganda and 
public opinion. Those listed are "name calling, 1 
"glittering generality," "transfer," "testimonial,"
"plain folks," "card stacking," and "band wagon."3 These 
devices, several of which are discussed by speech text­
books under other titles, are applicable in characteriz­
ing the persuasive appeals of Ickes. Moreover, they 
combine other elements of emotional appeal with those
3Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee (ed.), 
The Fine Art of Propaganda (New York: Hareourt, Brace 
and Company, 1939), pp. 23-24.
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dependent primarily upon language selection, and no 
analysis of Ickes would be complete which did not con­
sider his persuasive use of language.
"Name calling" and "glittering generalities" are 
essentially negative and positive descriptions of the 
language technique which Brembeok and Howell call 
"positive loading" and "negative loading."^ Since he 
was occupied primarily with the attack upon the Presl- 
dent’s opponents, it was "name calling," the technique 
of "giving an idea a bad label. . . to make us reject 
and condemn the idea without examining the evidence," 
which Ickes used most.^ When he labeled Landon a 
"practical progressive" and a "strong but silenced man"; 
when he called the Republican platform "weasel-worded"; 
when he referred to "Boss Hearst" and to the "liberty- 
loving duPonts"; and when he labeled Landon supporters 
as "Old Guard," "massed wealth," "vested interests," 
"predatory interests," "warlords," "reactionaries," 
and "Old Dealers"; when he did these things, Ickes was 
"name-calling." These, of course, represent only a few 
of the many illustrations of this practloe which have 
been noted in the analysis of Individual speeches.
Kinston Lamont Brerabeck and William Smiley Howell, 
Persuasion: A Means of Social Control (New York: Pren-
tloe-Kall, Inc., 195277 P* 153*
5Lee and Lee, ojo. olt. , P. 23.
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The New Deal’s most persistent attacker of Landon
£
also made use of the "transfer" device in persuasion. 0 
Again it was the negative aspect of the technique which 
he used most. As subjects, he employed Landon adher­
ents whom he thought to be low in public favor, denounc­
ing them and rhetorically tying them around the neck of 
the Republican candidate. Thus the opprobrium they bore, 
enhanced by Ickes1 own invective, was to be transferred 
to Landon. Foremost among those whose presumed lack of 
public favor he attempted to transfer to the Kansan were 
the duPonts, Hearst, Hoover, and the Liberty League.
The negative use of the "testimonial" was also a 
characteristic of Ickes’ persuasion.? His attacks in­
dicated the apparent belief that the candidate's virtue, 
his principles, and his program, could be no better than 
the people who supported him. This was the principle of 
"guilt by association." By calling attention to the fact 
that Hearst, Hoover, Insull, Morgan, and the Liberty 
League had subscribed to the Landon candidacy, Ickes
^"'Transfer' carries the authority, sanction, and 
prestige of something respected and revered over to some­
thing else in order to make the latter acceptable; or it 
oarries authority, sanction, and disapproval to cause us 
to reject or disapprove something the propagandist would 
have us reject and disapprove." Lee and Lee, op. cit., 
p. Z k .
?"'Testimonial' consists In having some respeoted 
or hated person say that a given idea or program or pro­
duct or person is good or bad." Ibid., p. 24.
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intended to discredit the Kansas Governor in the eyes of 
laborers, farmers, liberals, progressives, and most of 
the so-called "common" people.
The "plain folks" technique appeared in almost
O
all of' Ickes' speeches. Throughout the campaign, he 
worked to convince his radio audience that the election 
issue was between wealth and vested interests, on the 
Republican side, and the common people, who supported 
the President. Roosevelt and the New Deal would, ac­
cording to Ickes, benefit the worker, the farmer, the 
small businessman; Landon would represent wealth and 
big business. In this way, Ickes used the "plain folks" 
approach as a double-edged weapon.
The device called "card stacking" by the Institute 
for Propaganda Analysis is probably used by all campaign 
speakers in some degree, but Ickes’ speeches typified it 
as a propaganda device.9 His reasoning, his selection of 
evidence, and his language all reflected what Brembeck 
and Howell refer to as "two-valued orientation.
®"'Plain folks’ is the method by which a speaker 
attempts to oonvlnce his audience that his Ideas are 
good because they are ’of the people’, the 'plain 
folks'." Ibid., p. 24*.
9"»Card stacking' Involves the selection and use 
of facts or falsehoods, illustrations or distractions, 
and logical or illogical statements in order to give the 
best or worst possible case for an idea, program, person, 
or product." Ibid., p. 24.
l0Brerabeck and Howell, ojd. clt. . pp. 157-58.
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Ickes recognized no middle ground; there were only hlack 
and white. No action of Landon and his party was not 
suspect, and the worst possible Interpretation was 
placed upon their motives. The President, on the other 
hand, had done and could do no wrong. This extermely 
Intentional reasoning ran through the speaker's argu­
ments, and his language and evidence followed the same 
pattern.
Ickes made only limited use of the "band wagon" 
technique of persuasion.'*'■*' It would have been difficult 
to make extensive use of this device In company' With his 
sharp drawing of battle lines In the campaign. He did 
frequently remind his audience of Roosevelt's smashing 
victory in 1932 , and he indicated that the "common’ 
people" all supported Roosevelt and the New Deal. Only 
in the concluding appeal in his attack on Father Coughlin, 
however, did he make obvious use of the "get on the band 
wagon" Idea. His role In the campaign was more concerned 
with preventing Landon support than In making positive 
appeals for the President.
H"'Band wagon1 has as its theme: Everybody— at 
least all of 'us'— is doing it. With it, the propagandist 
attempts to convince us that all members of a group to 
which we belong are accepting his program and that we must 
therefore follow our crown and 'Jump on the band wagon.'" 
Lee and Lee, loc. clt.
Another technique of persuasion which character­
ized the speaking efforts of the New Deal's “chief de­
nouncer" was the use of humor. This aspect of Ickes1 
speaking has been noted in connection with each of his 
speeches, and its importance to the successful perform­
ance of his campaign task is difficult to over-erapha- 
size. The audience might soon weary of attacks on the 
opposition which were harsh but unimaginative, and 
criticism and accusation, if unrelieved, could eventually 
have created sympathy. Ickes* caustic humor refined, re­
lieved, and camouflaged— without softening— the blows he 
struck at Landon and his leading supporters. The acid 
humor which had won him the reputation as "the Cabinet 
witnl2 Wa8 Used, not merely to hold attention, but to 
implement persuasion as well.
One other form of suggestion which Ickes used 
extensively as a means of persuasion was repetition.
The use of repetition in individual speeches has been 
noted in the analysis in previous chapters. The Secre­
tary also repeated the main ideas of former speeches as 
supporting ideas in later ones. The reourring references 
to Landon as a "practical progressive" and to Hearst as 
the Kansan's "boss" are cases in point.
•^Ernest K. Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution (New 
York: The Viking Press, 1933")', P* 2 9 0.
In brief summary, Ickes1 persuasion was based 
primarily upon psychological appeals and techniques. 
Ethical and logical proofs were subordinated to and 
colored by psychological forms of persuasion. He made 
frequent use of the techniques of the propagandist; chief 
among them were "name-calling, 1 "transfer," "testimonial," 
"plain folks," and "card stacking." He also made exten­
sive use of repetition and humor as psychological forms 
of persuasion. Most of these techniques depended upon 
or were greatly enhanced by the speaker's use of vivid 
and persuasive language.
Harold L. Ickes was the New Deal's hatchet-man.
H1b primary assignment was to reduce the public stature 
of the President's Republican foe. His appeal to his 
mass audience was characterized by the psychological 
techniques of the propagandist, and it was influenced 
by the reputation, the wit, and the colorfulness of the 
man himself.
CHAPTER X
APPRAISAL
In the light of his I936 campaign efforts, how 
should Ickes be evaluated as a speaker? The criteria 
for appraising a speaker are numerous and varied, but 
Thonssen and Baird list and describe the following 
tests as "most common in contemporary evaluation": (1 ) 
the immediate response to the speeches, (2 ) the reada­
bility of the texts, (3 ) the technical perfection of the 
speeohes, according to accepted rhetorical principles,
(^ ) the historical test of the speaker’s ideas, (5 ) the 
delayed response to the speeohes, and (6 ) the ultimate 
effeot of the speeohes upon society. 1
Since Ickes is being evaluated as a political 
orator in a special campaign role, some of these cri­
teria are much less applicable than others. To begin 
with, the technical perfection of his speeches is less 
important than those tests dealing with the actual re­
sponse reoeived. It has already been noted, for example, 
that the organization of his speeohes was often weak
from a logical point of view. Since his particular ob­
ject did not depend to any large degree upon ordered
^Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech 
Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 19^8),
pp.
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proof, this technical weakness, while perhaps signifi­
cant, was not necessarily a limiting factor. The ap­
plication of the historical test of ideas would also 
yield little. Most of Ickes* subject matter was based 
on what could or could not be expected of Landon in the 
event of his election. Since Landon was not elected, 
then or later, the Secretary's ideas could not be 
weighed on the scale of actual performance. Nor would 
the gain be great from an attempt to evaluate the ul­
timate effect of Ickes* ideas upon society. His subject 
matter was of an immediate and temporary nature, and his 
ideas were particular rather than universal. Unless one 
were rash enough to ascribe Roosevelt's re-election to 
Ickes* efforts and then to attempt to evaluate the 
election's influence upon society, the social Impact 
test could not be used.
The test of readability of speech texts, on the 
other hand, is especially pertinent to the present study. 
As Thonssen and Baird have pointed out, opinion is 
divided on the question of whether or not a good speech 
reads well in print. 2 The idea that an effective speech 
will also read well is popularly held, but many rhetori­
cal critics hold that good oral style is so different
2Ibld.. p. 456.
from literary style that a good speech should not read 
well as printed matter. Ickes* speeches, to satisfy 
his particular goals, needed to blend oral and literary 
styles effectively enough that they would sound good 
over the air and yet read well in the newspapers. For, 
as noted in Chapter II, the Administration used its 
Secretary of the Interior at least partially for his news 
value, and Iokes himself devoted great effort toward secur­
ing the widest possible news coverage for his speeches.
That his style was, for the most part, well-adapted to 
oral presentation has been noted in the study of indivi­
dual speeches. At the same time, Ickes possessed a very 
creditable literary style. His language was not only 
colorful; it was almost always meticulously correct.3 
The speeches not only read well in print, but, even more 
important in this particular case, they made interesting 
reading. Newspapers, even some hostile ones, were will­
ing to'devote space to reprinting Ickes* major speeches 
entirely, or to quoting liberally from them. This ac­
complished one of the basic aims of the New Deal’s 
hatchet-man: It gave wide publicity to his attacks on
Landon and his party.
^Straus, Wolfsohn, and Cohen have indicated that 
Ickes possessed a good literary style, with a slight 
tendency toward the classical. Interviews.
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The Immediate reeponae to his speeches cannot 
be Ignored as a oriterlon for evaluating the speaker. 
Thonssen and Baird say of this criterion:
The effectiveness of a speech may be Judged by 
the character of the immediate, surface response.
If a speaker succeeds in holding the audience's 
unbroken attention; if he receives a favorable 
response in the form of applause or cheering; if he 
does these or other things which relate straightway 
to the response of the moment, he is presumed to 
have carried through his communicative attempt 
competently. This is a superficial, though some­
times accurate, indicator of rhetorical merit.^
Since Ickes* campaign speeohes were beamed primarily to 
the radio audience, several of them being studio broad­
casts, this type of analysis is difficult to make. In 
two speeches previously reported in which delivery was 
before a live audience, eyewitness and newspaper 
accounts have indicated that response to Ickes was 
enthusiastic .-5 Joel David Wolfsohn, who heard the
Secretary often in 1936» has indicated that the audi-
£
ences were favorably responsive in each case.
For reactions to Ickes' network radio addresses, 
however, the crltio must depend upon newspaper and other 
printed reports. Since newspapers and political oom- 
mentators cannot be considered as entirely unbiased 
observers, this type of reaction is also difficult to
^Thonssen and Baird, o£. clt. , p. 4-55.
^These were the speeches delivered at Columbus on 
October 9, and at Philadelphia on October 19.
^Interview.
evaluate. Some suggestions as to Ickes' effectiveness 
can, however, be gleaned from a review of the reactions 
of newspapers and of political observers of both parties. 
For example, the August 3 attack on Landon's progress- 
lvlsm brought forth reluctant admissions of the effect­
iveness of the speech from several Republican papers, 
and it received only complaints from Republican leaders. 
It also received exceptionally favorable and unanimous 
support from Democratic leaders and newspapers. That 
speech could be adjudged effective. The August 2? 
attack on Hearst was much less effective. It received 
a strong reply from William Hard and from the Republican 
press. Its charge, on the other hand, failed to receive 
support from many Democratic editorials. Using this 
type of appraisal, a study of reaction to the five major 
radio addresses would Indicate that all except the speech 
charging Hearst control.of Landon were largely effeotive. 
The most effective were the speeches questioning Landon's 
progresslvlsm and his sinoerity. The latter even drew 
reply from the Republican candidate, but the reply, 
though cleverly done', only partially met the issues 
raised. Though he was enthusiastic about the other four 
speeches, even the Secretary was dubious, as noted in 
Chapter VI, about the public reaction to his attack on 
Hearst.
According to observers, Ickes received a favorable
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immediate reaction from his audiences when an audience 
was present. No definitive conclusion can be reached 
about the reaction of his radio audience. Some evi­
dence does, however, suggest that at least four of the 
five major addresses received a favorable response.
Of greater Importance than the test of immediate 
audience reaction is the criteria of the ultimate re­
sponse of that audience. Comparing these two criterion, 
Thonssen and Baird say:
Much more significant is the test which measures 
effectiveness by the substantial responses deriving 
from possible changes in belief or attitude. . . . 
Thus, in an extended debate in the House of Commons 
or in the American Congress, a vote may not be taken 
for days after the delivery of certain significant 
speeches. But the fundamental test will be: Did
these speeohes.have an effect upon the subsequent 
disposition of the question? -Did they help to 
produce the delayed response?'
In the 1936 campaign, an evaluation would, then, be
based on whether Ickes* speeches had any effect on the
November vote. How is this to be determined? It would
be foolish to conclude that since Roosevelt won re-
election, Ickes had necessarily been effective in his
eampalgn efforts. Nor is it possible to say that since
Landon was prevented from attaining any great measure
of public confidence, that having been Ickes' special
assignment, this result proved the hatchet-man a
^Thonssen and Baird, 0£. clt. , p. 457.
successful speaker. The cause is too small for the 
effect, and other factors were operative. Indeed, the 
Secretary's diary indicates the belief that Landon cost
Q
himself many votes by his own unimpressive speeches. 0 
An attempt to survey the results in Columbus, Philadel­
phia, Chicago, and other cities where Ickes spoke would 
also prove little or nothing. The analysis of the 
Secretary's effectiveness must be based upon the opinion 
of observers.
Editorial comment, some of it from unfriendly 
sources, suggested that Ickes had been effective in his 
campaign role. The Louisville Hearld Post said, as the 
campaign neared its end, that he had "worn better than 
all other radio speakers" and mentioned his "unfailing 
c h a r m . T h i s  comment appeared in an article which also 
praised Herbert Hoover. The Washington Star of November 
1 9 , speculating upon cabinet changes, was sure that the 
Secretary of the Interior, under fire before the cam­
paign began, would be reappointed because "He did some 
heavy line-plunging for Roosevelt in the campaign. . . . 1 
Probably the most satisfying comment to Ickes, however, 
came from Hearst»s Chlcago-Amerlcan. It said: "In
8ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. ?02.
^Louisville Herald Post. October 26, 1 9 3 6.
10Washlngton Star, November 19, I9 3 6.
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fairness It should be recorded that Harold Ickes proved
1 1an Ace among the New Dealers." This comment probably 
was even more rewarding for that New Deal speaker than 
the post^-electlon oredlt given him for his part in the
vlotory by Frank Kent in his column in the Baltimore
12Sun. Kent had been one of Ickes' persistent critics 
during the oampalgn. Still another indication of ef­
fectiveness came from John Hamilton, Republican Chair­
man. He told Ickes on December 21 that he, Ickes, had 
"hit him harder than anyone elBe during the campaign.
Perhaps the best way to measure Iokes' effective­
ness is to discover the estimate placed on his services 
by the party and the administration which gave him his 
assignment. There is no doubt that he stood very high 
in this respect after the election was over. When he 
offered, as a matter of form, to extend his resignation 
before the second Roosevelt term began, Miss Marguerite 
Le Hand, the President's personal secretary, remarked to 
Thomas Corcoran that "the one man in the Cabinet who had 
nothing to worry about was the first one to talk about
•^Chloago-Amerloan, November 11, 1936.
•^Baltimore Sun, November 12, 1936.
•^Harold L. Ickes, The Inside Struggle, (Vol. II 
Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 3 vols.; New 
York:' Simon and Schuster, 195^ *) > P. 2 1.
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sending in hiB resignation."^ Congressman Maverick 
went so- far in early January as to announce publicly his 
support for Ickes for president in 19*K).^ This was, no 
doubt, exaggerating the Secretary’s political possibili­
ties, but it suggests the favorable attitude held by 
many Democrats toward their Bull-Moose ally in the cam­
paign. Alsop and Klntner have indicated that Ickes 
became muoh closer to the President after the campaign 
was over. In fact, they list him as one of the three 
men in the Administration who were closest to Roosevelt 
after 1936. 16
More pertinent Is the New Deal attitude after 
1936 toward Ickes specifically as a speaker. Had he 
not been regarded as effective in the 1936 campaign, he 
would probably not have been used extensively as a New 
Deal spokesman in future political struggles. The fact 
Is that he was a leading New Deal speaker in the Supreme 
Court fight of 193?, "the anti-monopoly fight in 1937-38, 
and the political "purge" of 1938.^  Then, in 19^0, the
lA<Tbld. , p. 17.
1 5Ibld., p. 29.
■^The three listed are Ickes, Hopkins, and Cor­
coran. Joseph Alsop and Robert Klntner, Men Around the 
President (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc.,
P. 9l.
17lbld., pp. 136-39, 183-85.
President, who according to Hosenman "loved to listen to 
him /Ickes/ lay it on," gave his Secretary of the Inter­
ior the same task he had been given in 1936.‘L® In July 
of 1940, the President told Henry Wallace, vice-presi­
dential nominee, to "see Harold, who will have to be our 
spearhead in this c a m p a i g n . " ^  On August 14, the Presi­
dent assigned to Ickes the radio reply to Wendell
Wlllkle's speech of acceptance, and the political
20hatohet-man was back at work. Nineteen-forty-four was
to find him again attacking, this time with Thomas E.
21Dewey as the Republican target. When asked to comment 
on whether Ickes was effeotlve as a political hatohet-raan 
in 1936, Paul C. Aiken responded with a definite af­
firmative and suggested the Secretary’s continued use in 
that role as eloquent proof.22
Up to this point, only Ickes’ effectiveness as a 
speaker has been considered. No organized attempt has 
been made to evaluate his speaking from an ethical point
•^sanmel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1952/, p. 442.
^Harold L. Ickes, The Lowering Clouds. (Vol. Ill 
of The Seoret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 3 vols.; New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1955). P* 268.
20Ibld., p. 3 0 3.
2^New York Times. February 4, 1952, p. 18. 
^Interview.
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of view, to determine to what extent he recognized and 
demonstrated a sense of responsibility to his audience. 
Gray and -Braden say of the speaker’s social respon­
sibility:
How one uses his ability in speaking, whether 
for the good or ill of society, is essentially a 
matter of the speakers’ own sense of ethical and 
moral values, of his own motives in speaking, of 
the honesty of his own thinking, and of the gen­
uineness of his concern for human welfare.23
As a public official and as a man, "Honest Harold" 
Ickes had an excellent and well-deserved reputation for 
sound ethical values. Interviews with Ickes’ associates 
reveal a deep-rooted conviction of his honesty and in­
tegrity. Others, even some who feuded with the Secre­
tary, have generally acknowledged his honesty. Hugh 
Johnson, who had disagreed bitterly with Ickes upon 
occasion, said that whatever else might be said of him 
"nobody had impugned his integrity.”2^ Rosenman also 
has emphasized this aspect of the Secretary: "Above all
the President felt great comfort and easiness with Ickes 
as Seoretary of the Interior because of his rugged 
honesty and incorruptibility."2^
23Glles Wilkeson Gray and Waldo W. Braden, Public 
Speaking: Prlnclples and Practice (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1951)> P* 19.
^Washington News, December 1, 1936.
25Rosenman, ojo. olt. , p. kk.
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No serious question seems to arise about the 
genuineness of Ickes’ "concern for human welfare." He 
was a progressive by conviction and supported many 
losing and hopeless causes for that conviction. As 
noted in Chapter III, he was regarded as a champion of 
minority groups and their rights. Ickes' foes often 
questioned his methods, but seldom the sincerity of his 
political beliefs. Nor were the Secretary's general 
motives for speaking a matter for serious question.
There is every indication that he sincerely believed 
the country would be better served by the re-election 
of Roosevelt than by the election of Landon. After 
listening to Roosevelt's acceptance speech, for example, 
he made this comment in his diary:
I came away from the meeting feeling that, as 
matters stand, I would have no option except to 
support the President, no matter what my personal 
differences might be with him over policies af­
fecting ray department. I simply would have no 
other choice in view of what I have believed in 
and stood for all my llfe.2°
He later entered comment about Landon which would 
Indicate the sincerity of his expressed fears of the 
Kansan as President. After describing him as "mediocre" 
and likening him to Harding, Ickes wrote:
As I say, someone will run him, and if it isn't 
the big interests I will be very much surprised.
26lckes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 626.
An honest and scrupulous man in the oil business 
Is so rare as to rank as a museum piece. And 
Landon has been In oil all his life.27
The serious question about the ethics of Ickes 
arises In regard to the degree of Intellectual honesty- 
reflected In his speech techniques. It has been demon- 
strated that his appeals were primarily emotional rather 
than logical. Emotional appeals are certainly not of 
themselves reprehensible, but they should be accompanied 
by sound reasoning and evidence. As Gray and Braden 
put It: " . . .  you /the speaker/ will Inevitably appeal
to motives, which are closely related to the emotions. 
But when you do, put those appeals on a national basis.
O Q
Back up your emotional appeal by sound reasoning.
Ickes* psychological techniques, especially those of 
"name-calling" and "transfer," were often not backed 
up by sound reasoning or evidence. It has been noted, 
too, that some of his arguments placed suoh an extremely 
partisan Interpretation on events and motives that they 
tended to distort the truth. An analysis of the Secre­
tary's persuasive techniques suggests that his partisan 
nature led him into excesses as a political speaker 
which, despite his basic integrity, did not demonstrate
27ibld., p. 646.
2®Gray and Braden, 0£. clt. , p. 14.
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a keen awareness of the ethical responsibility of the 
speaker to hlB society.
Harold L. Ickes will not be recorded as a great 
American orator. His most noted speeches were directed 
toward an Immediate political goal and were neither 
timeless nor elevated in theme. He was an intensely 
partisan political speaker; his speeches will not 
endure as models of selfless statesmanship. Viewed, 
however, in terms of performance in an unusual and 
demanding campaign role, Ickes was an effective politi­
cal speaker. He was, in 1936, the New Deal's hatohet- 
man, and he performed his task with apparent success.
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